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The Eleventh Amendment has long been regarded as an embarrassment to
the United States's aspiration to be a government of laws and not of men. 1
This rule-of-law ideal has rightly been said to entail the existence of judicial
remedies for the violation of legal rights, 2 and, relatedly, judicial power that
is coextensive with legislative power. 3 While the Constitution itself imposes
numerous legal obligations on the states4 and gives Congress the power to
impose additional obligations,5 the Eleventh Amendment by its terms prevents
the federal courts from entertaining suits against the states brought by citizens
of other states or of foreign states.6 Although scholars have argued that the
Amendment can be read in such a way as not to withdraw federal jurisdiction
over cases arising under federal law/ the Supreme Court in Hans v.
1. See, e.g., John Norton Pomeroy, The Supreme Court and State Repudiation-The Virginia and
Louisiana Cases, 17 AM. L. REv. 684, 684-85 (1883) (criticizing "national disgrace" resulting from
Eleventh Amendment decisions that would prevent enforcement of legal rights against states); see also
Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE
L.J. I. 3-4 (1988) (arguing that Eleventh Amendment is "in tension with" rule-of-law maxims described
below).
2. Chief Justice Marshall put it most famously in Marbury v. Madison: ''The government of the United
States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease to
deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right." 5 U.S.
(5 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
3. As Alexander Hamilton explained: "If there are such things as political axioms, the propriety of the
judicial power of a government being coextensive with its legislative may be ranked among the number."
THE F'EDERAUST No. 80, at 476 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). In Osborn v. Bank of
the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), Chief Justice Marshall wrote for the Court that judicial
and legislative powers of "every well-constructed government" must be "co-extensive with each other," id.
at 818, and that "[a]ll governments which are not extremely defective in their organization, must possess,
within themselves, the means of expounding, as well as enforcing, their own laws," id. at 818-19.
4. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
5. For example, see New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), discussed infra Section I.C.
6. The Eleventh Amendment provides, in its entirety, that "[t]he Judicial Power of the United States
shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST.
amend. XI. The Court has made it clear that it views the Eleventh Amendment as in some way having
given constitutional force, or at least recognition, to a preexisting immunity of the states. For this reason
my reference in this Article's title to "Eleventh Amendment immunity" may be misleading. It would
perhaps be more accurate to refer to an immunity having its source in "postulates" lying behind the
Eleventh Amendment and reaffirmed and given constitutional force by it. See Monaco v. Mississippi, 292
U.S. 313, 322 (1934); see also Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921) (''That a state may not be
sued without its consent is a fundamental rule of jurisprudence ... of which the [Eleventh] Amendment
is but an exemplification."). Nevertheless, I shall refer to this immunity as "Eleventh Amendment
immunity" for purposes of brevity--and with some justification, as it is this provision of the Constitution
that is thought to reflect the immunity's constitutional status. Also for the sake of brevity, and at the cost
of some precision (though, I hope, no confusion), I shall refer to the immunity "conferred" on the states
by the Eleventh Amendment, as opposed to the immunity of states "recognized and given constitutional
status" by that Amendment.
7. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1466-92 (1987);
William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an
Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033
(1983) [hereinafter Fletcher, Historical Interpretation]; John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State
Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1889 (1983); Jackson, supra note 1. But cf.
William P. Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment: A Critical Evaluation, I 02 HARV.
L. REv. 1372 (1989) (disagreeing with diversity thesis). For a reply to Marshall and other critics, see
Correspondence, Exchange on the Eleventh Amendment, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 117 (1990) (continuing debate
over varying interpretations); and William A. Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh
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Louisiana8 held that it did apply to such cases. Indeed, the Court went further
and interpreted the Amendment to protect states from being sued even by their
own citizens,9 though the Amendment does not so provide. In subsequent
cases, the Court has held that the Amendment also protects states from suits
brought by foreign states 10 and Indian tribes, 11 even though neither category
of plaintiff is mentioned in the Amendment. As so construed, the Amendment
is in substantial tension with the rule-of-law axiom that for every federal right
there must be a remedy enforceable in the federal court: Individuals, foreign
states, and Indian tribes cannot enforce their federal rights in federal court suits
against the states. 12
Over the years, the Court has found ways of avoiding some of the rule-oflaw problems posed by the Eleventh Amendment. The most important
ameliorative doctrine is the one that we today associate most closely with Ex
parte Young, 13 although its roots stretch back to the Founding period. As the
Court reads it today, Ex parte Young establishes that a state official does not
enjoy immunity under the Eleventh Amendment from suits seeking the
prospective enforcement of federal law. 14 This doctrine greatly alleviates the
rule-of-law problems posed by the Amendment, as it enables individuals to
obtain a federal court order requiring state officials to conform their future
conduct with federal law. Ex parte Young thus means that the Eleventh
Amendment inhibits only retrospective relief for a state's past violations of
federal law, 15 but its narrowing of the sphere of the Amendment's practical
operation does not dispose of the rule-of-law problems created by the Eleventh
Amendment. The rule-of-law ideal insists that federal courts have the power
not just to stop ongoing violations of federal law, but also to remedy at least
the most egregious past violations as well. 16
Amendment: A Reply to Critics, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1261 (1989) [hereinafter Fletcher, Diversity
Explanation].
8. 134 U.S. I (1890).
9. See id. at 15.
10. See Monaco, 292 U.S. at 330.
II. See Blatchford v. Native Village ofNoatack, 501 U.S. 775,779-82 (1991).
12. In the interest of brevity, I shall henceforth refer only to suits by, or liability to, individuals, with
the understanding that what I say applies equally to foreign states and Indian tribes.
13. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). As discussed below, this doctrine actually has its roots in much earlier
decisions and its rationale extends to suits for damages as well.
14. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984). But cf infra note 15
(suggesting that Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996), may signal change in Court's
interpretation of Ex parte Young).
15. As Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. 1114, shows, the Eleventh Amendment does protect states from
being sued eo nomine, even if only prospective relief is sought. But, unless Seminole Tribe signals a major
alteration of Ex parte Young doctrine, see Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, the Eleventh Amendment and
the Evisceration of Ex Parte Young: "The Double Progeny of the Same Evil Birth", 71 N.Y.U. L. REv.
(forthcoming 1997), prospective injunctive relief against officials who violate federal law is not barred by
the Eleventh Amendment, at least as long as Congress has not foreclosed it. See infra text accompanying
notes 106-09.
16. Akhil Amar defends a strong version of this point, apparently insisting that for every violation of
law the legal system must provide for "full remedies." See Amar, supra note 7, at 1489. Richard Fallon
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In its 1989 decision in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 17 the Court
interpreted the Eleventh Amendment in ~ way that virtually closed the
remaining remedial gap, at least with respect to federal statutory rights. A
majority of the Court in that case held that the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity could be abrogated by Congress pursuant to the Interstate Commerce
Clause, 18 a decision that was widely understood to establish that Congress
could do so under any of its legislative powers. 19 Under this regime, Congress
could give individuals the power to sue states in federal court to enforce their
federal rights. With respect to statutory rights at least,20 this congressional
power largely obviated the rule-of-law problems posed by the Eleventh
Amendment?' But the Supreme Court overruled Union Gas last term in
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 22 and held that Congress may not abrogate the
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity when legislating under pre-Eleventh
Amendment constitutional powers, such as the Commerce Clause.Z3 Although

and Daniel Meltzer defend a weaker version calling for a system of remedies that on the whole keeps
government tolerably within the law. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, New Law, NonRetroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1731, 1736 (1991) ("The first principle,
which is strong but not always unyielding, calls for effective redress to individual victims of constitutional
violations. The second, more absolute principle demands a general structure of constitutional remedies
adequate to keep government within the bounds of law.").
17. 491 U.S. I (1989).
18. See id. at 23.
19. See Daniel J. Cloheny, Exclusive Jurisdiction and the Eleventh Amendment: Recognizing the
Assumption of State Court Availability in the Clear Statement Compromise, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1287, 1306-07
(1994). This is how all of the Justices in Seminole Tribe interpreted Union Gas. See Seminole Tribe, 116
S. Ct. at 1126-27; id. at 1133-34 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 1184 (Souter, J., dissenting).
20. With respect to constitutional rights, a remedy against the states that depends on affirmative
congressional action is not entirely satisfying, as many of the constitutional obligations of the states are
countermajoritarian in nature and the Congress is, in theory at least, responsive to the preferences of
electoral majorities. For this reason, the Union Gas decision did not entirely solve the "right without a
remedy" problem. On this issue, see infra Parts V and VI.
21. By retaining a strong presumption that a congressionally imposed obligation of a state does not
necessarily carry with it a private right of action for damages against the state, the Union Gas regime did
continue to pose a son of rule-of-law problem, for the possibility remained that a federal statute clearly
imposing obligations on states towards individuals would be construed not to provide for retrospective relief
in favor of such individuals. I am sympathetic to the view that a legal right unaccompanied by a
retrospective remedy is problematic from a rule-of-law perspective. On this problem, see Jackson, supra
note 15. This problem exists, however, whenever Congress creates a legal obligation towards individuals
but denies such individuals a private right of action for damages, and no one disputes that Congress has
the power to do this. This issue is discussed infra Part V. These rule-of-law considerations would cenainly
justify a presumption in favor of private retrospective remedies against states whenever Congress has
imposed on them an obligation towards individuals. At any rate, the rule-of-law problems that existed under
the Union Gas regime were clearly of far less significance with respect to statutes than under the Seminole
Tribe regime, as Congress by speaking clearly could attach a retrospective remedy to its statutes when it
wanted them enforced vigorously and regarded a private retrospective remedy as necessary for this purpose.
If Congress did not regard such a remedy to be necessary to give efficacy to the states' obligation, then
the absence of such remedies does not pose much of a rule-of-law problem. The rule-of-law problems that
admittedly arise when Congress enacts a statute but does not provide an effective remedy because it does
not want the statute vigorously enforced are comparatively low in the hierarchy of rule-of-law concerns,
and in any event they are problems we have to live with, since many Supreme Coun decisions clearly
accept that Congress has such a power.
22. 116 S. Ct. lll4.
23. See id. at 1131.
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the Seminole Tribe Court reaffirmed its decision in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer4 that
Congress has the power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment, 25 Seminole Tribe resurrects the rule-of-law
problems the Eleventh Amendment poses with respect to federal laws having
their source in "antecedent" constitutional provisions.
This Article focuses on a recent series of cases that has received far less
notice than Union Gas and promises a somewhat different escape from the
rule-of-law problems posed by the Eleventh Amendment. Perhaps until now
these cases warranted less attention than Union Gas because Union Gas had
already largely taken care of, or at least submerged, the rule-of-law problems
posed by the Eleventh Amendment. If so, the reversal of Union Gas should
raise significantly the doctrinal and theoretical profile of these cases. At the
same time, however, Seminole Tribe includes hints that this second escape
from the rule-of-law problems posed by the Eleventh Amendment may not
long survive.
The first and most important of these cases is McKesson Corp. v.
Department of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco. 26 The Court in that case held
unanimously that: (1) the Due Process Clause sometimes requires the states to
make available to individuals a monetary remedy in their own courts; and (2)
the Eleventh Amendment does not bar Supreme Court review of a state court
judgment refusing to provide the remedy. Although neither of these holdings
was itself novel, 27 McKesson's juxtaposition of the two illuminated an
alternative escape from the rule-of-law problems posed by the Eleventh
Amendment. 28 McKesson seemed to establish that the Amendment does not
preclude remedies for state violations of federal rights or foreclose the exercise
of federal judicial power to enforce such remedies, but merely defers the
involvement of the federal judiciary in enforcing federal liabilities of the states
24. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
25. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,§ 5. Section 5 of the Amendment gives Congress the "power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of' the other sections of the Amendment.
26. 496 U.S. 18 (1990).
27. The due process holding was foreshadowed in Ward v. Board of County Commissioners, 253 U.S.
17 (1920). The idea that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court is usually traced to Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821), but Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion in that case does not clearly so hold. See Jackson, supra note I, at 19-25, 32. Vicki
Jackson has argued, however, that post-Cohens, pre-McKesson decisions of the Supreme Court clearly
establish that Eleventh Amendment immunity does not apply to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction.
See id. at 25-32. For a discussion of these cases, see infra Subsection ill.A.l.
28. This understanding of the Eleventh Amendment had been defended at some length by Vicki
Jackson two years earlier. See Jackson, supra note 1, at 73-75. Other commentators who espoused the
forum-allocation view before McKesson include Nicole A. Gordon & Douglas Gross, Justiciability of
Federal Claims in State Court, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1145, 1146-47 (1984); Louis E. Wolcher,
Sovereign Immunity and the Supremacy Clause: Damages Against States in Their Own Courts for
Constitutional Violations, 69 CAL. L. REV. 189 (1981); and William L. Taylor, Note, Section 1983 in State
Coun: A Remedy for Unconstitutional State Taxation, 95 YALE L.J. 414, 417-18 (1985). Commentators
taking the forum-allocation position since McKesson include Cloherty, supra note 19. See also infra note
34 (citing additional scholars who have embraced forum-allocation interpretation). But cf infra note 198
(citing scholars who have expressed skepticism about forum-allocation view).
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until the state courts have had a chance to afford the required relief. The
following year, in Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways Commission, 29
the Court held that the Federal Employers' Liability Act subjects states to
monetary liability to individuals, even though the Eleventh Amendment bars
such individuals from recovering damages against the states in federal court.
The Court said that "the Supremacy Clause makes that statute the law in every
State, fully enforceable in state court."3 Finally, in Reich v. Collins, 31 the
Court reaffirmed McKesson's due process holding, unanimously, and added
that while the Eleventh Amendment bars individuals from seeking the
constitutionally required remedy against the states in the lower federal courts,
the states are not free to deny the remedy in their own courts. 32
These three decisions reflect a view of the Eleventh Amendment as purely
a forum-allocation principle. As construed in these cases, the Amendment has
no bearing on Congress's power to regulate the states and subject the states to
damage liability to individuals for violating such regulation. If the Constitution
or a federal statute imposes such liability on the states, then the Supremacy
Clause requires the states to award such damages in their own courts. If state
courts decline to do so, the U.S. Supreme Court may review their decisions.
The Amendment, on this view, limits only the original jurisdiction of the
federal courts. Its function is merely to place the initial responsibility of
adjudicating claims against the states on the state courts, whose compliance
with the federal obligation to pay damages to individuals can be monitored by
the Supreme Court on appeal. Indeed, the McKesson/Hilton/Reich
understanding of the Eleventh Amendment may even permit Congress to
authorize review by the lower federal courts of state court decisions rendered
in suits against the states based on federal law?3 If so understood, the
Eleventh Amendment is far from the embarrassment to the United States's
rule-of-law aspirations that its detractors describe it to be. It is at worst a
nuisance to federal rightholders, postponing but not barring federal judicial
enforcement of federal laws making states liable in damages to individuals.
Many scholars had concluded after this trio of cases that the Supreme
Court had definitively embraced the forum-allocation interpretation of the
Eleventh Amendment, 34 but now it appears that the solution these cases

°

29. 502 u.s. 197 (1991).
30. /d. at 207.
31. 115 S. Ct. 547 (1994).
32. See id. at 549.
33. Whether it does or not depends on whether the Eleventh Amendment was found inapplicable in
McKesson because what was at issue was appellate jurisdiction, or because what was at issue was the
Supreme Coun's exercise of appellate jurisdiction. To the extent that the McKesson Coun was relying on
Cohens v. Virginia's holding that a writ of error is not a "suit" for Eleventh Amendment purposes, see
McKesson Corp. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18,26-27 (1990), it would
appear that its holding has to have been that the Eleventh Amendment is inapplicable to federal appeals
from the state couns, see id., whether the appeal goes to the Supreme Coun or some other federal coun.
34. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 385-86 (2d ed. 1994). Indeed, Henry
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appeared to bring to the rule-of-law problems posed by Hans may not survive
Seminole Tribe. There are indications in that opinion that the Court does not
regard the Eleventh Amendment as a mere forum-allocation principle. Most
significantly, the Court indicated that the Supreme Court "is empowered to
review a question of federal law arising from a state court decision where a
state has consented to suit."35 This suggests that a state may avoid the
exercise of federal judicial power simply by refusing to consent to a suit
against it in its own courts. If so, then the rule-of-law problems discussed
above reemerge. This and other statements in Seminole Tribe reflect an
understanding of Eleventh Amendment immunity sharply at odds with the
McKesson line of cases. They suggest that the Court regards the Eleventh
Amendment as conferring on states an immunity from retrospective liability
to individuals for their violations of federal law. They suggest, in other words,
that the Court understands the Eleventh Amendment to establish that nothing
in the Constitution requires or authorizes the courts (or gives Congress the
power to require the courts) to award damages against states for the violation
of their federal obligations to individuals. States are free to award such
damages if they wish, but they are not required to do so by federal law.
Whether the Eleventh Amendment precludes Congress from subjecting
states to damage liability to individuals, or merely requires that any liability
Congress chooses to impose be pursued initially in state courts is, of course,
of enormous significance. To be sure, Congress would retain the power in
either case to impose obligations on the states under Article I, such as the
obligation not to infringe copyrights or patents. Under Ex parte Young, those
obligations would be enforceable prospectively against state officials even if
private damage actions were unavailable in either state or federal court. The
question is whether, after Seminole Tribe, Congress's arsenal of potential
enforcement mechanisms to give efficacy to the obligations it imposes on the
states includes private damage actions. In other words, may Congress confer
on individuals a right to damages from states that infringe their patents or

Monaghan is so convinced that these cases established the forum-allocation view that he recently dismissed
the contrary suggestions in Seminole Tribe as "plainly wrong." Henry Paul Monaghan, Comment, The
Sovereign Immunity "Exception", 110 HARV. L. REv. 102, 125 n.l61 (1996). For the reasons discussed
in Parts III and IV, I would not be so sure that the suggestion was wrong, even if the test of the "rightness"
of a Supreme Court decision were its conformity with prior Supreme Court decisions.
State courts themselves have never been persuaded that they are obligated under the Supremacy
Clause to entertain federal claims that cannot be maintained in federal court because of the Eleventh
Amendment. See, e.g., Weppler v. School Bd., 311 So. 2d 409 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Board of
Comm'rs v. Splendour Shipping & Enters., 255 So. 2d 869 (La. Ct. App. 1972); Widgeon v. Eastern Shore
Hosp. Ctr., 479 A.2d 921 (Md. 1984); Morris v. Massachusetts Maritime Academy, 565 N.E.2d 422 (Mass.
1991); Maloney v. New York, 144 N.E.2d 364 (N.Y. 1957); Mossman v. Donahey, 346 N.E.2d 305 (Ohio
1976); Lyons v. Texas A&M Univ., 545 S.W.2d 56 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Gross v.
Washington State Ferries, 367 P.2d 600 (Wash. 1961). But see Clover Bottom Hosp. & Sch. v. Townsend,
513 S.W.2d 505 (Tenn. 1974) (acknowledging obligation).
35. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1131 n.l4 (1996) (citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S.
(6 Wheat.) 264 (1821)) (emphasis added).
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copyrights-a right enforceable initially only in state courts, but subject to
federal court review? 36 Or does the Eleventh Amendment immunize the states
from any such liability?
This Article examines this basic contradiction between McKesson and
Seminole Tribe concerning the nature of Eleventh Amendment immunity and
considers how the two cases might be reconciled. Part I defines more precisely
the two competing interpretations of the Eleventh Amendment, which I call
the "forum-allocation" interpretation and the "immunity-from-liability"
interpretation, and explains the relationship between both interpretations and
Congress's power to impose obligations on the states, a subject that has been
addressed by the Court under the rubric of the Tenth Amendment rather than
the Eleventh. Part II reviews the support in the pre-Seminole Tribe decisions
of the Supreme Court for the forum-allocation interpretation. Part ill describes
the Seminole Tribe case and examines the statements in the Court's opinion
that are difficult to square with the forum-allocation interpretation. Part ill then
reviews the pre-Seminole Tribe support for the immunity-from-liability
interpretation and concludes that, to the extent that the Seminole Tribe decision
supports it, it is part of a long line of Supreme Court authority that conflicts
with the forum-allocation interpretation.
Part IV considers another problem created by the Seminole Tribe holding,
a problem that appears at first to take us far afield of this Article's main
concerns, but that on closer inspection turns out to be quite pertinent. The
Seminole Tribe Court held that Eleventh Amendment immunity cannot be
abrogated by Congress pursuant to its Article I powers, but can be abrogated
pursuant to its power to "enforce" the Fourteenth Amendment. 37 The
Fourteenth Amendment includes a clause that prohibits the states from
depriving people of liberty or property without due process of law. It is well
established that legislatures may create "property" rights for purposes of this
clause by placing mandatory obligations on states vis-a-vis individuals. This
suggests an easy way for Congress to evade the Court's holding in Seminole
Tribe: Impose mandatory obligations on states pursuant to Article I, thus
giving individuals a "property" interest, and then abrogate the state.'s Eleventh
Amendment immunity to "enforce" the states' due process obligations with
respect to this newly created property. Indeed, Congress has already attempted
to abrogate the states' immunity using just this theory. 38 Of course,
recognizing Congress's power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity in
this fashion threatens to eviscerate Seminole Tribe's holding that Congress may
not abrogate under Article I. I call this the abrogation reductio.
36. Under the current statutory scheme, the federal courts possess exclusive jurisdiction over claims
under these statutes. See infra Section III.A.
37. See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1127-28.
38. It has invoked this theory in justifying its abrogation of the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity
from damage liability in patent and trademark cases. See infra notes 278-82 and accompanying text.
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My search for an escape from the reductio in Part IV requires an
examination of doctrine in a number of related areas, including the scope of
Congress's power to "enforce" the Fourteenth Amendment under Section 5 of
that Amendment. The most promising escape from the reductio relies on
McKesson, in conjunction with related procedural due process cases.
Examining McKesson's bearing on the abrogation reductio offers several
insights into the nature of Eleventh Amendment immunity. It shows, first, that
the conflict between McKesson and the immunity-from-liability interpretation
of the Eleventh Amendment is deeper than it at first appeared. Rather than
being an example of one instance in which the Constitution requires a remedy
against states, McKesson appears to stand for the proposition that whenever
federal law places a mandatory obligation on the states vis-a-vis individuals,
the Due Process Clause itself requires a damage remedy if the state violates
the obligation without offering a predeprivation hearing and no other remedy
would cure the injury. Although McKesson and related due process cases do
supply a rationale for escaping the abrogation reductio--a rationale consistent
only with the forum-allocation interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment-analyzing McKesson's implications exposes vulnerabilities of the
conventional reading of that case that ultimately lead to its unraveling.
Specifically, the analysis places McKesson in conflict with decisions
recognizing Congress's power to place mandatory obligations on states vis-avis individuals without granting individuals a damage remedy.
To avoid this conflict, and to reconcile McKesson with doctrine in other
areas as well, I propose in Part V a reinterpretation of McKesson that would
save what I regard as its most important insight, its recognition of the
importance of retrospective relief for the violation of constitutional rights. The
proposed reinterpretation would read the case to establish a constitutional right
to damages from state officials responsible for violating the Constitution, rather
than from the states themselves, a right of action having its source in the
Supremacy Clause, rather than the Due Process Clause. This reinterpretation
of McKesson does not require rejecting the forum-allocation interpretation of
the Eleventh Amendment, but it does make possible a reading of McKesson
that would reconcile it with Seminole Tribe's suggestion that a state's
"consent" to suit in its own courts is a condition of the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction to review state court decisions against states. It thus removes
McKesson and Reich from the ranks of the cases supporting the forumallocation interpretation and leaves that interpretation on considerably weaker
ground.
Part VI explores the options that remain open to Congress under the
immunity-from-liability interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment to give
efficacy to the obligations it validly imposes on the states, and it examines
more generally the rule-of-law ramifications of adopting that interpretation. I
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conclude that as long as McKesson and other cases are understood to recognize
a constitutional right of individuals to damages from state officials who have
willfully violated their constitutional rights, 39 and as long as Congress retains
the power to make such officials personally liable in damages for violating
obligations that Congress has validly imposed on the states, 40 the rule-of-law
problems with an immunity-from-liability interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment are not severe. Indeed, it is not at all clear that the forumallocation interpretation is superior to the immunity-from-liability interpretation
from a rule-of-law perspective. The availability of damages from state officials
appears to satisfy tolerably well the demand for effective sanctions for
government violations of law. The immunity-from-liability interpretation
appears to come out ahead, however, when other rule-of-law values are taken
into account, values such.as respect for precedent and the coherence in law.
Among the most pertinent demands of the rule of law is its demand that the
law be settled and clear. It is this test that the Court's current Eleventh
Amendment jurisprudence clearly fails. In the end, which of the two
interpretations of the Amendment the Court adopts is less important from a
rule-of-law perspective than that it clearly and definitively adopt one position
and permit the rest of us to arrange our affairs accordingly.
I.

THE

COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS OF 1HE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT

In this Part, I examine the varying ways in which the Eleventh
Amendment may be interpreted and the implications of each interpretation. In
Section A, I trace the history of the "diversity interpretation" of the
Amendment. I explore the Supreme Court's initial rejection of this
interpretation, the withering scholarly attacks that culminated in the Court's
eventual adoption of what might be regarded as a version of the diversity
interpretation in Union Gas, and the Court's recent change of heart in Seminole
Tribe. As I will explain below, adopting the diversity interpretation would
render largely moot the issues I develop in this Article. Because the Court
rejected this interpretation in Seminole Tribe, Section B describes the central
features of the forum-allocation and immunity-from-liability interpretations. In
Section C, I explain the relationship between both interpretations and the
Court's approaches in recent years to questions of congressional powers to
impose primary obligations on the states under Article I. I here examine the
complex relationship between the Court's Tenth Amendment jurisprudence and
the competing interpretations of the Eleventh Amendment on which this Article
focuses.

39. See infra Part V.
40. See infra notes 448-58 and accompanying text.
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A. The Rise and Fall of the Diversity Interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment

For a number of years now, the Supreme Court's approach to the Eleventh
Amendment has been the subject of great controversy and intense scrutiny.
With rare unanimity, scholars have argued that the Supreme Court's early
decision in Hans v. Louisiana41 was fundamentally mistaken and should be
reversed. 42 In Hans, the Court held that even though the Eleventh
Amendment applies by its terms only to suits against states by citizens of other
states or foreign states, the Amendment protects states from being sued in
federal court by its own citizens, even in cases arising under federallaw. 43
The Court reasoned that the Amendment was adopted to overrule the Supreme
Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia,44 in which the Court had held that
the states had given up their sovereign immunity when they adopted a
Constitution that under Article III subjected them to the federal judicial power
in, inter alia, cases between a state and citizens of another state. The Eleventh
Amendment, the Hans Court held, served to restore and constitutionalize the
original understanding that states would be immune from being sued by private
individuals. Since then, the Court has elaborated a complex jurisprudence of
state sovereign immunity under the rubric of the Eleventh Amendment, but one
that bears little relation to the Amendment's text. In particular, the Court has
held that the Amendment shields states from suits by foreign states45 and
Indian tribes,46 even though neither category of plaintiff is mentioned in the
Amendment, and that it applies to suits in admiralty,47 even though the
Amendment refers only to suits at law and in equity. By contrast, the Court
has held that the Amendment does not apply to suits brought by the United
States48 or by sister states,49 to nonfederal actions brought by individuals in
the state courts,50 to suits against state officials seeking prospective relief

41. 134 u.s. l (1890).
42. See Jackson, supra note l, at 4-5. Scholars critical of Hans include, in addition to those cited
supra note 7, CLYDE E. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTII AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY (1972); JOHN
V. 0RTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN
HISTORY (1987); David E. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44
U. COLO. L. REV. l (1972); and Suzanna Sherry, The Eleventh Amendment and Stare Decisis: Overruling
Hans v. Louisiana, 57 U. CHI. L. REv. 1260 (1990). Even scholars who are critical of "revisionist"
Eleventh Amendment scholarship are critical of Hans. See Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of
the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1342, 1343 (1989).
43. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 15.
44. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
45. See Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 330 (1934).
46. See Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatack, 501 U.S. 775, 779-82 (1991).
47. See Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921).
48. See United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128 136-38 (1965); United States v. Texas, 143 U.S.
621, 643-46 (1892).
49. See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 83 (1907).
50. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 418-21 (1979).

1997]

Eleventh Amendment Immunity

1695

from violations of federallaw, 51 or to suits seeking damages from individual
defendants who hold public office.52
Scholars have objected most strenuously to the Court's conclusion in Hans
that the Eleventh Amendment grants states constitutional immunity from suits
arising under federal law. While recognizing that sovereign states at the time
of the Constitution's framing were thought to possess immunity from private
lawsuits, revisionist scholars53 have denied that either Article lli or the
Eleventh Amendment was intended to make that immunity applicable to cases
arising under "supreme" federal law.54 The Court has held that the
Constitution itself places certain legal obligations on states vis-a-vis individuals
and empowers Congress to impose additional obligations. 55 To recognize state
immunity from federal jurisdiction in cases arising under federal law would be
to place awkward, and possibly severe, obstacles in the way of the enforcement
of the obligations towards individuals that the Constitution plainly placed on
the states. If the Amendment's Framers had intended to leave such a gap in the
federal government's power to enforce the legal obligations it has the power
to impose, they certainly could have chosen clearer language to do so.
Much of the revisionist scholarship on the Eleventh Amendment appears
to have been driven by profound discomfort with this enforcement gap created
by the Hans interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. 56 I too find such a
gap to be constitutionally problematic. As explained below, however, I am
satisfied that the "fictions" that the Court has used to alleviate the problems
created by Hans reduce the gap to manageable proportions, even if the
immunity conferred by the Eleventh Amendment is thought to operate at the
level of remedy. I discuss below the opportunities that remain available to
Congress and the courts to "manage" this gap, but first I shall discuss the
solution proposed by the diversity theorists. This solution would have entirely
bridged the gap, and it would have done so in a way that would render largely
moot the question that is the focus of this Article. The Supreme Court flirted
51. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 150-54 (1908).
52. See, e.g., Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 237-38 (1974).
53. The term is not mine. See George D. Brown, Has the Supreme Court Confessed Error on the
Eleventh Amendment? Revisionist Scholarship and State Immunity, 68 N.C. L. REv. 867, 871-75 (1990).
54. This is the thrust of the "diversity" explanation of the Eleventh Amendment. See infra text
accompanying notes 63-64.
55. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 160 (1992) (affirming Congress's power to
make applicable to states "generally applicable" laws imposing obligations towards individuals); Fletcher
v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135-39 (1810) (finding that Contracts Clause prohibits states from
impairing their own contracts with individuals).
56. Depending on whether one views the immunity as a forum-allocation principle or an immunity
from damage liability (an issue to which revisionist scholars have not devoted much attention), the
Amendment will be viewed as doing one of two very different things. If the immunity is from liability, the
Amendment prevents Congress from subjecting states that violate their obligations to individuals to damage
liability to such individuals, thus creating a gap between primary obligations and secondary, or remedial,
obligations. If the immunity is jurisdictional, however, then the Amendment permits Congress to impose
such liability but prevents the federal courts from enforcing it, thus creating a gap between secondary
obligation and federal judicial power.
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briefly with this approach, but then gave renewed significance to this question
by abandoning the approach in Seminole Tribe.
Most scholars agree with the Hans Court's premise that the Amendment's
purpose was to reverse Chisholm. Revisionist scholars, however, disagree with
the Hans Court about which feature of Chisholm the Eleventh Amendment was
intended to reverse. Some stress that the principal flaw of the Chisholm
decision, the one the Framers of the Eleventh Amendment sought to correct,
was the one that caused Justice Iredell to dissent. In particular, Congress had
not specifically withdrawn the states' immunity from private lawsuits, and
Justice Iredell argued that Article III should not be construed as itself an
abrogation of the states' common law sovereign immunity.57 On this view,
the Eleventh Amendment does not give constitutional status to the states'
sovereign immunity; it merely reversed Chisholm's holding that the
Constitution itself did away with this immunity. Adherents to this view accept
that state sovereign immunity remains as a common law immunity, but they
maintain that, as such, it is subject to plenary abrogation by Congress.58
Other scholars stress that Chisholm was an action in assumpsit involving
an ordinary commercial dispute between an individual and a state. They argue
that the Eleventh Amendment merely reversed the Chisholm Court's holding
that the states could be sued in federal court by individuals on nonfederal
causes of action. 59 This interpretation makes some sense in light of the
Amendment's reference to suits brought by citizens of other states or foreign
states, but not suits brought by the states' own citizens.60 Since the latter
cases can be brought in federal court only if the action is based on federal
law,61 the Amendment could be read simply to withdraw two of the
57. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 435-37 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting).
58. See Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines:
Congressional Imposition of Suit upon the States, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1203, 1261-62 (1978) [hereinafter
Field, Congressional Imposition]; Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity
Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515,54045 (1978); John E. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional
Power to Create Causes of Action Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and
Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1441-45 (1975); Laurence H. Tribe, Intergovernmental
Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Issues in Controversies About
Federalism, 89 HAR.v. L. REV. 682, 693-96 (1976).
59. See Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 428.
60. Article ill extends the judicial power of the United States to, inter alia, "Cases ... arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority," and "Controversies ... between a State and Citizens of another State ... and between a State,
or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects." U.S. CONST. art. ill, § 2. The Eleventh
Amendment provides, in its entirety: "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens
of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." /d. amend. XI. The diversity
interpretation holds that the Amendment merely repealed the state-citizen and state-alien diversity
provisions insofar as they gave the federal courts jurisdiction over suits against the states.
61. Here I include admiralty, which is today regarded as federal law. See Moragne v. States Marine
Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 388-93 (1970). But cf Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S.
354, 359--80 (1959) (holding that general federal question statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994), does not confer
jurisdiction over admiralty cases). I am also using "based upon" broadly to accommodate Congress's power
(if any) to confer "protective" jurisdiction. See generally Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the
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"diversity" bases of federal jurisdiction over suits against states, leaving
untouched the federal judicial power over cases "arising under" federallaw. 62
This construction neatly solved the problem that the Hans interpretation posed
for the effective enforcement of the federal obligations of the states, for under
this interpretation, the Eleventh Amendment does not reach cases arising under
federal law.
By the late 1980s, these strands of revisionist Eleventh Amendment
scholarship coalesced into what became known as the "diversity"
interpretation.63 Although they differ on some details, diversity scholars agree
that the Amendment should not be understood to bar Congress from conferring
jurisdiction on the federal courts over cases arising under federal law but
should instead be read to preclude only federal jurisdiction over suits against
states predicated solely on diversity. 64 Most of them also agree that state
sovereign immunity could continue to play a role as a subconstitutional
doctrine tied loosely or not at all to the Eleventh Amendment, but they all
insist that Congress has plenary power to abrogate any such immunity pursuant
to any of its legislative powers.
The question that is the focus of this Article-is Eleventh Amendment
immunity just a forum-allocation principle or does it also create an immunity
from federal liability?-would of course not even arise for a scholar who did
not regard the Eleventh Amendment to be applicable at all to suits arising
under federal law. If the scholar accepted the existence of state sovereign
immunity but regarded it merely as a matter of common law, the question
whether this subconstitutional immunity is merely an immunity from original
federal jurisdiction or also an immunity from federal liability would be a
relatively unimportant one, for in either case the "immunity" could be
withdrawn by Congress. Indeed, it seems awkward to call it an "immunity" at
all if Congress has the power to withdraw it. Such an "immunity" would
operate merely as a presumption that generally applicable laws have not been
District Courts, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 157 (1953).
62. See Fletcher, Historical Interpretation, supra note 7, at 1033; Gibbons, supra note 7, at 1889.
63. In addition to the articles cited above, see Amar, supra note 7, at 1425; and Jackson, supra note
1. A minority of scholars has rejected aspects of the interpretation. See Marshall, supra note 42; Marshall,
supra note 7; Calvin R. Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments, 56 U. CHI.
L. REv. 61 (1989).
64. Some scholars appear to go even further and maintain that the Eleventh Amendment limited only
the federal judiciary's power to exercise jurisdiction directly under the Constitution, not Congress's power
to grant federal jurisdiction. See Nowak, supra note 58, at 1442. If so, then Congress would presumably
be free to confer jurisdiction over suits against states not based substantively on federal law. Since the
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts is entirely dependent on congressional authorization, the Eleventh
Amendment as interpreted by Professor Nowak would only affect the Supreme Court's jurisdiction. The
interpretation is highly implausible. It is true that the Amendment limits only the 'judicial power," but it
is well understood that the limits on the judicial power are limits on Congress's power to confer jurisdiction
on the lower courts. Justice Jackson's suggestions to the contrary in National Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 592 (1949) (plurality opinion), were clearly rejected by a majority
of the Court. See id. at 626 (Rutledge, J., concurring); id. at 640-41 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting); id. at 655
(Frankfurter, J ., dissenting).
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made applicable to the states. The question whether this type of immunity is
an immunity from original federal jurisdiction only or an immunity from
liability as well might be relevant in determining whether Congress, in order
to remove it, need only make known its intent to subject states to suit in
federal court or must also express its intent to make states liable in damages
to individuals. Few diversity scholars have addressed this issue at all. 65
On the Supreme Court, the first signs of dissatisfaction with the Hans line
of cases came in dissenting opinions by Justice Brennan. At first, Brennan
advocated a literal interpretation of the Amendment, under which the
Amendment would apply to suits "arising under" federal law, but only if the
suit was brought by a citizen of a different state or of a foreign state. 66 He
combined this view, however, with a broad theory of congressional power to
abrogate sovereign immunity under Article !. 67 Eventually, Brennan embraced
the diversity interpretation, under which the Amendment would have no
application to suits arising under federal law and the states would enjoy at best
a subconstitutional immunity subject to congressional abrogation. 68 Three of
his colleagues concurred in this view, 69 and at one point the Court was evenly
divided on whether to adopt it. 70 In Union Gas, however, Justice Brennan
switched gears in an apparent attempt to garner a fifth vote. Rather than press
the diversity interpretation, he now relied on his reasoning in Parden v.
Terminal Railway71 to extend to the Commerce Clause the Court's holding
in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer72 that Congress has the power to abrogate Eleventh

65. A notable exception is Jackson, supra note I, who gave the issue sustained attention in 1988. This
Article argues that the forum-allocation intetpretation is not as well grounded as Jackson suggests. William
Aetcher also gave more than passing consideration to the issue. See Fletcher, Historical Interpretation,
supra note 7. While Fletcher concludes that the Eleventh Amendment has no bearing on Congress's power
to subject states to damage liability, he acknowledges that other provisions of the Constitution may limit
Congress's power in this respect. He argues that the scope of Congress's power to subject states to damage
liability to individuals should be regarded as a clause-specific question of substantive law, a question the
courts should approach as a matter of intetpreting the specific constitutional provision that assertedly gives
Congress the power to legislate substantively on the matter. See id. at 1107. I suggest below that the Court
may now understand this issue to be governed by the Eleventh Amendment, which distinguishes only
between pre- and post-Fourteenth Amendment obligations of the states.
66. See Employees of Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411
U.S. 279, 313 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
67. The theory was that the states surrendered their sovereignty to the extent that they gave Congress
the power to legislate under Article I. See Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 196-97 (1964).
68. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 261-63, 301 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
69. Justices Marshall, B1ackmun, and Stevens concurred in Brennan's Atascadero dissent. See id. at
247 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
70. In Welch v. Texas Department of Highways & Public Transportation, 483 U.S. 468 (1987), Justice
Scalia reserved judgment on the question, see id. at 495-96 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring
in judgment), but in Union Gas, he ultimately came down in favor of affirming Hans, see Pennsylvania
v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 35 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
71. 377 U.S. at 196-97 (suggesting that states waived their sovereign immunity from suit under federal
statutes when they ratified Constitution giving Congress power to enact those statutes).
72. 427 u.s. 445 (1976).
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Amendment immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment. 73 Justice White
apparently agreed that the reasoning of Fitzpatrick could not be confined to
obligations imposed on states under the Fourteenth Amendment and so he
provided a fifth vote for the holding that Congress may abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity pursuant to its power to regulate interstate commerce
as well. 74 Union Gas was widely understood to establish that the Eleventh
Amendment could be abrogated by Congress under any of its legislative
powers. 75
Although the Union Gas decision did not explicitly adopt the diversity
interpretation, it produced virtually the same result. Proponents of the diversity
theory maintain that the Amendment has no application in federal question
cases, but they accept a subconstitutional doctrine of state sovereign immunity.
The doctrine is subconstitutional in the sense that Congress may abrogate it.
The plurality in Union Gas did not say that Eleventh Amendment immunity
was not of constitutional stature, but its holding that Congress may abrogate
the immunity under any of its legislative powers rendered the immunity
subconstitutional in the very sense urged by the diversity theorists. Whether the
immunity was an immunity from original federal jurisdiction only or an
immunity from federal liability as well was accordingly unimportant, as in
either case Congress had the power to do away with it.
Union Gas was expressly overruled last term in Seminole Tribe, where a
majority of the Court held that Eleventh Amendment immunity could not be
abrogated under Article 1.76 This decision, of course, resurrects the issue that
mattered little under the diversity view. State sovereign immunity is once again
beyond Congress's reach, and it is accordingly once again important to know
exactly what the Eleventh Amendment prevents Congress from doing. Does it
merely prevent Congress from subjecting states to the original jurisdiction of
the federal courts, or does it disable Congress from subjecting states to damage
liability to individuals?

73. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 15-19.
74. The other four Justices in the majority had embraced the diversity interpretation in Atascadero.
In his concurring opinion, Justice White wrote cryptically that he agreed with Justice Brennan's conclusion,
though not all of his reasoning. See id. at 45 (White, J ., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in
part).
75. All of the Justices in Seminole Tribe so interpreted the decision. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida,
116 S. Ct. 1114, 1126-27 (1996); id. at 1133-34 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 1184 (Souter, J.,
dissenting).
76. See id. at 1128. Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented. Justice Stevens, who had
earlier embraced the diversity interpretation, maintained, as he had done in Union Gas, that there are two
Eleventh Amendments, one having constitutional stature, which Congress may not abrogate, and another
having subconstitutional stature and subject to plenary congressional abrogation. See id. at I 144 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). Justice Souter (joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer) would have affirmed the Union Gas
holding that Congress has the power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity under any of its legislative
powers. They would have interpreted Hans as resting on the lack of an act of Congress expressly
withdrawing the states' sovereign immunity. See id. at I 184-85 (Souter, J., dissenting). These three Justices
would thus have accepted the diversity theory in substance if not in name.
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B. The Forum-Allocation and Immunity-from-Liability Interpretations
Unlike the diversity issue, the issue that is the focus of this Article has not
received sustained attention from either judges or scholars, and (perhaps
because the Justices have failed to focus on the issue) the Supreme Court's
Eleventh Amendment opinions have for some time been sending conflicting
signals about it. I shall provisionally put the question this way: Is the immunity
conferred on the states by the Eleventh Amendment an immunity from liability
under federallaw, 77 or is it merely an immunity from the jurisdiction of the
federal courts?
The Amendment's text appears to provide a clear answer to that question.
By its terms, the Amendment limits "the Judicial power of the United
States."78 This phrasing suggests that it relates only to federal jurisdiction, but
reflection reveals the dichotomy, as posed above, to be a false one.
Recognizing this falsity, moreover, permits us to see that the text of the
Amendment actually supports the view that the Eleventh Amendment confers
an immunity from liability. Whatever the nature of the immunity conferred by
the Eleventh Amendment, it is relevant only where retrospective monetary
relief9 is being sought by individuals. Assume that Eleventh Amendment
immunity is "only" an immunity from federal court jurisdiction. Assume
further that a federal statute purports to obligate the states to pay damages to
individuals under certain circumstances. If no federal court is empowered to
enforce that liability, then it is questionable whether the states can be said to
be under a legal obligation to pay those damages. 8 For present purposes, it
suffices to observe that a federal liability of the states that is enforceable only
in state courts is not an effective liability. It is more like a congressional
recommendation that states pay damages to individuals. Chief Justice Marshall

°

77. The Supreme Court has clearly held that the Amendment does not protect the states from liability
under the law of sister states, or from being sued in the courts of sister states. See Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S.
410, 426-27 (1979). Presumably the Amendment also does not protect the states from being subjected to
liability under the laws of foreign states, a liability that would be enforceable in the courts of sister states
(if permitted by sister states). Thus, to the extent that the Amendment can be an immunity from liability,
it would at best be an immunity from liability under federal law (unless the 6-3 decision in Nevada v. Hall
were to be revisited).
78. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
79. See Edelman v. Jordan,415 U.S. 651, 668-<i9 (1974), discussed il!fra Part ill. As discussed below,
suits against state officials for prospective relief from violations of federal law are not barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. The Eleventh Amendment is accordingly not an obstacle to individuals seeking
prospective relief from continuing violations of federal law by the states. As Seminole Tribe itself reminds
us, the Amendment protects states from being sued by private parties in their own names even for
prospective relief. Seminole Tribe may further establish that a suit seeking prospective relief from violations
of federal statutes may be available only if the statute that imposes the primary obligation does not preclude
such relief.
80. In another piece, I not only defend such an understanding of what it means to be under a legal
obligation but also argue that the Supremacy Clause embraces such an understanding of the term "law."
See Carlos Manuel Vazquez, The Constitution as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause and
Constitutional Remedies (1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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noted in Osborn v. Bank of the United States 81 that "the legislative, executive,
and judicial powers, of every well constructed government are co-extensive
with each other" and that "[a]ll governments which are not extremely defective
in their organization, must possess, within themselves, the means of
expounding, as well as enforcing, their own laws." 82 Marshall was referring
to the need for a federal forum to give efficacy to all federal laws. The point
is even more compelling when the federal law at issue is one that imposes a
liability on the states. It is one thing to rely on state courts to enforce the
federal liabilities of private individuals; it is quite another to rely on state
courts to enforce the federal liabilities of the states. Whether we consider a
liability to be a legal one if it depends on the willingness of the obligated party
to comply is a question I leave for another day. Surely it is a liability of
questionable efficacy. If all federal courts lack jurisdiction over cases in which
individuals seek money damages from the states under federal law, then the
states are effectively immune from federal liability to individuals for
damages. 83
In one of its many departures from the text of the Amendment, the
Supreme Court has held that the Eleventh Amendment does not constrain the
jurisdiction of all federal courts: It does not limit the Supreme Court's own
appellate jurisdiction. The most forceful recent articulation of this idea came
in McKesson, in which a unanimous Supreme Court concluded that "the
[Eleventh] Amendment does not circumscribe our appellate review of statecourt judgments."84 As discussed below, this decision is one of the
cornerstones of the forum-allocation interpretation of the Eleventh

81. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
82. !d. at 818-19.
83. The federal liabilities of the federal government are enforceable only by federal courts. Because
both the tribunal and the obligated party are federal entities, it might be argued that my analysis would
require me to say that the federal liabilities of the federal government are not really legal liabilities either.
But, the situations are different in important respects. First, the federal courts are constitutionally insulated
from pressure from the political branches. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § I. Second, the liabilities of the federal
government have been enacted by the federal Congress. Thus pressure from that quarter would serve only
to increase the efficacy of the federal liability. By contrast, a damage liability imposed on states from
without is likely to be opposed by the political branches of the state governments, and the state courts are
not as a general matter insulated from state legislatures or from popular pressures.
The analogy to the sovereign immunity of the United States actually supports the conclusion that state
sovereign immunity is an immunity from liability, for the Supreme Court has treated the sovereign
immunity of the United States as negating the existence of any legal right against the United States, not
just precluding access to a court for the enforcement of an existing right. See The Western Maid, 257 U.S.
419, 433 (1922) ("Legal obligations that exist but cannot be enforced are ghosts that are seen in the law
but that are elusive to the grasp."); cf. Kawananakoa v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907) ("[T]here can
be no legal right as against the authority that makes the Law on which the right depends."). For a further
defense of the conclusion that a federal liability of states that no federal court is empowered to enforce is
not a legal liability, or is, at any rate, an ineffective liability, see infra text accompanying notes 438-40.
84. McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 28 (1990). On
whether the forum-allocation view would permit congress to authorize lower federal courts to hear appeals
from state courts in suits against states, see supra note 33.
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Amendment. 85 The immunity it confers under this view is only an immunity
from the original jurisdiction of the federal courts. It has nothing to say about
the liability of states to individuals under federal law; it merely channels
damage actions by individuals against the states into the state courts. If federal
law subjects the states to liability to individuals, the state courts are required
by the Supremacy Clause to award the required relief, and, if they do not,
McKesson holds that the Supreme Court may reverse their judgments. The
Eleventh Amendment, on this view, protects the states' dignity by delaying the
exercise of the federal courts' coercive power, but it does not protect state
coffers. It assumes that the states will ultimately comply with any federal
obligation to pay damages to individuals, and it holds in reserve a federal
judicial power to compel such payment if the states prove recalcitrant.
In light of McKesson, the question posed above may be rephrased as
follows: Is the immunity conferred by the Eleventh Amendment on the states
only an immunity from the original jurisdiction of the federal courts, or is it
also (effectively) an immunity from liability to individuals under federal
law?86 Because the Eleventh Amendment is phrased as a limitation on the
"judicial power of the United States," the Amendment's text appears
incompatible with the forum-allocation reading, 87 but the Amendment's text
has long ceased to do any dispositive work, and the decisions in McKesson and
other Supreme Court cases88 seem to reject the immunity-from-liability
reading. On the other hand, Supreme Court decisions dating back to Hans, and
indeed to Justice Iredell's dissent in Chisholm v. Georgia, 89 are in substantial
tension with the forum-allocation view. Significantly, the Court's most recent
pronouncement on the Eleventh Amendment, its opinion in Seminole Tribe,
strongly hints that the Court regards Eleventh Amendment immunity as
(effectively) immunizing the states from monetary liability to private
individuals. The majority stated that the Supreme Court may exercise appellate
jurisdiction over suits arising in the state courts "where a State has consented

85. Cf. Jackson, supra note I, at 7 (identifying forum allocation as important aspect of Eleventh
Amendment doctrine).
86. I shall henceforth describe an immunity of states from the jurisdiction of all federal courts as an
immunity from federal liability on the theory that a liability that Congress has the power to impose on the
states but only state courts have the power to enforce is no liability at all. Readers who are unwilling to
go that far may insert the term "effectively" as indicated in brackets.
As the text indicates, I am not posing an "either-or" choice. It is clear that Eleventh Amendment
immunity is at least an immunity from the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. The question is whether
it is also an immunity from liability under federal law. On whether the existence of an immunity from
federal court jurisdiction has any relevance if the states are in any event immune from liability under
federal law, see infra note 270.
87. The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court can, of course, be no broader than the whole
"judicial power of the United States."
88. See cases discussed infra Part II.
89. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 429-50 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting); see also infra note 238 and
accompanying text. The Court has relied on Justice Iredell's dissent in construing the meaning of the
Eleventh Amendment. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. I, 18-19 (1890).
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to suit,"90 thus suggesting that a state's successful invocation of sovereign
immunity in state court will immunize the state court decision from Supreme
Court review. 91 This language from Seminole Tribe, and statements to the
same effect in other recent cases, 92 invite a closer look at McKesson and the
judicial support for the forum-allocation interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment.
Seminole Tribe is not the only recent decision that supports the immunityfrom-liability interpretation-indeed, in the previous Term the Court used
language that supports it even more clearly93-but its principal holding
elevates substantially the significance of the issue. As noted, Seminole Tribe
overruled Union Gas, in which the Court had held that Congress has the power
to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant to any of its Article I
powers. By affirming that the Eleventh Amendment is beyond Congress's
power to abrogate except in certain circumstances, this decision obviously
makes understanding the scope of Eleventh Amendment immunity all the more
important.
C. The Relationship Between the Immunity-from-Liability Interpretation of the
Eleventh Amendment and the Court's Tenth Amendment Jurisprudence
An interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment as limiting not just the
original jurisdiction of the federal courts but also Congress's power to subject
the states to monetary liability to individuals would arguably encroach upon
some of the turf currently occupied by the Court's Tenth Amendment
jurisprudence. This Section addresses the relationship between the immunityfrom-liability interpretation and the Court's recent Tenth Amendment
jurisprudence. We might understand the immunity-from-liability interpretation
as dividing up the relevant turf along the following lines: While Congress's
power to impose obligations on the states is governed by the Court's Tenth
Amendment jurisprudence, the availability of remedies for the violation of such
obligations is determined by the Eleventh Amendment.
The relationship between the immunity-from-liability interpretation of the
Eleventh Amendment and the Court's Tenth Amendment jurisprudence is
complex. In Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,94 the

90. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1131 n.14 (1996).
91. Indeed, the statement suggests that even an unsuccessful invocation of sovereign immunity in the
state courts would preclude the Supreme Court from reviewing a decision on the merits favoring the state.
92. See, e.g., Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 400. Even McKesson itself has language that supports the immunityfrom-liability interpretation. See infra text accompanying note 128.
93. See Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 400 ("The Eleventh Amendment largely shields States from suit in federal
court without their consent, leaving parties with claims against a State to present them, if the State permits,
in the State's own tribunals.").
94. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
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Court overruled National League of Cities v. Usery, 95 in which it had held
that the Tenth Amendment protected the states from being regulated by
Congress in certain spheres-i.e., in areas of the states' "traditional
governmental functions." 96 Largely because the Court had had difficulty
specifying exactly which activities fell within that category, Garcia discarded
this limitation. 97 It held that the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), a federal
statute requiring employers to pay employees a minimum wage, could
constitutionally be applied to the states acting as employers. In New York v.
United States, 98 the Court backtracked somewhat, but left Congress with
considerable power to regulate the states. The Court limited Garcia to federal
laws that regulate the states as a part of a broader category of regulated parties
that includes nonstate actors. 99 Thus, after New York v. United States,
Congress remains free to regulate the states as, for example, employers, as it
did in the FLSA.
How does the Eleventh Amendment bear on all of this? The FLSA
authorized suits against employers for back pay, and in Garcia the Court
permitted the suit to go forward against the San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Authority, a local agency. Because the defendant was not a state agency, as
that term is understood in Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, 100 the case did
not raise an Eleventh Amendment issue. Post-Garcia, the lower courts held
that Congress, in amending the FLSA in 1974, clearly expressed its intent to
abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. 101 Under the Union Gas
holding, Congress had the power to do this, but Seminole Tribe calls into
95. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia, 469 U.S. 528.
96. /d. at 852.
97. To be precise, the Court said that any limits on Congress's power in this regard were not judicially
enforceable. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556-57. The Court thus left open the possibility that the Tenth
Amendment might indeed impose limits, but it held that any such limits were "enforceable" only through
the political process. I would question the legal status of constitutional limits that can be "enforced" only
through the political process. See Vazquez, supra note 80. Others apparently share this skepticism, for
Garcia has come to be understood as holding that the Tenth Amendment does not place limits on
Congress's power to regulate the states. See, e.g., Southeastern Pa Transp. Auth. v. Pennsylvania Pub. Uti!.
Comm'n, 826 F. Supp. 1506, 1518 (E.D. Pa. 1993), aff'd, 27 F.3d 558 (3d Cir. 1994); Karl M. Tilleman,
Note, Does the Tenth Amendment Pose Any Judicial Limit on the Commerce Clause After Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority and South Carolina v. Baker?, 1989 BYU L. REv. 231. Indeed,
the Supreme Court itself appears to have so interpreted its Garcia holding. See South Carolina v. Baker,
485 U.S. 505, 512 (1988) (stating that "Garcia left open the possibility that some extraordinary defects in
the national political process might render congressional regulation of state activities invalid," thus implying
that without such defects such regulation would be valid).
98. 505 u.s. 144 (1992).
99. See id. at 160.
100. For Eleventh Amendment purposes, a "state" includes a statewide agency but not local
governments or local government agencies. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S
THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1056 (4th ed. 1996) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER].
For Tenth Amendment purposes, as Garcia itself shows, local governments and local government agencies
are treated as the state.
101. See Johns v. Stewart, 57 F.3d 1544, 1556 (lOth Cir. 1995); Brinkman v. Department of
Corrections, 21 F.3d 370, 372 (lOth Cir. 1994); Reich v. New York, 3 F.3d 581, 590 (2d Cir. 1993); Hale
v. Arizona, 993 F.2d 1387, 1391 (9th Cir. 1993) (en bane).
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question the validity of this abrogation, as the FLSA appears to have been
enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause. 102 If Eleventh Amendment
immunity were merely a forum-allocation principle, then Seminole Tribe would
mean that Congress may require states as employers to pay a minimum wage,
and it may subject states that violate this obligation to suit by private
individuals, but such suits would have to be brought in state courts. The
Supremacy Clause would obligate the state courts to enforce the states'
statutory obligations, and the Supreme Court through its appellate jurisdiction
would have the power to monitor the state courts' compliance with this
obligation. 103 If Eleventh Amendment immunity were an immunity from
liability, then Congress would lack the power to subject the states to any
monetary liability to individuals. The state courts would thus not be under any
obligation to entertain damage actions brought by private individuals in state
courts alleging the violation by states of statutes enacted by Congress pursuant
to Article I and clearly made applicable to the states (as permitted by New
York v. United States 104).

I 02. A federal circuit court and three district courts have already found this abrogation to be
unconstitutional under Seminole Tribe. See Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, Nos. 95-3086, 95-3143, 1996 U.S.
App. LEXIS 28067 (6th Cir. Oct. 30, 1996); Adams v. Kansas, 934 F. Supp. 371, 372 (D. Kan. 1996);
Taylor v. Virginia, No. 3:95cv1026, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19748 (E.D. Va. Dec. 18, 1996); American
Fed'n of State, County and Mun. Employees v. Virginia, No. 94-097-A, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18810
(W.D. Va. Dec. 13, 1996). In addition, a federal district court in Alabama has found the abrogation of
Eleventh Amendment immunity in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) to be
unconstitutional under Seminole Tribe. See MacPherson v. University of Montevallo, 938 F. Supp. 785,
788-89 (N.D. Ala. 1996). On the other hand, a district court has found the Eleventh Amendment abrogation
in the ADEA to be a valid exercise of Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Teichgraeber v. Memorial Union Corp., No. 95-4118-SACS, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18131 (D. Kan. Nov.
26, 1996). Courts have also reached conflicting conclusions on whether Congress's abrogation of Eleventh
Amendment immunity for suits brought under section 106 of the Bankruptcy Act was a valid exercise of
its Section 5 power. Compare In re Burke, No. 92-11482, 1996 Bankr. LEXIS 1614 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 16,
1996) (valid), with In re Koehler, No. 4-94-6040, 1997 Bankr. LEXIS 9 (D. Minn. Jan. 3, 1997) (invalid),
and In re Charter Oaks Assocs., No. 91-23999, 1996 Bankr. LEXIS 1554 (D. Conn. Nov. 25, 1996)
(invalid), and In re Lush Lawns, Inc., No. 96-13469, 1996 Bankr. LEXIS 1576 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 19, 1996)
(invalid). An appellate court has found Congress's abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity in suits
under the Equal Pay Act to have been a valid exercise of its Section 5 power. See Timmer v. Michigan
Dep't of Commerce, No. 95-1706, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 545 (6th Cir. Jan. 15, 1997). Two district courts
have held that Congress's abrogation of the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Americans
with Disabilities Act (ADA) was a valid exercise of its enforcement power under the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Kaufman v. Carter, No. 1:95-CV-313, 1996 WL 731925 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 9, 1996);
Mayer v. University of Minn., 940 F. Supp. 1474 (D. Minn. 1996) (also finding abrogation under
Rehabilitation Act to be valid). Furthermore, an appellate court has found, notwithstanding Seminole Tribe,
that Congress has the power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity under its War Power. See DiazGandia v. Dapena-Thompson, 90 F.3d 609, 616 n.9 (1st Cir. 1996) (upholding abrogation of Eleventh
Amendment immunity in Veterans' Reemployment Rights Act); see also Knussman v. Maryland, 935 F.
Supp. 659,663 (D. Md. 1996) (reserving judgment on validity of abrogation in Family and Medical Leave
Act); infra notes 278-82 (discussing Congress's abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity under patent
and trademark laws).
103. See generally infra Section II.A.
104. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). Alternatively, one might say that the Supremacy Clause obligates the states
to award such damages, but that no federal court has the power to monitor the state courts' compliance with
this obligation. As discussed above, this is tantamount to an immunity from liability.
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It bears emphasizing that adoption of the immunity-from-liability
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment would not be a backhanded way of
overruling what New York left of Garcia. It is important to distinguish three
concepts: (1) the primary obligations imposed by the law; (2) the secondary
or remedial obligations the law imposes in the event the primary obligation is
violated; 105 and (3) the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. Garcia held
that Congress could impose primary obligations on the states, such as the
obligation to pay employees a minimum wage. Under the forum-allocation
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, Congress possesses the power to
subject states that violate those obligations to damage liability to aggrieved
individuals. The immunity-from-liability interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment holds that Congress may not subject the states to such liability,
but there are other ways to give efficacy to the states' primary obligations.
First, individuals may sue state officials in their official capacities for
prospective relief. 106 Thus an individual who is aggrieved by a state's failure
to pay him the required minimum wage could obtain a court order requiring
the responsible state official to pay him the minimum wage. This order would
comply with the Eleventh Amendment under current doctrine so long as the
order required the official to pay wages that accrue after the court's order was
entered. 107 If the official violates that order, she would subject herself to
contempt sanctions and, if the violation amounted to bad faith, the court would
have the power to require the state itself to pay the unpaid amounts due under
the court's order. 108 This regime appears effective to ensure prospective
compliance with an obligation, for example, to pay a minimum wage. 109 To
be sure, limiting the individual to prospective relief appears to give states the
opportunity to avoid compliance for at least some period of time. But there are
ways, short of subjecting the states to damage liability, to deter the states from
even temporarily violating their obligation. Congress could, for example,
subject states that violate the minimum wage obligation to a fine collectible by
a federal agency. The Eleventh Amendment does not protect the states from
suits by the United States. no There may be other ways to give efficacy to the
105. On the distinction between primary and secondary obligations, see Carlos Manuel Vazquez,
Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1082, 1089-90 & n.26 (1992).
106. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. lll4, 1131 n.l6 (1996).
107. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 668-69 (1974) (affirming order requiring state official to
comply with federal obligation to pay money to individuals from state funds, insofar as order required
payment of amounts that accrued after entry of court's order).
108. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 691-92 (1978). But cf. infra text accompanying note 443
(noting that adoption of immunity-from-liability interpretation of Eleventh Amendment may protect states
from contempt sanctions and costs where official has violated court order requiring prospective compliance
with duty imposed by Congress under Article 1).
109. By "prospective" in this context, I mean from the time of the court's order forward.
110. See supra text accompanying note 48. The Court has held that states may not, consistently with
the Eleventh Amendment, maintain parens patriae actions against sister states. See Hawaii v. Standard Oil
Co., 405 U.S. 251, 258 n.l2 (1972); New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 90-91 (1883). If this
principle extends to the federal government as well, then there may be Eleventh Amendment problems with
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underlying federal obligation. 111 Congress might make waiver of Eleventh
Amendment immunity a condition of participation in some related federal
program. 112 What I have said, however, is sufficient to show that interpreting
the Eleventh Amendment as an immunity from liability is not tantamount to
denying Congress the power to regulate the states as permitted by Garcia and
New York.
The immunity-from-liability interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment
would, however, limit in an important way Congress's options for giving
efficacy to the obligations it imposes on the states vis-a-vis individuals. It
would eliminate (or at least place significant obstacles in the way of) perhaps
the most effective, and certainly the most straightforward, method of enforcing
those obligations: private lawsuits for damages by aggrieved individuals against
the state itself. It is true that even the narrower, forum-allocation interpretation
of the Eleventh Amendment places a potentially awkward obstacle in the way
of such lawsuits: They must be brought in the state courts as an initial matter,
with federal court involvement available only on appeal. But at least this
option would remain available to Congress under the forum-allocation
interpretation, whereas it would be unavailable under the immunity-fromliability interpretation unless Congress could secure a waiver of immunity
under a Spending Clause program. It is also true that even if the Eleventh
Amendment were merely a forum-allocation principle, Congress might prefer
to devise a scheme to procure a waiver of the immunity and thus permit suits
a regime in which a federal agency obtains fines against states that violate federal obligations towards
individuals, and then turns over the fines to the aggrieved individuals. One scholar has argued that Congress
does have the power to turn over the proceeds to the injured individuals, and that Congress may even
authorize the individuals to sue the states in a qui tam action on behalf of the U.S. government, and perhaps
even to sue the states in their own names. See Jonathan R. Siegel, The Hidden Source of Congress's Power
to Abrogate State Sovereign Immunity, 73 TEX. L. REV. 539 (1995). The Court's opinion in Blatchford v.
Native Village of Noatak throws cold water on (at least) the latter two suggestions. See 501 U.S. 775, 785
(1991) (expressing "doubt" that United States's power to sue states can be delegated even "to persons on
whose behalf the United States itself might sue"). The water was thrown before the arguments were made,
but the author did not consider it too cold. See Siegel, supra, at 568.
111. See, e.g., Siegel, supra note 110, at 564-69 (proposing that individuals use qui tam actions to
enforce their own rights in place of U.S. government). In Pan VI, I discuss Congress's power to authorize
individuals to obtain damages from state officials responsible for violations of federal statutes.
112. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (upholding congressional use of spending power
to "encourage" states to impose minimum drinking age). With regard to this conditioning power, Judge
Frank Easterbrook has stated that Congress '"has the whip hand in all of this.' For example, ... Congress
can wield its 'conditioning power,' tying a state's receipt of federal money to its promise not to infringe
copyrights." Constitutional Law Scholars Attempt to Distill Recent Supreme Court Term, 65 U.S.L.W. 2274,
2288 ( 1996). Easterbrook mistakenly assumes here that Seminole Tribe denies Congress the power to make
the copyright laws applicable to the states, however. At most, Seminole Tribe denies Congress the power
to make states liable in damages for infringing copyrights. This misconception may explain Easterbrook's
further statement that Seminole Tribe is incompatible with Garcia. See id.
It has been suggested that in light of its recent holding in United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624
(1995), the Court should scale back Congress's power to induce states to act under the Spending Clause
in circumstances in which Congress could not require the states to act under its other enumerated powers.
See Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1916 (1995).
If the Court does so, then the option noted in the text accompanying this footnote may become less
promising than under current doctrine.
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in federal court. Whichever way the matter is analyzed, however, determining
whether the Eleventh Amendment confers only an immunity from the original
jurisdiction of the federal courts or also an immunity from liability will be
important to Congress in determining how to respond to the recent decision in
Seminole Tribe.
The issue has already attracted the attention of litigants, ll3 and it should
soon attract Congress's attention. 114 At issue is the efficacy with respect to
the states of such generally applicable laws as those prohibiting copyright and
patent infringement. Does Seminole Tribe mean that Congress may not allow
copyright holders to sue state agencies that infringe their copyrights for
damages in federal court (absent waiver), and thus that copyright holders
would be relegated to a remedy in state court (if Congress should authorize
one), subject to Supreme Court review? Or does it mean that Congress may
not give copyright holders a right to obtain damages in any court from state
agencies that infringe their copyrights? I will discuss in Part IV what Seminole
Tribe suggests on that question, but first I shall discuss what recent preSeminole Tribe cases suggested.
II. PRE-SEMINOLE TRIBE SUPPORT FOR READING THE ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT AS MERELY A FORUM-ALLOCATION PRINCIPLE

Readers of the Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment opinions before
Seminole Tribe would certainly have had grounds to conclude that the Court
had definitively rejected what I have called the immunity-from-liability
interpretation of that Amendment. Not only did a number of those opinions
state broadly that the Amendment has no application in state courts, 115 but
the Court also unanimously ruled that the Eleventh Amendment does not limit
the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. 116 It found that certain federal
constitutional and statutory provisions impose damage liabilities on states, and
it held that the Supremacy Clause requires the states to entertain suits seeking
such damages in their own courts. 117 In this Part, I review the indications in
the pre-Seminole Tribe cases that the Court has viewed the Amendment as
bearing only on original federal jurisdiction-that the Amendment, in other
words, does not have any bearing on whether states are liable to individuals

I 13. See Victoria Slind-Fior, High Court Gambling Case May Give States Big Payoff, NAT'L L.J., July
8, 1996, at Bl.
114. See Letter from Jonathan R. Siegel, Associate Professor, George Washington Univ., to Betty
Wheeler, Democratic Counsel, Courts & Intellectual Property Subcomm., Judiciary Comm., U.S. House
of Representatives (Apr. 12, 1996) (on file with author).
115. See, e.g., Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1989); Maine v. Thiboutot,
448 U.S. I, 9 n.7 (1980); Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 420-21 (1979).
116. See infra text accompanying notes 123-27.
117. See infra text accompanying notes 144-51.
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for damages, but merely requires that any federal liability of the states toward
individuals be enforced in the state courts, subject to review in the Supreme
Court.
A. Cases Recognizing a Constitutional Obligation of States to Afford
Monetary Relief to Individuals in Their Own Courts
Authority for the proposition that the Eleventh Amendment does nothing
more than confer an immunity from the original jurisdiction of the federal
courts can be found in the cases in which the Supreme Court appears to have
recognized that the Constitution itself in certain circumstances requires the
states to afford monetary relief to private individuals. These cases indicate that
if the states do not afford that relief voluntarily, individuals are entitled by the
federal Constitution to maintain an action against the states in the state courts,
and the Supreme Court may review the state courts' decisions to ensure that
those courts have enforced the states' constitutional obligation to afford the
required relief. These cases indicate that neither the Eleventh Amendment nor
the states' own law of sovereign immunity may be interposed to avoid such
a suit, and that the Eleventh Amendment similarly does not bar Supreme Court
review of the state courts' decisions.
Perhaps surprisingly, the Court has found a right of individuals to damages
from the states in only two provisions of the Constitution. One of them is the
Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, made applicable to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment. This is one of the few constitutional provisions
that expressly addresses issues of liability. It provides that "private property
[shall not] be taken for public use, without just compensation." 118 The
Supreme Court has held that "a landowner is entitled to bring an action in
inverse condemnation as a result of '"the self-executing character of the
constitutional provision with respect to compensation.""' 119 The Court has
indicated that this remedy is available in the state courts even if there is no
state statute that authorizes it. 120 Nor may the state courts interpose their own
law of sovereign immunity to bar such claims. 121 The Eleventh Amendment
is not regarded as a bar to Supreme Court review of inverse condemnation

118. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
119. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 315 (1987)
(quoting United States v. Clarke, 445 U.S. 253, 257 (1980) (quoting 6 P. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN §
25.41 (3d rev. ed. 1972))).
120. See id. (citing San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621, 654-55 (1981)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)).
121. See id. at 316 n.9 (rejecting Solicitor General's argument that ''principles of sovereign
immunity [help] ... establish[] that the [Fifth] Amendment itself is ... not a remedial provision").
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actions from the state courts raising takings issues under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 122
The other constitutional provision that the Court has held sometimes
requires the states to afford monetary relief to individuals is the Due Process
Clause. The relevant holdings have come in tax refund cases in which the
Court has held that if a state does not offer taxpayers an opportunity to
challenge the lawfulness of a tax before paying it, then the state must give the
taxpayer a postpayment hearing to determine the tax's validity and, if the tax
turns out to have been invalid, a refund of the tax or some other remedy that
would cure the violation. 123 The Court's clearest recent articulation of this
principle came in McKesson. The McKesson principle appears to require the
state itself to provide persons a damage remedy whenever it deprives them of
liberty or property without giving them a predeprivation hearing and the
deprivation turns out to have been in violation of state law. I consider this
issue below. 124 For the moment, we may assume that the principle applies
only in cases involving state deprivations of property that are challenged as
violating federal law. What is important is that the Court recognized that the
Constitution requires the state to confer a refund if the deprivation was invalid
and no other remedy would cure the violation, and that the state may not
interpose its own law of sovereign immunity to bar a lawsuit seeking such a
remedy. 125 The defendant in McKesson was a state agency, and the Court's
opinion appears to hold that the Due Process Clause requires a damage remedy
from the state itself. 126 As discussed above, the Court also reaffirmed in
McKesson that the Eleventh Amendment does not protect the states from
Supreme Court review of tax refund cases brought initially in the state
courts. 127
There is language in McKesson, however, that may cast doubt on whether
the case in fact stands for the broad propositions just stated. In describing its
Eleventh Amendment holding, the Court stated that "when a state court takes

122. See Jack M. Beennann, Government Official Torts and the Takings Clause: Federalism and State
Sovereign Immunity, 68 B.U. L. REv. 277, 337 (1988). The Eleventh Amendment does, however, bar
individuals from maintaining takings claims against states in the lower federal courts. See John G. & Marie
Stella Kenedy Mem'l v. Mauro, 21 F.3d 667, 674 (5th Cir. 1994); McMurtray v. Holladay, 11 F.3d 499,
504 (5th Cir. 1993).
123. If the tax is invalid because discriminatory, the state may be able to cure the violation by
collecting more taxes from the previously favored parties. If the state does so, it may not be required to
provide a refund to the disfavored party. See McKesson Corp. v. Division of Alcoholic Beverages &
Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 39-41 (1990). If the tax was invalid because the state lacked the power to impose
it, the state is required to provide a refund. See id. at 39; Ward v. Board of County Comm'rs, 253 U.S. 17,
24 (1920).
124. See infra text accompanying notes 421-27. See generally Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 16, at
1826 (suggesting that McKesson applies only to tax refund cases).
125. The Court made the latter point clear in Reich v. Collins, 115 S. Ct. 547, 549 (1994).
126. See McKesson, 496 U.S. at 22; see also American Trucking Ass'n, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167,
182-83 (1990).
127. See McKesson, 496 U.S. at 26-31.
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cognizance of a case, the State assents to appellate review by this Court of the
federal issues raised in the case." 128 This suggests that if the state refuses to
take cognizance of the case by, for example, invoking its own law of Sovereign
immunity, the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction would be defeated. This
interpretation is in substantial tension, to say the least, with the Court's due
process holding. The Court held that the Due Process Clause requires the states
to afford a hearing and award a monetary remedy if the hearing discloses the
tax to have been illegal. A state that denies a remedy on the ground of
sovereign immunity is not in any meaningful sense offering a postdeprivation
hearing, let alone the required postdeprivation remedy. In Reich v. Collins, 129
the Court, again unanimously, made it clear that the state is not free to deny
the constitutionally required damage remedy by invoking its own law of
sovereign immunity. 130 Is it conceivable that the Court meant that the Due
Process Clause prohibits the state from invoking its sovereign immunity law
to deny a hearing and a remedy, but that if the state (illegally) does so, the
Supreme Court for that very reason lacks appellate jurisdiction? That would
certainly be a problematic holding, one that would effectively gut the supposed
"obligation" to provide a hearing and remedy. I shall accordingly interpret
McKesson as permitting the Supreme Court to review state court decisions
denying the remedy required by the Due Process Clause even if the state does
not consent.
The takings and tax refund cases appear to establish that in certain
circumstances the Constitution itself obligates the states to confer a
retrospective monetary remedy to private individuals. 131 In those
circumstances, the Eleventh Amendment requires that the remedy be sought
initially in the state courts, 132 but the Supremacy Clause obligates the state
courts to entertain actions seeking the remedy and to award the remedy. State

128. /d. at 30.
129. 115S.Ct.547.
130. See id. at 549.
131. A third constitutional provision that may itself require the states to entertain private damage
actions against themselves may be the Full Faith and Credit Clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I. In Nevada
v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410,426-27 (1979), the Court held that California was free to subject the state of Nevada
to a private suit in the California courts and to apply its law to hold the state liable for an accident caused
by a Nevada official on California roads. If the plaintiff in such an action recovers a judgment, does the
Full Faith and Credit Clause require the courts of Nevada (or any other state in which Nevada has assets)
to enforce the money judgment? The Court has not addressed the issue, but if the answer is yes, then this
would be another example of a constitutional provision that obligates the states to pay money to individuals
that would be enforceable in the state courts and, if the forum-allocation interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment is correct, in the U.S. Supreme Court on appeal. If the immunity-from-liability interpretation
is correct, then the Supreme Court would be powerless to enforce this obligation against a recalcitrant state.
This, in my view, would be tantamount to holding that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not in fact
require the states to enforce the money judgments entered against states by sister states on state law causes
of action.
132. See Reich, 115 S. Ct. at 549 (recognizing that Due Process Clause requires state to confer
monetary relief to individuals, but noting that Eleventh Amendment "does generally bar tax refund claims
from being brought [against the states in federal court]"); see also supra note 122.
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law of sovereign immunity may not be interposed to bar such a claim. The
Supreme Court through its appellate jurisdiction may monitor the state courts'
compliance with their obligations under the Supremacy Clause. These cases
thus support the conclusion that the Eleventh Amendment is merely a forumallocation principle.
B. Cases Involving Statutes That Impose a Liability on States Without
Abrogating Eleventh Amendment Immunity

The cases recognizing that the federal Constitution in certain circumstances
obligates the states to pay money damages to individuals could perhaps be
regarded as a limited exception to an Eleventh Amendment interpretation that
gives states an immunity from federal liability. On this theory, the states'
immunity from liability and suit simply does not apply with respect to those
few constitutional provisions that themselves make states liable in damages to
individuals, but it does preclude Congress from subjecting the states to damage
liability by statute. Whatever the theoretical plausibility of that position, 133
it is flatly contradicted by recent pre-Seminole Tribe cases that interpret federal
statutes to impose an obligation on states and to subject states to monetary
liability to individuals aggrieved by violations of the obligation, but not to
abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity.
As discussed above, the Garcia decision held that the Tenth Amendment
did not preclude Congress from making the FLSA applicable to the states.
Congress expressly extended the substantive protections of that Act to certain
state employees in 1966. 134 In Employees of the Department of Public Health
& Welfare v. Department of Public Health & Weifare, 135 the Court
considered whether the 1966 amendments to the FLSA also subjected states
that violate those provisions to suits for damages by their employees. The
majority opinion by Justice Douglas left that question open, 136 but Justice
Marshall's opinion concurring in the result (joined by Justice Stewart)
concluded that the amendments clearly contemplated private damage suits
against the states. 137 Marshall went on to note, however, that the Eleventh
Amendment protected the states from being sued in federal court. He wrote:

133. As discussed in Part IV, the McKesson holding that a state is required to supply a damage remedy
when it illegally deprives persons of liberty or property without a prior hearing is tantamount to a holding
that Congress has the power to subject states to damage liability whenever it has the power to impose
primary obligations on the states under Article I.
134. See 29 U.S.C. § 203(e)(2)(C) (1994).
135. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
136. See id. at 287. The majority noted that even in the absence of private damage actions, the
substantive provisions of the Act could be enforced against the states by the Secretary of Labor. See id.
at 286.
137. See id. at 297 n.l2 (Marshall, J ., concurring in result).
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While constitutional limitations upon the federal judicial power bar a
federal court action by these employees to enforce their rights, the
courts of the State nevertheless have an independent constitutional
obligation to entertain employee actions to enforce those rights ....
Thus, since federal law stands as the supreme law of the land, the
State's courts are obliged to enforce it, even if it conflicts with state
policy.•3s
Justice Marshall's reasoning became the basis for the majority's response
in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon 139 to a criticism raised (ironically)
in a dissenting opinion in which Marshall concurred. At issue in Atascadero
was whether Congress had abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity in enacting the Rehabilitation Act of 1973! 40 In dissent, Justice
Brennan stressed indications in the statutory text and legislative history that
Congress had intended to make the substantive requirements of the
Rehabilitation Act applicable to the states, and he described the majority's
holding that the states were protected by the Eleventh Amendment as
tantamount to "exempting the States from compliance with laws that bind
every other legal actor in our Nation." 141 Justice Powell's majority opinion
accused the dissent of misperceiving the issue. Powell quoted Marshall's
statement in Employees that "'the issue is not the general immunity of the
States from private suit ... but merely the susceptibility of the States to suit
before federal tribunals."' 142 The majority went on to say that "[i]t denigrates
the judges who serve on the state courts to suggest that they will not enforce
the supreme law of the land." 143
In Employees and Atascadero, the language that supports the forumallocation interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment appeared in concurring
opinions or was dictum. 144 That dictum became holding with the Court's
138. ld. at 298 (Marshall, J., concurring in result) (citations omitted).
139. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
140. Id. at 235.
141. Id. at 248 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 240 n.2 (quoting Employees, 411 U.S. at 293-94 (Marshall, J., concurring in result)
(emphasis added)).
143. ld. The Atascadero Court's conception of Eleventh Amendment immunity as an immunity from
the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts is shown further by its insistence that a waiver of that immunity
cannot be inferred merely from a state statute or constitutional provision in which the state consents to be
sued by private individuals. To count as a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity, the statute or
constitutional provision must specify that the state consents to be sued in federal coun. A general consent
to suit will be construed, the Court said, as a consent to be sued in state court. See id. at 241; see also Ford
Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 465 (1945); Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S.
47, 54 (1944); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 441 (1900). These cases are not inconsistent with the
immunity-from-liability interpretation, however. The immunity-from-liability interpretation maintains that
the Eleventh Amendment is both an immunity from jurisdiction and an immunity from liability. If we apply
a clear statement rule to both immunities, then it would be appropriate to hold that the states are suable in
federal courts only if Congress has clearly made them suable in federal court. If the state is not amenable
to suit in federal court, the question of its immunity from liability arises only in state court actions.
144. The language from Atascadero may indeed not count as full-fledged support for the forumallocation interpretation. Justice Powell recognized that the state courts were obligated to enforce federal
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recent decision in Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways Commission. 145
In that case, the Court reaffirmed on stare decisis grounds the holding of
Parden v. Terminal Railway of Alabama Docks Department, 146 that the
Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA) subjected the states to monetary
liability to individuals. 147 In Welch v. Texas Department of Highways &
Public Transportation, 148 however, the Court overruled Parden's additional
holding that FELA abrogated the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. 149
The upshot is that FELA imposes a monetary liability on states which, because
of the Eleventh Amendment, can be enforced only in state courts. The Court
affirmed in Hilton that '"the Eleventh Amendment does not apply in the state
courts,"' 150 and that "when ... a federal statute does impose liability upon
the States, the Supremacy Clause makes that statute the law in every State,
fully enforceable in state court." 151

Ill. SEMINOLE TRIBE AND THE CASE FOR AN IMMUNITY-FROM-LIABILITY
INTERPRETATION OF THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT

Given the clarity with which the Court had appeared to embrace the
forum-allocation interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, many observers
were surprised to find indications in the Seminole Tribe majority opinion that
laws, but he did not say that the Supreme Court would have jurisdiction to review state court decisions in
suits against states. The Atascadero footnote may therefore be consistent with a view of the Eleventh
Amendment as pennitting Congress to impose liabilities on the states dependent for their efficacy on the
state courts without Supreme Court review. (Such an interpretation would be consistent with Powell's
expression of confidence in the state courts' ability and willingness to enforce federal law faithfully.) As
noted above, however, someone who agrees with Chief Justice Marshall's more realistic appraisal in
Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), of state court willingness to enforce
their own obligations without monitoring by a federal court would question whether such liabilities are in
fact legal ones. Justice Marshall's opinion in Employees does not refer explicitly to the Supreme Court's
power to review state court decisions denying a required federal remedy, but his citation of Testa v. Katt,
330 U.S. 386 (1947), and General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211 (1908), suggests strongly that he
assumed that such review would be available. See Employees, 411 U.S. at 298 (Marshall, J., concurring
in result).
145. 502 u.s. 197 (1991).
146. 377 u.s. 184 (1964).
147. See Hilton, 502 U.S. at 206-07.
148. 483 u.s. 468 (1987).
149. See id. at 478. The issue in Welch was whether the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity was
abrogated by the Jones Act, but the Jones Act incorporates the remedial scheme of FELA and the Court
in both Welch and Hilton assumed that the issue would be resolved the same way under both statutes. See
Hilton, 502 U.S. at 204 n.2; Welch, 483 U.S. at 495 (White, J., concurring).
150. 502 U.S. at 205 (quoting Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1989)).
151. /d. at 207. The Court cited for this proposition Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 367-68 (1990),
thus indicating that state Jaw principles of sovereign immunity cannot bar such a state court action. Howlett
was an action brought against a school board in the state courts under section 1983. The state court had
dismissed the suit on sovereign immunity grounds, but the Supreme Court reversed, holding that a
sovereign immunity defense is unavailable in a federal action to a defendant that is not immune from suit
under state law in analogous state Jaw actions. See id. at 375. In Hilton, the Court appears to have read
Howlett to establish the broader proposition that state law sovereign immunity defenses cannot be
interposed to bar from the state courts validly imposed federal liabilities.
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the Court embraces an immunity-from-liability construction of the Amendment.
The indications are all the more surprising because of the importance the
Court's principal holding gives to this issue. Whatever the nature of the
immunity conferred by the Eleventh Amendment, the Court established in
Seminole Tribe that it may not be abrogated by Congress pursuant to Article
I.
The statements in Seminole Tribe suggesting that the Court now rejects the
forum-allocation view might perhaps be dismissed as dictum. Certainly, the
points did not appear to be central to the Court's reasoning. Even if dictum,
however, they are important because of what they tell us about how the
Justices in the majority think about Eleventh Amendment issues. Moreover, as
I shall explain, there is a sense in which the Court's entire treatment of the
Eleventh Amendment might be regarded as dictum.
The Seminole Tribe sued Florida and its Governor in federal court seeking
an order requiring the State to negotiate in good faith with the Tribe over
gaming rights, as the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) required the State
to do. 152 IGRA included an express statutory abrogation of the states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity, and the Court's principal holding in the case
was that the suit against the State had to be dismissed because the abrogation
of Eleventh Amendment was unconstitutional. 153 As noted earlier, the Court
reaffirmed its holding that Eleventh Amendment immunity may be abrogated
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, but it reversed Union Gas's holding
that such abrogation could be accomplished pursuant to "antecedent"
constitutional provisions. 154 It is curious that this holding came in a case
seeking only injunctive relief. Because prospective injunctive relief may be
obtained under Ex parte Young in a suit against state officials without running
afoul of the Eleventh Amendment, the Court's Eleventh Amendment holding
came in a case in which the Amendment's impact was purely formal. An
Eleventh Amendment holding that will have its primary substantive impact on
suits seeking damages from the state was thus rendered in a case in which
damages were not at stake.
Because the Tribe had sued the Governor as well as the State, the Court
had to do some fancy footwork even to reach the Union Gas issue. Had the
Court sustained the suit against the Governor, the need to determine whether
the suit against the State should be dismissed would have evaporated. The
Court could perhaps have gone on to consider whether a suit against the state
seeking the same relief could be maintained even after finding that the relief
could be sought against the Governor, but reversing Union Gas where nothing
at all turned on it would have seemed too much like an advisory opinion, even
152. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1119 (1996).
153. See id.
154. See id. at 1127-28.
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if technically it may not have been one. But dismissing the suit against the
Governor required some doctrinal gymnastics. The Court held that the suit
against the Governor could not be maintained because IGRA authorized only
a suit against the State and placed certain limits on what the court could
order. 155 The Court concluded that permitting the Tribe to obtain injunctive
relief against the Governor would be incompatible with the finely-honed
remedial scheme Congress had set up when it enacted IGRA. 156 The
principle the Court applied in dismissing the suit against the Governor-that
an injunctive remedy against a state official is unavailable to enforce a statute
if Congress in enacting the statute set up an enforcement mechanism that is
incompatible with such a remedy-is unexceptionable. Indeed, the Court had
established such a rule with respect to suits under section 1983, 157 and it
would have been extraordinary had the Court found an injunctive remedy to
be available independently of section 1983 where the same remedy would be
unavailable under section 1983 because incompatible with the statute
establishing the right. What is difficult to understand is the Court's conclusion
that the injunctive remedy the Tribe sought against the Governor would have
been inconsistent with the remedial scheme established in IGRA. First, it is a
stretch to say that IGRA contemplated only suits against the State. 158 Even
assuming it did, the Court struck this provision down because suits against the
state violate the Eleventh Amendment. How can a suit against the Governor
seeking the very same relief be said to be incompatible with the scheme
Congress set up? The Court said it was incompatible because IGRA did not
authorize a court order requiring compliance with the obligation to negotiate
in good faith, but authorized only specific steps the court could take in
response to the State's failure to comply. 159 But the Tribe did not seek in the
suit against the Governor anything more than it could have gotten in its suit
against the State, 160 and the Court did not explain why permitting a suit
seeking that limited form of relief to go forward would be incompatible with
IGRA's remedial scheme. At any rate, the Court made it clear that the
problem, such as it was, was statutory. It recognized that the Eleventh
155. Specifically, the court could not require the State to negotiate in good faith; it could only refer
the matter to a mediator if the State refused to negotiate, and if no agreement was reached after a certain
period of time, the matter would be referred to the Secretary of the Interior. See id. at 1120.
156. See id. at 1131-33.
157. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clatnmers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 13-18
(1981).
158. The statute does not specifically provide that the suit must be brought against the state, as
opposed to its officials. Its jurisdictional provision merely states that the district courts shall have
jurisdiction over "any cause of action initiated by an Indian tribe arising from the failure of a State to enter
into negotiations with the Indian tribe ...." 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A)(i) (1994). The Court's construction
of this language as requiring that the suit be brought against the state, as opposed to its officials, appeared
to contravene the well-known maxim that statutes are to be construed where possible so as to avoid
constitutional problems. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. 490, 504-07 (1979).
159. See Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1120.
160. See Jackson, supra note 15.
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Amendment would not prevent Congress from authorizing a suit against the
Governor for the limited relief IGRA contemplated in a suit against the
State. 161
The mess the Court made of Ex parte Young doctrine in Seminole Tribe
is not the focus of this Article. 162 I have discussed it to the extent that I have
to suggest that even the principal holding of the case shares an important
feature of obiter dicta: It was rendered in a case whose facts did not squarely
present the issue. At the very least, it was rendered in a case involving a form
of relief that was unavailable in the case, at best, because of a gross drafting
error on Congress's part. Relatedly, the Court's tortured reasoning in the Ex
parte Young part of the opinion showed its eagerness to take liberties to
accomplish quick doctrinal change in this area. For these reasons, technical
distinctions between holding and dicta seem to be out of place in examining
the Court's opinion. 163
A. Indications in Seminole Tribe of a Shift to the Immunity-from-Liability
Interpretation
In summing up its holding overruling Union Gas, the Court in Seminole
Tribe stated that "[e]ven when the Constitution vests in Congress complete
lawmaking authority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents
congressional authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting
states." 164 The Court's failure to limit that statement to suits in the federal
courts, suggesting that Congress lacks the power to authorize suits against the
states enforceable in state courts, may just have been an oversight. Yet there
are further indications in the Seminole Tribe opinion that the majority in that
case regarded Eleventh Amendment immunity as immunity from liability, not
just from federal jurisdiction, and thus understood its holding as a holding that
Congress may not subject states to liability to private individuals pursuant to
Article I powers. Admittedly, the suggestions are subtle and may reflect
nothing more than sloppy drafting or a failure to think through the issues. It
161. See 116 S. Ct. at 1132-33. The Court did not decide whether the obligations IGRA imposed on
the states comported with the constitutional limitations the Court enunciated in New York v. United States.
Thus it is certainly not clear that a statute obligating the Governor to negotiate in good faith would be
constitutional. See infra note 305 and accompanying text. But such a statute would not violate the Eleventh
Amendment.
162. On this subject, see Jackson, supra note 15.
163. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens offers another, very different reason for regarding the
majority's treatment of the Eleventh Amendment as dictum. The functions that IGRA requires the federal
courts to perform, he maintains, are not "judicial" functions within the meaning of Article III, because the
courts' "dispensible involvement [comes] in the intermediate stages of a procedure that begins and ends
in the Executive Branch." Seminole Tribe, 116 S. Ct. at 1144-45 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also infra
note 305 and accompanying text (discussing whether IGRA is unconstitutional, because it commandeers
states in violation of New York v. United States).
164. 116 S. Ct. at 1131.
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is possible, however, that the evidence to which I shall point reflects a shift
towards a conception of the Eleventh Amendment as an immunity from
liability.
1.

The Seminole Tribe Court's Interpretation of Cohens

As discussed above, the Court in McKesson said that the Eleventh
Amendment does not limit the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. This
proposition is usually traced to the Court's decision in Cohens v. Virginia. 165
Cohens was an action brought by the state of Virginia in its own courts against
private individuals. The individuals lost in the state courts and appealed to the
Supreme Court. The Court's Eleventh Amendment holding might be
understood merely as a holding that a state waives its immunity when it
initiates an action against an individual in state court, and that the Eleventh
Amendment therefore does not bar an appeal to the Supreme Court from a
judgment favoring the state. So construed, the Amendment could still bar an
appeal to the Supreme Court in a case that was initiated in the state courts by
the private party. The Court's opinion in Cohens appears to support such an
interpretation. 166 In McKesson, however, the Court acknowledged this
ambiguity in Cohens and went on to note that the decision had come to be
understood for the broad proposition that the Eleventh Amendment simply does
not limit the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. 167
In light of this history, it is interesting to note the Seminole Tribe Court's
interpretation of Cohens. The Court described the case as standing for the
proposition that "this Court is empowered to review a question of federal law
arising from a state court decision where a State has consented to suit." 168
The Court's resurrection of the "consent" interpretation of Cohens casts doubt
on the forum-allocation interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. It suggests
that if Congress subjects a state to monetary liability to individuals, a state
may still interpose a state law defense of sovereign immunity to bar the action
in state courts, and, if the state thus signals its lack of consent to the suit, the
U.S. Supreme Court would lack the power to review any state court decision.
Although in theory perhaps the state courts would remain bound by the
Supremacy Clause to afford the federal remedy, in practice there would be no
way for a federal court to intervene should the state violate that obligation. The
result is that the states may effectively immunize themselves from federal
liabilities.

165. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
166. See generally Jackson, supra note I, at 19-25.
167. See McKesson Corp. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 4% U.S. 18, 27 (1990)
(citing General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 233 (1908) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
168. 116 S. Ct. at 1131 n.14 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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As noted above, the "consent" language the Court employed in Seminole
Tribe was also used by the Court in McKesson in describing its Eleventh
Amendment holding. Yet as discussed above, McKesson itself holds that the
Due Process Clause requires the states to provide a hearing and a damage
remedy in certain circumstances, and this conflicts flatly with the idea that a
state is free to interpose its own law of sovereign immunity to deny the
required remedy. Reich v. Collins confirms that the state may not do so. 169
It would certainly be odd to say that an unlawful invocation of sovereign
immunity is nevertheless effective to defeat the Supreme Court's appellate
jurisdiction. Such an interpretation of McKesson likewise would be inconsistent
with the Court's holding in General Oil Co. v. Crain, 170 on which the
McKesson Court also relied. In Crain, the state court had relied on the state's
own law of sovereign immunity in refusing to entertain a suit seeking an
injunction, 171 but the Supreme Court ruled that the state-law sovereign
immunity did not deprive it of jurisdiction to review the case. 172
Given that the main thrust of the McKesson opinion was that the states
were required to provide certain remedies, a reader might be forgiven for
taking Justice Brennan's reference to the states' "assent" as a reference to
some form of constructive assent. Perhaps Justice Brennan would say that a
state "assents" to a suit against it by taking cognizance of the case even if the
suit is dismissed at the outset on sovereign immunity grounds. If so, then a
state effectively assents to Supreme Court review of cases against it by having
a system of courts that allows the filing of claims by individuals. 173 (Justice
Brennan argued forcefully in a number of cases that the states should be
deemed to have waived their immunity from private claims in federal court by
ratifying the Constitution. 174) Chief Justice Rehnquist's reference to
"consent" as a condition of the Court's appellate jurisdiction over suits against
the states is no doubt a reference to a more robust understanding of that

169. See 115 S. Ct. 547, 549 (1994) (holding that state courts must give effect to federal statute
imposing liability on state, notwithstanding "the sovereign immunity States traditionally enjoy in their own
courts").
170. 209 u.s. 211 (1908).
171. See id. at 216.
172. See id. at 228.
173. Indeed, a state would probably be deemed to have assented to suits against it on this theory even
if its court system did not permit the filing of claims by individuals. Vicki Jackson maintains that "[t]he
mere existence of the state court of general jurisdiction to which a claim against the state might be
presented, even absent the state's consent to be sued, has justified the Supreme Court's assertion of
constitutional obligations to provide remedies against the state," Jackson, supra note I, at 38, but she goes
on to recognize that "to the extent consent refers to the mere existence of a state court system, the concept
no longer seems aptly captured by the word 'consent,"' id. at 39. For a discussion of the cases cited by
Jackson for the first proposition, see infra note 390.
174. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. I, 19-20 (1988) (arguing that states, by
ratifying Constitution, relinquished immunity where Congress found it necessary under Commerce Clause
to render them liable); Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 192 (1964) (same).
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term. 175 As noted above, making the states' consent a condition of the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction over suits against them would be
tantamount to an adoption of the immunity-from-liability interpretation of the
Eleventh Amendment.
2.

Seminole Tribe:s- Prescriptions for Antitrust, Bankruptcy, Copyright,
and Patent Claims Against the States

If the Court's interpretation of Cohens had been the only hint in Seminole
Tribe that the Court regarded Eleventh Amendment immunity as an immunity
from liability, I could perhaps be accused of making too much of what may
simply have been a careless description of precedent. 176 Another portion of
the Court's opinion, however, reinforces this interpretation.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens cited as a reason for rejecting the
Court's abrogation holding the problems it would pose for the effective
enforcement against the states of numerous federal statutes, including those
relating to antitrust, patent, bankruptcy, and copyright. 177 Federal courts have
exclusive jurisdiction over suits to enforce those statutes. Thus, if Congress
lacks the power to subject the states to private suits in federal court, no forum
would exist for the enforcement of state obligations under these statutes. 178
The majority described Justice Stevens's fears as exaggerated, 179 but the two
reasons the majority gave for this characterization are telling. First, it noted
that prospective relief may be obtained in the federal courts for violation of
these statutes under Ex parte Young} 80 Second, it observed that the Court
175. Chief Justice Rehnquist does, however, say plainly that a state's consent to being sued in its own
courts will automatically give rise to Supreme Court jurisdiction. The state is thus not free to consent to
suit in its own courts while avoiding possible Supreme Court review of the resulting state court decision.
On the possible justifications for this rule, see infra note 468. The state's freedom to withhold consent to
suit in its own courts may be limited in certain respects by federal law. McKnett v. St. Louis & San
Francisco Railway, 292 U.S. 230 (1934), and related cases hold that the states' discretion to deny
jurisdiction to their courts is limited by a nondiscrimination principle: States may not discriminate against
rights based on federal law. See id. at 234. Scholars have argued that this principle means that states may
not withhold their consent to be sued in their own courts under federal law if they have consented to be
sued on analogous claims based on state law; at least one commentator has gone further and denied that
states can withhold consent to be sued in their own courts in cases based on federal law if they have
consented to be sued in their own courts in any type of case. See Massey, supra note 63, at 145-46. But
see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 3-26, at 184 n.45 (2d ed. 1988); Fletcher,
Historical interpretation, supra note 7, at 1095 & n.243. While the narrower limitation, prohibiting state
refusals to consent if they have consented to similar suits under state law, may be plausible, the broader
one cannot, I think, be reconciled with the statement in Seminole Tribe. Indeed, the proponent of this view
uses this line of argument to argue that the forum-allocation view is correct. See Massey, supra note 63,
at 146.
176. That is, indeed, how I am inclined to take the similar statements of the Seminole Tribe dissenters
and of Justice Kennedy in the Hess case. See infra text accompanying notes 220-26.
177. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1134 & n.l (1996) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
178. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
179. See id. at 1131 n.l6.
180. See id.
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has never held that the federal antitrust, copyright, or bankruptcy statutes
authorize suits against the states. 181 (The majority's second response ignored
the problem its decision poses for patent laws, which Congress clearly has
made applicable to the states and enforceable against them in private suits in
federal court. 182) What the majority glaringly omitted to say, however, is that
Congress could easily alleviate the problem by giving the state courts
jurisdiction over these suits. If it had viewed Eleventh Amendment immunity
as an immunity from original federal jurisdiction only, the majority surely
would have regarded state court suits under these statutes, subject to Supreme
Court review, as an effective way to enforce these statutes insofar as they
impose obligations on the states. Justice Stevens probably would not have
regarded suits in the state courts as comparable to suits in the federal courts,
but the Justices in the majority tend to have confidence in the state courts'
ability and willingness to enforce federal law faithfully. That was indeed
Justice Powell's point in Atascadero. It is true that with respect to these
statutes, unlike the statute involved in Atascadero, Congress has made the
judgment that only federal court enforcement will do. 183 If the Eleventh
Amendment precludes Congress's preferred scheme (as the Court held in
Seminole Tribe) then it is surely important that state court enforcement with
Supreme Court review remains an option.
The majority's failure to mention this option in responding in a footnote
to a point made by a dissent is not, to be sure, weighty authority for the
proposition that the Court now regards the Eleventh Amendment as
establishing an immunity from liability. Certainly, someone litigating before
the Court would not be well advised to cite this footnote for that proposition.
But I do think that this omission is important for what it tells us about the
majority's mindset when it comes to the Eleventh Amendment. A Justice who,
in considering the Eleventh Amendment, thinks of the forum-allocation
principle that some believe the Amendment to be-a Justice who regards the
Eleventh Amendment as establishing nothing more than that someone who has
a claim against a state must litigate that claim initially in state court and may
seek a federal forum only on appeal-surely, the very first response such a
Justice would have given to Justice Stevens's concern would have been that
Congress could easily fix the problem by granting the state courts jurisdiction
over claims against the states under those statutes (particularly if the Justice
regarded state judges as equally willing and able as federal judges to enforce
federal law). The majority's failure even to mention that possibility as a reason
Justice Stevens's concerns were "exaggerated" shows, at the very least, that the

181. See id.
182. See infra Part IV.A.
183. This judgment is implicit in Congress's decision to give federal courts exclusive jurisdiction.
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Justices in the majority have not internalized the forum-allocation interpretation
of the Eleventh Amendment. 184
B. Pre-Seminole Tribe Support for the Immunity-from-Liability Interpretation
"[F]ootnotes are a dangerous place to seek authoritative statements of law,
particularly in a field as complex as [the Eleventh Amendment]." 185 If the
subtle hints in Seminole Tribe were the only support for the immunity-fromliability interpretation, I would be the first to urge caution. Yet a fresh look at
the pre-Seminole Tribe cases with the "immunity-from-liability versus forumallocation" question in mind shows that this is not just a conflict between clear
Supreme Court holdings, some unanimous, supporting the forum-allocation
interpretation and a few ambiguous footnotes supporting the immunity-fromliability interpretation. The immunity-from-liability interpretation, indeed, finds
significant support in authority dating back to Chisholm.

1.

The Framers' Intent

To a remarkable degree, recent Eleventh Amendment scholarship has
sought to ascertain the intent of the Framers of the Amendment, and of
Article III as originally adopted. Diversity theorists in particular have sought
to make the case that the Court in Hans got its history wrong. The doctrinal
payoff for their historical scholarship has been small, and not just if measured
by its success in the Supreme Court. In response to scholarly challenges to the
theory, the most persistent of the diversity theorists who stress Framers' intent,
William Fletcher, 186 has clarified the scope of his historical claims, and they
appear to be quite modest. Although he claims that the Eleventh Amendment
was not intended to withdraw "arising under'' jurisdiction over suits against the
states, he concludes that it is not at all clear that the Framers of Article III
intended to extend the federal judicial power to suits against the states based
184. Scholars writing after Seminole Tribe have discussed Eleventh Amendment immunity as if it
related to more than just the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. See, e.g., Suing the State Gets Tough,
LEGAL TIMES, July 29, 1996, at S41 (statement of Michael Masinter, Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern
Univ.) (interpreting Seminole Tribe as adopting immunity-from-liability interpretation of Eleventh
Amendment). But see Monaghan, supra note 34, at 125 (rejecting such an interpretation).
185. Fletcher, Historical Interpretation, supra note 7, at 1097.
186. I call Fletcher the most persistent because, after defending the diversity interpretation at some
length in Fletcher, Historical Interpretation, supra note 7, he has twice responded in print to the theory's
critics. See Correspondence, supra note 7; Fletcher, Diversity Explanation, supra note 7. The other diversity
scholar who stresses Framers' intent is Gibbons, supra note 7. Although Amar, supra note 7, and Jackson,
supra note I, make Framers' intent arguments, they give greater prominence to arguments based on
constitutional structure and principle. Granted, these latter arguments are based in part on arguments about
the general values and principles held by the Founders, but Fletcher and Gibbons place greater emphasis
on the evidence (or lack of evidence) of what the Framers intended to accomplish when they adopted the
Eleventh Amendment.
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on federal law in the first place. This was, Fletcher writes, an "unsettled, and
very difficult, question[] that [was] left to be answered as the meaning of the
Constitution unfolded." 187 Hans, of course, settled the question (at least for
a time), but the answer the Court provided does not satisfy Professor Fletcher
because: (1) the Court in Hans mistakenly relied on the Eleventh Amendment
instead of Article III; and (2) the Court mistakenly believed that history
provided an answer. The first objection seems purely terminological.
Substantively, Fletcher is willing to concede that an interpretation of Article
III's "arising under" slause that would protect states transsubstantively 188
from suits brought by individuals is not in conflict with the intent of Article
III's Framers, and he expressly agrees that the Framers of the Eleventh
Amendment did not mean to deny states that protection. As far as terminology
is concerned, I am willing to stipulate that the term "Eleventh Amendment
immunity" is shorthand for the protection that any part of the Constitution
gives the states from the federal government's power to impose and enforce
judicial remedies against them. The second objection is not an objection to
Hans's conclusion, but rather to the way the Court arrived at it. The objection
implicates profound issues of constitutional interpretation, as does the decision
about how to respond to Hans's error, if such it be, after having lived with it
and relied on it in many ways for just shy of a century. 189 In the end, the
disagreement between diversity theorists and their critics is not so much about
history as about the relative weight constitutional interpreters should give to
other types of arguments, including arguments about stare decisis 190 and
about constitutional structure and principle. 191
I do not propose to address those questions here. I instead make a modest
claim about the Framers' intent: While there is conflicting evidence on whether
the Framers of Article III and of the Eleventh Amendment intended to confer
(or preserve) a right to sue states in federal courts for violating federal law,
there appears to be no evidence that the Framers "intended" to establish the
187. Correspondence, supra note 7, at 137.
!88. By this I mean without regard to the particular provision of federal law sought to be enforced.
Fletcher's willingness to entertain the possibility that Article ill might give states such transsubstantive
protection appears at first to conflict with what I had taken to be his position: that whether states can be
subjected to damage liability to individuals should tum on an interpretation of the particular provision of
the Constitution that Congress claims to be exercising when it purports to subject the states to such liability.
See Fletcher, Historical Interpretation, supra note 7, at 1108-09. But the positions are actually not in
conflict. He apparently concedes that history does not preclude an interpretation of Article III that would
give states such transsubstantive protection, but he offers nonhistorical arguments for treating the question
as a matter of interpreting particular constitutional provisions giving Congress legislative powers. See id.
at 1118-27.
189. On this question, see Jackson, supra note I, at 7: and Sherry, supra note 42.
190. See Marshall, supra note 7, at 1375 ("The ninety-nine years of jurisprudence built upon Hans
creates a presumption in favor of the current interpretation of state immunity. Review of the historical
evidence and arguments, in tum, establishes that the diversity theorists have not overcome the
presumption.").
191. See generally Amar, supra note 7 (relying heavily on arguments based on structure and principle);
Jackson. supra note I (relying on arguments based on structure, principle, and judicial doctrine).
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forum-allocation principle that some regard the Eleventh Amendment as
embodying. Indeed, there is some evidence that the Framers did not intend that
principle. More importantly, given what virtually all scholars appear to agree
was one of the Framers' key concerns when they adopted the Eleventh
Amendment, it is unreasonable to attribute to them the intent to establish the
forum-allocation principle. Thus, while the historical evidence may well be
indeterminate as to whether the Eleventh Amendment was or was not meant
to apply to claims under federal law, it cuts decidedly against the claim that
the states are required to entertain federal damage actions against themselves
in their own courts, subject to appellate review in the federal courts.
The critics of the diversity theory have made a convincing case that in
adopting the Eleventh Amendment, "the framers clearly were motivated by a
concern for the protection of state treasuries." 192 Fletcher agrees that the
"adopters" of the Amendment "wanted to protect state treasuries," 193 and
other "diversity theorists do not deny" this. 194 As Fletcher describes it, the
point of contention is this: While the diversity theory's critics maintain that the
Framers meant to protect state treasuries from actions under federal law as
well as state law, its defenders maintain that the desire to protect state
treasuries
did not necessarily prevail over all others. It prevailed when state
treasuries were at risk from suits, like Chisholm, based on non-federal
law brought under the state-citizen diversity clause, for there was little
countervailing federal interest. But when violations of federal law
were at issue, the relative strength of the claim of the state treasuries
was diminished. 195
Whether the Amendment in the end left open the possibility of suing the states
on federal claims depends, Fletcher says, on whether Article III allowed it in
the first place, and that question, he concludes, was "both unresolved and very

192. Marshall, supra note 7, at 1383.
193. See Correspondence, supra note 7, at 135-36, where Fletcher expresses agreement on this point
with Calvin Massey, a critic of the diversity theory.
194. Marshall, supra note 7, at 1386; see also Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 401Hl7
(1821); RAOUL BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SUPREME COURT 327 (1969); Amar, supra note 7, at 1474
n.202 (arguing that Framers of Eleventh Amendment were concerned with protecting states from debt
actions); Alan D. Cullison, Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Case of the White Knight's Green
Whiskers, 5 Hous. L. REv. l, 7 (1967); Herbert Hovenkamp, Judicial Restraint and Constitutional
Federalism: The Supreme Court's Lopez and Seminole Tribe Decisions, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 2213, 2240
(1996) (arguing that Eleventh Amendment is "concerned with private actions compelling states to pay their
war debts" and that focus of debate was between those who wanted to bar federal as well as nonfederal
actions against states and those who wanted to bar only nonfederal actions); Jackson, supra note I, at 23;
Nowak, supra note 58, at 1437-39.
195. Correspondence, supra note 7, at 136; see also Hovenkamp, supra note 194, at 2240 (arguing
importance of federal-law claims against states under Treaty of Paris in historical debate over scope of
Eleventh Amendment).
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difficult." 196 Taking the view more congenial to the diversity theory, it
appears that for some Framers, the desire to protect state treasuries prevailed
over the "countervailing federal interests" and for others it did not. As the
Amendment did not reflect a meeting of the minds on this issue, Fletcher
maintains, its adoption cannot be said to have resolved the dispute.
Perhaps not, but on one point we can attribute an agreement to the
Framers: An arrangement under which the states courts would have been
required to entertain suits seeking damages against states on the basis of
federal law, subject to Supreme Court review, would not have satisfied anyone.
The "countervailing federal interests" would have been sacrificed by such an
arrangement, as enforcement of federal law would have been delayed. The
states' interest in protecting their treasuries would not have been protected
either if the states remained liable in damages under federal law and the
Supreme Court remained available to enforce that obligation if the state courts
did not. 197 Even if the arrangement would have enabled the states to
postpone the day of reckoning, the Supreme Court would presumably have had
the power to award the federal rightholder interest to compensate for the delay.
In any event, surely the Amendment was not designed to protect state
treasuries by rewarding states' recalcitrance in complying with their federal
obligations. In short, the forum-allocation interpretation is incompatible with
any desire to protect state treasuries. 198
That the Framers were not of the view that the states were required to
entertain federal damage actions against themselves in their own courts is
affirmatively suggested by the history of the Amendment's approval in the
House. Among the versions of the Amendment that were rejected by the House
was one that would have accomplished just that. This version would have
limited the Amendment's application to suits against states '"where such State
shall have previously made provision in their own courts, whereby such suit
may be prosecuted to effect. "' 199 This proposal was defeated overwhelmingly
(77 votes to 8), and immediately thereafter the current version passed 81 to
9?00 The most reasonable interpretation of this history is that whatever

196. Correspondence, supra note 7, at 136.
197. The Supreme Court's jurisdiction under section 25 of the Judiciary Act to review state court
decisions denying federal rights was mandatory. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 100, at 492-93.
198. At least some diversity theorists have expressed skepticism about the forum-allocation
interpretation. See Amar, supra note 7, at 1477-78 nn.209 & 211; Fletcher, Historical Interpretation, supra
note 7, at 1093-99; see also ORrn, supra note 42, at 11, 139, 151 (expressing skepticism); Tribe, supra
note 58, at 692 (same). But cf Gibbons, supra note 7, at 1937 n.256 (considering forum-allocation view
"reasonable"). Less surprisingly, the few defenders of Hans reject the forum-allocation view. See, e.g.,
DAVID CURRIE, FEDERAL COURTS 573 (1975) ("[D]o you really believe the storm over Chisholm v.
Georgia was over so trivial a matter as the choice of forum?").
199. JACOBS, supra note 42, at 66-67 (quoting 4 ANNALS OF CONG. 476-77 (Mar. 4, 1794)).
200. See id.
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protection the Framers wanted to give the states was assumed to apply in state
court as well as federal court. 201
2.

The Continuing Doctrinal Connection Between the Eleventh
Amendment and the Protection of State Treasuries

The Justices in the majority in Seminole Tribe appeared distinctly, if
uncharacteristically, uninterested in historical arguments. 202 I am certainly not
arguing that evidence of the Framers' intent should prevail in this area over
such other indicia of constitutional meaning as evolved judicial doctrine. But,
where the Framers' intent on a particular subject has been and continues to be
relied on by the Court in resolving constitutional questions, the case for taking
that intent seriously in resolving related questions is, in my view, strong. In
this Section, I show that the Court continues to resolve questions in the
Eleventh Amendment area by invoking the idea that the Amendment's purpose
is to protect state treasuries-a purpose that, as noted already, is simply
incompatible with the forum-allocation interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment. This case law not only strengthens the argument for taking
seriously the evidence that the Framers indeed had that purpose, it also
supplies independently relevant doctrinal support for the immunity-fromliability interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. 203

201. My review of the secondary literature has uncovered no persuasive support for the idea that the
Framers intended to establish a forum-allocation principle. Clyde Jacobs has noted that Spencer Roane,
Marshall's political enemy on the Virginia Court of Appeals, see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 100, at
496, insisted in response to the decision in Cohens v. Virginia that the Eleventh Amendment was not
adopted, as Marshall had suggested, "'on the sordid ground of unwillingness in the States to pay debts,"'
but instead reflected an objection to requiring states to defend suits in the federal courts. See CHARLES G.
HAINES, I THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS, 1789-1835,
at 441 (1960) (quoting Roane) cited in JACOBS, supra note 42, at 91-92. Roane's point, however, was
decidedly not that state courts would entertain suits against the states at the behest of individuals, as he
mentions in the same very discussion (approvingly) the resolution passed by the Virginia legislature in
response to Chisholm to the effect that "a State cannot, under the Constitution of the United States, be
made a defendant at the suit of any individual." HAINES, supra, at 441. He certainly would not have agreed
that the Supreme Court could review a state court decision dismissing a suit against a state based on federal
law. That position conflicts with the entire thrust of his comments in response to Cohens, as well as with
his opinion for the Virginia Court of Appeals in Hunter v. Faiifax's Devisee, 15 Va. (I Munf.) 218, 223-32
(1810), rev'd sub nom. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816), which denied the power
of the Supreme Court to review the decisions on federal questions rendered by state courts even in suits
involving only private parties.
202. The majority denigrated Justice Souter's dissent, which relied extensively on historical scholarship
concerning the intent of the Founders, as "a theory cobbled together from law review articles and its own
version of historical events," and it described the dissent's "extralegal" explanation of the Hans decision
as "a disservice to the Court's traditional method of adjudication." Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct.
1114, 1129-30 (1996).
203. It is arguable that reasons of doctrinal coherence would justify a court in continuing to rely on
a supposed "intent" of the Framers if it has done so in the past, even if it could be shown that the Framers
did not in fact have any such intent. If so, then the doctrine I shall discuss in the rest of this Part may
supply sufficient reasons for rejecting the forum-allocation interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment even
if the evidence of Framers' intent I just discussed did not exist. Moreover, where, as here, there is doctrinal
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The Edelman Line of Cases and the Prospective/Retrospective
Distinction

As noted, the Court has long drawn a distinction for Eleventh Amendment
purposes between suits against the states and suits against state officials. The
Eleventh Amendment does not bar suits against state officials who are alleged
to be violating federal law, on the theory that because the states lack the power
to authorize their officials to violate federal law, an official who does so is not,
in contemplation of law, acting in the name of the state. Notwithstanding the
notion that the official is not acting in the name of the state for Eleventh
Amendment purposes, the Court has no trouble in this context concluding that
the official's action is state action sufficient to make the Constitution's
substantive prohibition applicable. The Ex parte Young "authority-stripping"
rationale for escaping the Eleventh Amendment bar is now understood to rest
on a "fiction," 204 a fiction the Court has considered necessary to "give[] life
to the Supremacy Clause."205 Courts and scholars now recognize that the
defendant in an Ex parte Young action is for all practical purposes the state

support for conflicting interpretations, evidence that the Framers in fact did have such an intent may tilt
the scales in favor of the one consistent with that intent.
On the other hand, I am willing to discount evidence of Framers' intent that is based on conceptions
that are no longer widely shared. On this score, I should address a possible objection to my reliance on the
Framers' apparent assumption that state courts were not required to entertain in their own courts suits
brought by individuals against them based on federal law. It may well be that this assumption was based
on their broader assumption that state courts were under no obligation to entertain federal claims of any
sort. See Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995
WIS. L. REv. 39 (defending latter position). As applied to federal suits against individuals, this broader
assumption conflicts with a great deal of entrenched case law that recognizes an obligation of states under
the Supremacy Clause to entertain federal law suits in their own courts, at least if those courts have
jurisdiction over analogous suits based on state law. See generally id. at 166-70 (discussing Testa v. Katt,
330 U.S. 386 (1947), and related cases). I regard the latter line of cases as well-settled and accept the
principle they established as part of our constitutional landscape. Indeed, I substantially agree with those
who have argued that the state courts would be under a constitutional obligation to entertain (at least) suits
seeking injunctive relief from constitutional violations by state or federal officials, (at least) if Congress
denied the federal courts jurisdiction over such suits. See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note I 00, at
373-79, 469. (It appears that Collins does not disagree with this, although he would prefer to say that such
an action is a "state-law" action. See Collins, supra, at ]64-{)6 n.359 (discussing General Oil Co. v. Crain,
209 U.S. 211 ( 1908)).) I do not regard the evidence that the Founders held a contrary assumption to be part
of our usable past. It is nevertheless legitimate to rely on the Founders' narrower assumption that states
were not required to entertain federal law suits for damages against themselves in their own courts, even
if their narrower assumption was based on their broader assumption. The consequence of the broader
assumption (as applied to suits involving only individuals) was simply to require Congress to create lower
federal courts and endow them with jurisdiction over such suits, something that Congress has done and is
unlikely to undo, particularly with respect to suits to enforce federal statutes. In light of the Eleventh
Amendment, the consequence of the narrower assumption was to deny Congress the power to create any
judicially enforceable liability against the states. The Founders' application of the broader principle to the
specific context of suits against the states has a special relevance to what they understood would be
accomplished by the Eleventh Amendment. Moreover, the Founders' views on this narrower issue continue
to be invoked by the Court today, whereas their views on the broader question are rightly considered part
of a "jurisdictional Stone Age." Collins, supra, at 170.
204. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 114 n.25 (1984).
205. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985).
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itself, 206 but the Eleventh Amendment does not bar such suits even though
they often will result in a judicial order requiring the significant expenditure
of state resources. 207
In Edelman v. Jordan, 208 the Court drew a distinction between suits
seeking prospective relief from ongoing violations of federal law and suits
seeking retrospective relief from past violations of federal law. The Eleventh
Amendment does not apply to suits seeking prospective relief even though the
costs will be borne by the state, but it does bar suits seeking retrospective
relief if the damages are sought from the state. 209 The Court has not had an
easy time distinguishing prospective from retrospective relief. For present
purposes, we need not examine where the line falls or how convincing or
stable the Court's jurisprudence in this area has been. Edelman and succeeding
cases are important to us because of what they show about how the Court
conceives of Eleventh Amendment immunity.
The Court in Edelman did not explain the policies advanced by
interpreting the Eleventh Amendment to permit suits seeking prospective relief,
but not suits seeking retrospective relief. But a clue to the Court's thinking can
be found in its response to Justice Douglas's claim that the effect on the state
treasury is the same in both circumstances. The majority stated:
This argument neglects the fact that where the State has a definable
allocation to be used in the payment of public aid benefits . . . the
subsequent ordering by a federal court of retroactive payments to
correct delays in such processing will invariably mean there is less
money available for payments for the continuing obligations of the
public aid system. 210
Of course, an order of retroactive benefits by a state court would have
precisely the same effect. The majority's response to Douglas was accordingly
no response at all if it conceived of the Eleventh Amendment as merely a
forum-allocation principle, reflecting, as Justice Powell indicated in
Atascadero, a confidence that state courts would give effect to federal law
faithfully, and subject in any event to review by the Supreme Court. The
majority's response makes sense only if it viewed the Amendment as

206. Although, as the Court in Seminole Tribe reminded us, the Eleventh Amendment still immunizes
states from being sued by private parties by name, even for prospective relief. See Seminole Tribe, 116 S.
Ct. at 1122; see also HART & WECHSLER, supra note 100, at 1073.
207. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977).
208. 415 u.s. 651 (1974).
209. The Eleventh Amendment does not bar a suit seeking retrospective relief from the officer's own
resources. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 100, at 1076. In this context, however, the officer will be
protected by an "official immunity" that protects her from liability if her conduct did not violate "clearly
established" federal law. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
210. 415 U.S. at 666 n.ll.
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protecting state coffers, something that only the immunity-from-liability
interpretation would do.
Its subsequent decision in Quern v. Jordan 211 confirmed that this is how
the Court viewed the Amendment. After the Edelman case was remanded, the
lower federal courts ordered the state official to send members of the plaintiff
class a "'mere explanatory notice ... advising them that there is a state
administrative procedure available if they desire to have the state determine
whether or not they may be eligible for past benefits. "'212 The Court upheld
this notice requirement as ancillary to the prospective injunctive relief the
Court had upheld in Edelman. In explaining its decision, the Court stressed
that under the notice, "whether or not the class member will receive retroactive
benefits rests entirely with the State, its agencies, courts, and legislature, not
with the federal court." 213 In Green v. Mansour, 214 the Court explained
Quern as standing for the notion that "state agencies rather than federal courts
would be the final arbiters of whether retroactive payments would be
ordered." 215 These statements are inconsistent with the forum-allocation
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. As discussed in Part I, if the
Amendment relates only to the original jurisdiction of the federal courts, it tells
us nothing about whether the states are under a federal obligation to provide
retroactive payments to individuals. If a statute does require such payments,
then the Supremacy Clause would require the state courts to award such relief,
and if the state courts violate that obligation, the Supreme Court would have
jurisdiction to reverse their judgments. Thus the availability of retrospective
relief would not depend on action by the state "legislature," and state agencies
would not be the "final arbiters of whether retroactive payments would be
ordered." The Court's statements would be true only if there were no federal
obligation to afford individuals monetary relief (or no Supreme Court power
to enforce that obligation). However, if that is what the Court held in these
Eleventh Amendment decisions, it understood the Amendment to bear on
liability, not just the original jurisdiction of the federal courts. 216
211. 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
212. /d. at 336 (quoting Jordan v. Trainor, 563 F.2d 873, 875 (7th Cir. 1977) (en bane), aft'd, 440
U.S. 332).
213. /d. at 348.
214. 474 u.s. 64 (1985).
215. /d. at 71.
216. Vicki Jackson has pointed out that the statute involved in Green expressly required the states,
as a condition of receiving federal funds, to compensate individuals for benefits that had been wrongfully
withheld, and that although the statute apparently did not require states to grant judicial review of decisions
not to compensate, the state of Michigan (the relevant state in Green) had made judicial review available.
Thus, the Court's statement that the state courts and state legislatures would be the "final arbiters" of
whether individuals would receive payment would apparently have been wrong even if we assumed the
correctness of the immunity-from-liability interpretation. The state undertook to provide retrospective relief
in exchange for federal funds, thus incurring a federal obligation, and the state's voluntary decision to grant
judicial review would appear to satisfy Seminole Tribe's "consent" condition for Supreme Court review of
a Michigan court's erroneous decision to deny such relief. The Court in Green appears to have overlooked
these propositions. But this does not detract from the conclusions reached above--that the Court's analysis
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That the Court so viewed the Amendment is suggested further by the
Court's explanation in Green and in Papasan v. Allain211 of the rationale for
distinguishing between prospective and retrospective relief. The Court wrote
in Green:
Both prospective and retrospective relief implicate Eleventh
Amendment concerns, but the availability of prospective relief of the
sort awarded in Ex parte Young gives life to the Supremacy Clause.
Remedies designed to end a continuing violation of federal law are
necessary to vindicate the federal interest in assuring the supremacy
of that law. But compensatory or deterrence interests are insufficient
to overcome the dictates of the Eleventh Amendment. 218
The Court here speaks of Eleventh Amendment immunity as if it determined
the type of relief available for violations of federal law, not as merely
specifying the initial forum in which such relief may be obtained. If the
Amendment had been perceived as merely allocating the initial duty to enforce
federal norms in certain circumstances to a nonfederal forum considered
equally effective, the Court's rationale would not make much sense, for the
interest in deterring and compensating in those instances would not be
sacrificed in the state forum, nor would the interest in stopping ongoing
violations of federal law be compromised by relegating that form of relief to
state courts. The Court seems to be saying in these cases that prospective relief
is all that is needed to give federal norms efficacy; deterrence and
compensation are not necessary and are accordingly unavailable. 219
in this case is in substantial tension with the forum-allocation interpretation. Indeed, Professor Jackson
makes that point herself. See Jackson, supra note I, at 71-72 (referring to Green's "inconsistency with [the
idea that the] Supreme Court [has the power to review] state cases involving federal questions").
217. 478 u.s. 265 (1986).
218. 474 U.S. at 68 (citations omitted). In Papasan, the Court quoted the last two of these sentences
and added that the Young doctrine applies to cases "in which the relief against the state official directly
ends the violation of federal law as opposed to cases in which that relief is intended indirectly to encourage
compliance with federal law through deterrence or directly to meet third-party interests such as
compensation." 478 U.S. at 278.
219. There is perhaps an explanation of the Court's differing treatment of prospective and retrospective
relief that would be consistent with the forum-allocation interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, but this
explanation rests on an assumption that the defenders of Hans have been unwilling to make (at least
publicly): that state courts can be expected to be less vigorous than federal courts in enforcing federal
norms. If we make this assumption, then the different treatment of prospective relief and retrospective relief
may be explained as being based on the conviction that the need to stop ongoing violations of federal law
is more pressing than the need to compensate victims of past violations or the need to deter future
violations by punishing past violations. Litigants seeking the less pressing forms of relief may be relegated
to the more burdensome process of suing in state courts with a possible appeal to the Supreme Court.
Where the violation of federal Jaw is already in the past, respect for the dignity of the states outweighs the
need for quick relief. The premise of this argument may not be true; for example, someone who illegally
has been denied public benefits can be expected to have an exceedingly pressing need for those benefits.
Indeed, the need for wrongly withheld past due benefits is likely to be more pressing than the need for not
yet due benefits (the payment of which federal courts have the power to order under Edelman and Hutto).
If one accepts this premise, the distinction may make some sense. On this theory, Congress validly may
determine that deterrence and compensation are important enough to warrant subjecting states to liability,
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Hess and the Question of What Counts as the State

That at least one of the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment is to protect
state coffers plays a prominent role as well in the case law concerning which
entities count as the "state" for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. As
noted, the general rule is that the Amendment protects statewide agencies but
not local government agencies. 220 Occasionally, the courts are confronted
with an agency that does not clearly fall into either category. The Court
confronted such a question most recently in Hess v. Port Authority TransHudson Corp., 221 which involved an entity created by interstate compact. In
reaching its decision that the Eleventh Amendment did not protect the entity
from a suit in federal court under FELA, the Court stressed that ''the
vulnerability of the State's purse [is] the most salient factor in Eleventh
Amendment determinations" 222 and said that "'[o]ne of the most important
goals of the immunity of the Eleventh Amendment is to shield states'
treasuries. "'223
As noted above, if the Eleventh Amendment merely protects the states
from the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, it does not shield the states'
treasuries. 224 Justice Powell in Atascadero was confident that the state courts
would comply with their duty to enforce federallaw, 225 but the state treasury
would not be a beneficiary of a forum-allocation interpretation of the Eleventh
but the Eleventh Amendment reflects a constitutional judgment that such remedies are not so important that
they require immediate access to the lower federal courts. The Supreme Court has not articulated this
rationale for the Amendment, however. Indeed, its current approach appears to be based on the assumption
that state courts faithfully will enforce the states' federal liabilities. See infra text accompanying notes
438-40.
The suggestion in these cases that retrospective relief is unnecessary to secure the efficacy of federal
law is, to be sure, in tension with the rule-of-law ideal. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. As
discussed in Part VI, the availability of retrospective relief against state officials alleviates this difficulty
substantially. In addition to the other mistakes the Court made in Green, see supra note 216, we may add
its overlooking the fact that Edelman left open the possibility of obtaining damages payable by state
officials personally.
220. See supra note 100.
221. 115 S. Ct. 394 (1994).
222. ld. at 404.
223. ld. at 405 (quoting Jacintoport Corp. v. Greater Baton Rouge Port Comm'n, 762 F.2d 435, 440
(5th Cir. 1985)); see also id. ('"[T]he state treasury factor is the most important factor to be considered ...
and, in practice, ... [is] generally accorded ... dispositive weight.'") (quoting Brief for the States of New
Jersey, New York, et al. as Amici Curiae at 18-19, Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 115 S. Ct. 394
(1994) (No. 93-1197)). That protecting state treasuries is one of the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment
appears to have been the view of all of the Justices in Hess. The four dissenting Justices would have
regarded an impact on the state treasury to be a sufficient condition for applying the Eleventh Amendment,
but criticized the majority for apparently making it a necessary condition. See id. at 410 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). Whether a threat to the state treasury is indeed a necessary condition will be addressed by the
Supreme Court in reviewing Doe v. Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, which relied heavily in
concluding that the agency was not entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity on the United States
government's agreement to reimburse a state agency for any damages assessed against it. See 65 F.3d 771
(9th Cir. 1995), cert. granted sub nom. Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Doe, 116 S. Ct. 2522 (1996).
224. See supra text accompanying notes 86-89.
225. See supra text accompanying note 143.

1732

The Yale Law Journal

[Vol. 106: 1683

Amendment even if we made more realistic assumptions about state court
judges, for under the forum-allocation interpretation, the Court would retain the
power to monitor state compliance with federal obligations. Requiring litigants
to pursue their claims against the states through several levels of (by
hypothesis) hostile state courts before reaching a federal tribunal might result
in some marginal gain to state treasuries if litigants decided that the cost of
litigation was not worth the potential gain, 226 but surely the Court did not
mean in Hess that the point of the Eleventh Amendment was to enable the
states to save money by engaging in scorched-earth tactics. The Court's
endorsement in Hess of the idea that the Eleventh Amendment was designed
to protect state treasuries is, in short, irreconcilable with the forum-allocation
interpretation.
3. Additional Support in the Case Law for the Immunity-from-Liability
Interpretation
That one of the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment is to protect state
treasuries is a thread stretching from the Founding to the Supreme Court's
1994 Term, and, for the reasons discussed above, this thread is inconsistent
with the forum-allocation interpretation. But there is more support in the case
law for the immunity-from-liability view. I shall not attempt to quote all of the
statements in Supreme Court opinions that support the immunity-from-liability
view by describing the immunity conferred by the Amendment as an immunity
from unconsented "suits" without going on to specify that the protection
applies only in state courts. 227 Nor shall I refer to other statements in
Supreme Court opinions supporting the immunity-from-liability view if those
statements were not central to the Court's analysis of the issues before it. 228
I shall limit myself to what I regard as the major cases, or lines of cases, that
tend to support the immunity-from-liability interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment.
226. See Jackson, supra note 1, at 64 n.262.
227. See, e.g., Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1934) ("There is also the postulate that
States of the Union, still possessing attributes of sovereignty, shall be immune from suits, witlwut their
consent, save where there has been 'a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention."') (quoting
The Federalist No. 81, at 487 (Alexander Hatnilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)) (emphasis added); Ex
pane New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921) ("That a state may not be sued without its consent is a
fundamental rule of jurisprudence ....").
228. For example, the Court stated in Kiefer & Kiefer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., 306 U.S. 381
(1939), a case involving the immunity of a federally chartered corporation, that "[a]s to the States, legal
irresponsibility was written into the Eleventh Amendment," id. at 388. I am not counting as support for the
immunity-from-liability interpretation statements in dissenting opinions by Justices who adhere to the
diversity interpretation and/or regard the immunity as subject to abrogation by Congress under any of its
powers. For an example of one such statement, see supra text accompanying note 141. Cf Hess v. Port
Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 115 S. Ct. 394 (1994); infra text accompanying notes 255-58 (discussing Hess
majority opinion in which Justices who regard immunity as subject to plenary congressional abrogation
make statements that support immunity-from-liability interpretation of Eleventh Amendment).

Eleventh Amendment Immunity

1997]
a.

1733

Hans

If Seminole Tribe resurrects the Hans interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment, then it makes sense to ask just how the Court in Hans conceived
of the immunity it conferred. Many scholars have pointed out the flaws in the
Hans Court's analysis. My purpose is not to defend the decision but to
understand it. Examination of the Hans decision shows that the Court clearly
did not embrace the forum-allocation interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment. Such an examination of the Hans opinion also supplies additional
pre-Hans support for the immunity-from-liability view.
The Court in Hans concluded that the Eleventh Amendment applied to
cases brought by individuals against their own state, even though the
Amendment does not by its terms apply to such cases, because the
Amendment's Framers intended to constitutionalize the common law sovereign
immunity of the states, which the Chisholm Court had mistakenly interpreted
Article ill to have withdrawn. The common law immunity constitutionalized
by the Amendment appears to have been an immunity from liability. The Court
in Hans, for example, relied on statements of Alexander Hamilton in The
Federalist No. 81 to the effect that the states retained their sovereign
immunity. 229 What Hamilton said was that "[t]he contracts between a nation
and individuals are only binding on the conscience of the sovereign, and have
no pretensions to a compulsive force. They confer no right of action
independent of the sovereign will.' 7230 The Court similarly relied on a
229. See Hans, 134 U.S. at 12-14.
230. THE F'EDERAUST No. 81, at 488 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (emphasis
added); see also Hans, 134 U.S. at 16 (relying on statement of Daniel Webster that "[t]he security for state
loans is the plighted faith of the State as a political community. It rests on ... the good faith of the
government making the loan, and its ability to fulfill its engagements."). It is true that Hamilton and
Webster referred only to liability under the common law, so they arguably would not have extended this
reasoning to federal norms. Indeed, there is a strong argument to be made that the analysis of Hamilton
and Webster should have led the Court in Hans to adopt the diversity interpretation. The starting point of
Hamilton's analysis was the idea that there can be no right of action, no judicial remedy, against the states
as sovereigns. He deduced from that premise the conclusion that the federal courts lacked jurisdiction over
suits against the states, but he deduced from the same premise the conclusion that the states were under
no primary legal obligation to comply with their contracts in the first place. Hamilton's reasoning reflects
what I have elsewhere called a sanctionist view of law, under which a legal duty is said to exist only if its
violation subjects the violator to a judicially enforceable sanction. This is a view of law to which I am
sympathetic, and, indeed, it is a view of law that has resonated powerfully in the American legal culture
since its inception. See generally Vazquez, supra note 80. What is important for present purposes is that,
at first blush anyway, it seems to require a holding different from the one the Court arrived at in Hans. If
a duty that is not judicially enforceable is not a legal duty, then it would seem to follow from the fact that
the Constitution itself imposes duties on the states and declares those duties to be the "law of the land" that
the Eleventh Amendment cannot protect states from suits to enforce those duties. If so, then perhaps the
Hans Court could have cited Hamilton for the proposition that while the states cannot be sued in the federal
courts under the common law, they can be sued in federal court to enforce the duties imposed on them by
the supreme law of the land. Because the Court rejected that interpretation, it must have understood
Hamilton's statements differently. In light of Hans, perhaps we should take him to be making a point about
contractual obligations that is not necessarily true about the other obligations of the state. Because
traditionally the exclusive way to enforce contracts judicially has been for one party to sue the other in
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statement by James Madison that "'[i]t is not in the power of individuals to
call any State into court, "'231 as well as on a statement by John Marshall that
"'[i]t is not rational to suppose that the sovereign power should be dragged
before a court. "'232 Neither statement is consistent with the idea that the
states are required to entertain suits against themselves in their own courts. The
Court also cited Justice Miller's discussion in Cunningham v. Macon &
Brunswick Railroad:
"It may be accepted as a point of departure unquestioned, that neither
a State nor the United States can be sued as defendant in any court
in this country without their consent, except in the limited class of
cases in which a State may be made a party in the Supreme Court of
the United States by virtue of the original jurisdiction conferred on
this court by the Constitution." 233
The Court relied further on Chief Justice Taney's statement for the Court in
Beers v. Arkansas that "'[i]t is an established principle of jurisprudence in all
civilized nations that the sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts, or in any
other, without its consent and permission."' 234 The Court described Justice
Iredell's opinion in Chisholm, with approval, as "contend[ing] that it was not
the intention [of the Founders] to create new and unheard of remedies, by
subjecting sovereign States to actions at the suit of individuals.'m5
The immunity-from-liability interpretation is supported further by the Hans
Court's alternative holding that the general federal question statute as it then
existed did not confer jurisdiction over damage actions brought by individuals
against states. The Court relied on the language in the statute conferring

court, Hamilton was perhaps justified in concluding that a contract that cannot be enforced in court by one
party does not really impose legal obligations on the other party. The federal constitutional obligations of
the states, however, can be enforced in court in ways other than through suits for damages by private
individuals. See supra Section I.C; infra Part VI. Thus, denying individuals the right to obtain damages
from the states for their violations of federal law does not leave those obligations entirely without a
judicially enforceable sanction. If this is how the Court took Hamilton, then we are left with: (I) Hamilton's
statement that individuals can possess no right of action for damages against the states; and (2) the Hans
Court's holding that this lack of remedy extended to suits to enforce federal obligations. These propositions
add up to the conclusion that individuals can possess no right of action for damages against the states under
federal law.
231. 134 U.S. at 14 (quoting 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT
PHILADELPHIA IN 1787 TOGETHER WITH THE JOURNAL OF THE fEDERAL CONVENTION, LUTHER MARTIN'S
LETTER, YATES'S MINUTES, CONGRESSIONAL OPINIONS, VIRGINIA AND KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS OF '98-99
AND OTHER ILLUSTRATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION 533 (reprint 1987) (Jonathan Elliot ed., New York, Burt
Franklin 1888) [hereinafter DEBATES] (statement of James Madison)).
232. 134 U.S. at 14 (quoting 3 DEBATES, supra note 231, at 555 (statement of John Marshall)).
233. !d. at 17 (quoting Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R.R., 109 U.S. 446, 451 (1883))
(emphasis added).
234. ld. (quoting Beers v. Arkansas, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 527, 529 (1857)) (emphasis added).
235. ld. at 12 (emphasis added). The Court in Hans also saidthat suits against the states "are not
subjects of judicial cognizance," id. at 15, again without limiting itself to the federal judiciary.
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jurisdiction on the federal courts "concurrent with the courts of the several
states." 236 The Court said:
Does not this qualification show that Congress, in legislating to carry
the Constitution into effect, did not intend to invest its courts with any
new and strange jurisdictions? The state courts have no power to
entertain suits by individuals against a State without its consent. Then
how does the Circuit Court, having only concurrent jurisdiction,
acquire any such power? 237
The Court thus assumed that states were free to close their courts to claims
against them based on federallaw. 238 Like the other statements quoted above,
this one conflicts with the forum-allocation interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment, which posits that though the Amendment protects the states from
the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts, it does not protect them from being
subjected to liability to individuals, and if federal law imposes such a liability,
they must entertain suits against themselves in their own courts, subject to
Supreme Court review. 239
b.

Poindexter

Another Supreme Court decision that appears to conflict with the forumallocation interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment is Poindexter v.
Greenhow. 240 It is perhaps surprising to find Poindexter among the cases that
support a broad interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, for that case is best
known for its strong affirmation of the importance of federal remedies and
federal jurisdiction for the enforcement of federal constitutional rights, as well

236. ld. at 18.
237. ld.
238. A similar argument appears in Justice Iredell's dissent in Chisholm. See Chisholm v. Georgia,
2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 436-40 (1793) (Iredell, J., dissenting). There is perhaps another available reading of
this part of Hans. The Court here held that the general federal question statute did not confer jurisdiction
over suits against states. Because this was an alternative holding, perhaps we should understand this part
of the Court's opinion as proceeding from the assumption that Congress does have the power to subject
the states to suit in federal court. Thus, it might be argued that the Court contemplated that states would
be able to close their doors to federal claims against them only because (it was assuming) Congress would
have the power to open the federal doors to such claims if it should find it desirable to do so. The Court's
discussion does not seem susceptible to such a reading, however. The Court had just held that the Eleventh
Amendment protected states from being subjected to suit in federal court. It is true that the statutory
interpretation issue would arise only if that holding were rejected (that is the nature of alternative holdings),
but it is nevertheless noteworthy that the Court nowhere suggested that the states' power to close their
doors to federal claims against them would exist only if its alternative holding were rejected.
239. The Court itself has read Hans as recognizing an immunity of states from suit in state as well
as federal court. See Palmer v. Ohio, 248 U.S. 32, 34 (1918) ("The right of individuals to sue a State, in
either a federal or a state court, cannot be derived from the Constitution or laws of the United States. It
can come only from the consent of the State.") (citing, inter alia, Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. I (1890)).
240. 114 U.S. 270 (1885).
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as for its articulation of the reason the Eleventh Amendment did not stand in
the way of the remedy being sought in the case. The remedy being sought in
that case, however, was a remedy against a state official, not a remedy against
the state. The official forcefully argued that the Eleventh Amendment barred
the suit anyway, as he was being sued for action he took in his official
capacity, but the Court rejected the argument for the now familiar reason,
today most closely associated with the later decision in Ex parte Young, 241
that a state official who violates federal law cannot be acting within the scope
of his authority, for federal law, being the supreme law of the land, limits his
authority. Because of the Supremacy Clause, the Court held in Poindexter, the
state is without power to authorize his violation of federal law, and the official
is accordingly subjected in his person to liability for the injuries he caused. 242
What is significant for our purposes is that the Court's lengthy affirmation
of this principle came in a case that was brought in the state courts. There are
two possible reasons why the Court thought it necessary to discuss the
Eleventh Amendment in this case, and both are inconsistent with the forumallocation interpretation. First, the Court may have believed that the
Amendment applied in state court because it conferred an immunity from
liability, not just from federal jurisdiction. Second, the Court may have
believed that the Amendment, when it applies, limits the Court's appellate
jurisdiction. I suggested above that these two reasons are actually one and the
same, for a liability against the states that is not enforceable in the federal
courts is, as a practical matter, no liability at all. That the Court in Poindexter
engaged in an extended discussion of the Eleventh Amendment in a case
brought in the state courts without bothering to say why the Amendment was
relevant suggests that the Court, too, regarded the reasons as identical.
c.

Abrogation Cases

In Section II.B, I discussed some abrogation cases that support the forumallocation interpretation of the Amendment, cases recognizing that failure to
find an abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity does not mean that the
states are free of monetary liability to individuals. Other abrogation cases,
however, support the immunity-from-liability interpretation.
In Atascadero, Justice Powell's majority opinion insisted that a state
statute generally consenting to suit does not amount to a waiver of Eleventh
Amendment immunity. A waiver will be found only where the state's intent
to submit to lawsuits in federal court is so clear that no other inference may
be drawn?43 The Court adopted the same clear statement rule for purposes
241. 209 u.s. 123 (1908).
242. See Poindexter, 114 U.S. at 285-89.
243. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 239-40 (1985).
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of finding a congressional abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity. 244
Yet in recent cases, the Court has been willing to find a congressional
abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity if the statute makes it clear that
Congress intended to subject states to monetary liability to private individuals,
even if the statute does not go on to make it clear that Congress intended that
this liability be enforceable in federal court. Perhaps the most noteworthy of
these cases is Union Gas. There, all of the Justices, in examining the
abrogation issue, looked for evidence that Congress intended to hold states
liable to private individuals, but none looked for evidence that Congress
intended this liability to be enforceable in federal court. The Justices who
dissented on this issue did so because the majority, in their view, failed to
produce sufficient textual evidence to rebut the possibility that Congress
contemplated that the primary obligations imposed on the states by the statute
be enforceable only at the behest of the federal govemment. 245 Vicki Jackson
has provided a convincing explanation of why the Justices were justified in
focusing solely on the liability issue, notwithstanding Atascadero: The federal
courts were given exclusive jurisdiction over the statute involved in Union
Gas. 246 It is at least curious that none of the opinions mentioned this point.
This silence suggests that at least some of the Justices understood the
Amendment to bear on the liability issue, not just the jurisdictional question.
Similar suggestions appear in other opinions. Those of Justice Scalia are
perhaps the most revealing. In Union Gas, he explained his concurrence in
Justice Brennan's abrogation holding as being based on Brennan's showing
that the statute involved "clearly renders States liable for money damages in
private suits."247 He made no mention of federal courts. Scalia made clear
in his brief concurring opinion in Dellmuth v. Muth 248 that, in his view, an
abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity should be found in "statutory
text that clearly subjects States to suit for monetary damages." 249 If this had
been written by another Justice, one might think that he had merely overlooked
the need for a clear statement of the state's amenability to suit in federal court.
One does not expect such technicalities to be overlooked by Justice Scalia
when they serve to insulate states from federal power. A likely explanation is
that Justice Scalia views the states' immunity under the Eleventh Amendment
as an immunity from liability, not just from federal court jurisdiction.

244. See id. at 240; see also id. at 253 n.S (Brennan, J ., dissenting) ('The ... test that the Court
applies to purported state waivers of sovereign immunity is a mirror image of the test it applies to
congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity.").
245. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. I, 55-56 (1989) (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
246. See Vicki C. Jackson, One Hundred Years of Folly: The Eleventh Amendment and the 1988 Term,
64 S. CAL. L. REv. 51, 85-86 n.150 (1990).
247. 491 U.S. at 29 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
248. 491 u.s. 223 (1989).
249. /d. at 233 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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Combining that position with his argument in Union Gas/50 later accepted
by a majority in Seminole Tribe/ 51 that Congress lacks the power to abrogate
Eleventh Amendment immunity under its Article I powers, we arrive at a
position that is overall more protective of state sovereignty: Not only does
Congress lack the power to subject the states to private suits in federal court,
it lacks the power even to subject states to liability to private individuals
except under the Fourteenth Amendment. 252
That Justice Scalia views the Eleventh Amendment as bearing on more
than just jurisdiction is further shown by his discussion of the abrogation issue
in Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak. 253 Here, writing for a majority,
Scalia chided the dissenting Justices for treating the Eleventh Amendment as
if it were merely a matter of jurisdiction: "The fact that Congress grants
jurisdiction to hear a claim does not suffice to show Congress has abrogated
all defenses to that claim. The issues are wholly distinct." 254 The Court's
characterization of Eleventh Amendment immunity as a nonjurisdictional
defense is, of course, in tension with the forum-allocation interpretation of the
Eleventh Amendment.
d.

Hess Again

The Court's reliance on the idea that a purpose of the Eleventh
Amendment is to protect state treasuries is not the only aspect of the Hess
opinion that conflicts with the forum-allocation view. There is, in addition,
dictum in the opinion that directly contradicts that interpretation of the
Eleventh Amendment. Although I have eschewed any reliance on dicta so far,
I have made an exception for the Hess dictum because it is so recent and
because it reflects the views of the Justices who dissented in Seminole Tribe.
The Court in Hess began its discussion of the Eleventh Amendment by
noting that "[t]he Eleventh Amendment largely shields States from suit in
federal court without their consent, leaving parties with claims against a State
to present them, if the State permits, in the State's own tribunals."255 Read
literally, this sentence supports the immunity-from-liability interpretation even
more directly than does the "assent" language in McKesson or the "consent"
250. See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 36-45 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
251. 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1131-32 (1996).
252. Even if we attributed the foregoing views to him, Justice Scalia would still arguably have been
guilty of overlooking a technicality favoring the states. As explained below, if Eleventh Amendment
immunity is both an immunity from lower federal court jurisdiction and an immunity from liability, then
Scalia could have taken the position that a clear statement of an intent to abrogate the latter immunity
should not enable an individual to bring suit in federal court unless Congress also clearly stated its intent
to abrogate the former immunity. See infra notes 270 & 272.
253. 501 u.s. 775 (1996).
254. Id. at 786-87 n.4.
255. Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 115 S. Ct. 394, 400 (1994) (emphasis added).
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language in Seminole Tribe. These latter cases suggest that the states' consent
to suit is a condition of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, but they do
not intimate that states are free to refuse to entertain damage claims against
themselves in their own courts. 256 If the Eleventh Amendment did not protect
the states from federal liability, and if Congress were to make states liable,
then under the Supremacy Clause, the states would be required to enforce that
liability. 257 Hess's statement that states are free not to permit suits under
federal law to proceed against themselves in their own courts 258 is for this
reason inconsistent with the forum-allocation interpretation. The statement
would be true only if some legal principle protected the states from liability
under federal law, not just from the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts.
The Justices in the Hess majority appear to have regarded the Eleventh
Amendment as embodying such a principle.
In evaluating the latter statement in Hess, however, it is important to keep
in mind that the opinion was written during the reign of Union Gas by a
Justice who later dissented from the Court's overruling of that decision. 259
Indeed, only Justice Kennedy was in the majority in both Hess and Seminole
Tribe. 260 With the possible exception of Justice Kennedy, therefore, the
Justices who expressed the belief in Hess that the Amendment protected the
states from federal liability also believed that Congress had the power to
subject the states to both federal liability and lower federal court jurisdiction.
In other words, they viewed the protection afforded the states by the Eleventh
Amendment as presumptive only. Given the Seminole Tribe majority's
recasting of the Eleventh Amendment as a limitation on congressional power,
it is open to question whether the members of the Hess majority (except
perhaps Justice Kennedy) would feel bound to adhere to what was after all
only dictum in that case, 261 and by all appearances ill-considered dictum to
256. I maintain that the assent language in both McKesson and Seminole Tribe supports the immunityfrom-liability interpretation because, in the absence of Supreme Court review, any federal liability of states
would be illusory or at least ineffectual. My point here is that Hess supports the immunity-from-liability
interpretation even more directly because it denies the obligation of states to entertain such cases even in
their own courts.
257. The Court made this point in both Reich and Hilton, as did Justice Marshall in Employees. See
supra Part II.
258. I am assuming that the Court's statement applies to suits based on federal law, as the Hess action
was itself a suit under federal law. See 115 S. Ct. at 397. I am also assuming that the adverb "largely" does
not qualify the part of the sentence that indicates that the state is free not to permit a suit against itself to
proceed in the state courts.
259. Justice Ginsburg wrote the opinion, which Justices Stevens, Kennedy, Souter, and Breyer joined.
See Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 397.
260. There is nothing in the dissenting opinion in Hess indicating that the dissenting Justices either
agreed or disagreed with the statement that the states are free to close their courts to suits seeking damages
under federal law.
261. I am characterizing as dictum the statement that states can be sued in state court only "if the State
permits." Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 400. The statement that the purpose of the Eleventh Amendment was to
protect state treasuries was not dictum. Given the Justices' conception of the Eleventh Amendment as
subject to plenary congressional abrogation, however, the majority's statements in that regard could be
recast as a statement about the factors that determine which entities qualify as the state for purposes of the
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boot. 262 For this reason, I do not regard the Hess dictum to be nearly as
probative of whether the current Court regards Eleventh Amendment immunity
as immunity from liability as the statements in Seminole Tribe discussed
above, statements by Justices who (except for Justice Kennedy) criticized the
Hess majority for "underprotecting ... state sovereignty."263 But the dictum
does show, at the least, that even the Justices least enamored of the Eleventh
Amendment have not fully internalized the forum-allocation interpretation.
4.

Will

One might read the Court's recent opinion in Will v. Michigan Department
of State Police 264 as a recognition that states enjoy two sorts of immunity
from federal power, an immunity from the original jurisdiction of the lower
federal courts and a separate immunity from liability. Yet the Court in Will
clearly treated the states' immunity from liability as subject to abrogation by
Congress. Will thus suggests the possibility that while the states enjoy an
immunity from the original jurisdiction of the lower federal courts that is
irrepealable by Congress under Article I, they enjoy only a presumptive
immunity from liability under federal law. This would represent only a minor
inroad on the forum-allocation interpretation. Will also offers a possible post
hoc explanation of the decisions discussed in Section B: Might their references
to the protection of state treasuries be understood as references to the
rebuttable immunity from liability recognized in Will as opposed to a
hypothetically irrepealable immunity from liability under the Eleventh
Amendment? I conclude that this possible way to reconcile these cases with
the forum-allocation interpretation is unconvincing.
Will was a suit brought against the state in the state courts under section
1983. 265 The Court acknowledged that the Eleventh Amendment did not
apply because the suit had been brought in the state courts. 266 The issue was
whether section 1983 made states liable in damages to private individuals. The
Court held that whether a statute makes states liable in damages to individuals
should be decided through the application of a clear statement rule identical in

immunity from liability recognized in Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
See infra Subsection lll.B.4. With respect to the particular statute involved in Hess, however, the Court had
already held (in Hilton) that the Will immunity from liability had been abrogated by Congress. See Hilton
v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 206-07 (1991) (affirming on stare decisis grounds that
obligations imposed by FELA apply to states).
262. That the dictum was ill-considered is suggested by the fact that two of the Justices who concurred
in the opinion (Stevens and Kennedy) had indicated just a few terms before that the states were required
by the Supremacy Clause to entertain suits under FELA in their own courts. See Hilton, 502 U.S. at 207.
263. Hess, 115 S. Ct. at 410 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
264. 491 U.S. 58 (1989).
265. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
266. See Will, 491 U.S. at 63-64.

1997]

Eleventh Amendment Immunity

1741

substance to the one that detennines whether the Eleventh Amendment has
been abrogated. 267 The Court held that although the clear statement rule is
not, strictly speaking, required by the Eleventh Amendment, it is supported by
the Amendment and by the constitutional principles of federalism it
exemplifies.268 The Court's decision in Will might be understood as a
recognition of a quasi-constitutional immunity of states from liability to
individuals, an immunity emanating in part from the Eleventh Amendment but
based more broadly on constitutional principles of federalism, 269 but an
"immunity" subject to plenary congressional abrogation.
The Will holding may help reconcile some of the decisions discussed in
this Part with the forum-allocation interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment.
The statements in Edelman and its progeny-suggesting that because of the
Eleventh Amendment, the states would remain free to decide whether or not
to provide retrospective monetary relief-make sense if one assumes that the
Court was referring here to the immunity from liability discussed in Will rather
than a jurisdictional immunity. 270 We might similarly try to reconcile the
Court's statement in Hess that the purpose of Eleventh Amendment immunity
is to protect state treasuries with the forum-allocation interpretation by
recasting it as a statement about the purpose of the immunity from liability
recognized in Will. The Will case may also provide a retrospective explanation
267. See id. at 65.
268. See id.; see also Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1131 n.l5 (1996) (requiring
application of "clear statement" rule based on "principles of federalism"); Hilton v. South Carolina Pub.
Ry. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 209 (1991) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("The [Will] clear statement rule is not
a mere canon of statutory interpretation. Instead, it derives from the Constitution itself.").
269. Some may quarrel with calling the protection Will gave the states an "immunity" if it is subject
to plenary abrogation by Congress. I share this semantic concern. Nevertheless, during Union Gas's brief
reign, the Eleventh Amendment was said to give the states an "immunity" even though the protection it
provided had the force of a mere presumption. See Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 115 S. Ct. 394,
400 ( 1994). The Court also refers to the protection afforded by the Eleventh Amendment as an "immunity"
even in contexts in which it is clearly subject to abrogation. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473
U.S. 234, 240 (1985) (requiring for finding of abrogation "an unequivocal expression of congressional
intent to overturn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of the several states") (citations omitted). I shall
accordingly refer to the Wili decision as recognizing an "immunity" from liability, with the understanding
that such "immunity" may be nothing more than a presumption that Congress has not created a liability.
270. Other parts of the Edelman opinion, however, make sense only if the Court was referring to a
jurisdictional immunity. For example, the Court said that the immunity "sufficiently partakes of the nature
of a jurisdictional bar" that states can invoke it for the first time on appeal without waiving it. See Edelman
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,678 (1974). Of course, Will is consistent with the idea that the states possess both
forms of immunity. The waiver issue discussed in Edelman presented the Court with one of the few
situations in which an immunity from federal jurisdiction would retain any relevance when accompanied
by a coextensive immunity from liability. Another area would be appealability. The Court in Puerto Rico
Aqueduct & Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 147 (1993), held that the denial of an
Eleventh Amendment claim is immediately appealable, a holding that rests on a view of Eleventh
Amendment immunity as an immunity from suit in federal court as opposed to an immunity from liability.
The Court's express statements that Eleventh Amendment immunity is an immunity from suit do not
contradict the claim that it is also an immunity from liability. Cf Gould, Inc. v. Pechiney Ugine Kuhlmann,
853 F.2d 445, 449-51 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that denial of foreign sovereign immunity claim is
immediately appealable (consistent only with conclusion that foreign sovereign immunity is immunity from
suit) and that privatization of defendant company does not deprive company of its entitlement to immunity
(consistent only with conclusion that foreign sovereign immunity is immunity from liability)).
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of the abrogation decisions in which the Court sought evidence of a
congressional intent to make states liable to private parties. Under Will,
abrogation of immunity from liability is governed by the same clear statement
rule as abrogation of immunity from federal jurisdiction, and, of course, if
there is no liability, the suit must be dismissed. The Court thus could have
properly dismissed the claim in Dellmuth v. Muth211 on the ground that
Congress had not abrogated the states' immunity from liability. 272
But there is little in these opinions to support such a reading. The states'
obligation to provide the retrospective relief at issue in the Edelman line of
cases had clearly been made a condition of the states' receipt of federal funds
by the time Green was decided, so under the forum-allocation view (even as
modified in Will) the state courts would have been required to provide a forum
in which to recover that relief. Yet the Court treated the absence of original
federal jurisdiction as the equivalent of denying the states' obligation to afford
such relief. Congress's power to condition the receipt of federal funds on the
undertaking to provide retrospective relief was (and is) not in doubt. Congress
could clearly have made submission to suit in federal court a condition as well.
The Court's apparent assumption that the state court was nevertheless under
no enforceable federal obligation to afford the relief sought is inconsistent with
the forum-allocation view. It is possible, I suppose, that the Green Court
overlooked the fact that the statute and regulations at issue imposed on the
states an obligation to afford retrospective relief. The fact remains that the
Court equated the lack of original federal jurisdiction with the freedom of
states to deny retrospective relief, and this form of analysis is simply
inconsistent with the forum-allocation view. 273
It is even more difficult to explain Hess as a decision about the immunity
from liability involved in Will. First, Will preceded Hess, yet the Court did not
frame the issue in Will terms. Second, the Court had already held in Hilton
that states were liable in damages to individuals for violations of FELA.
Indeed, the holding of Hilton, one of the trio of cases supporting the forumallocation view, only serves to heighten the conflict between the forumallocation position and the Hess Court's statements that the Eleventh
271. 491 U.S. 223 (1989).
272. The reverse, however, is not necessarily true: If there are two immunities, then abrogation of the
immunity from liability does not mean that immunity from lower federal court jurisdiction has been
abrogated. Thus, Will does not explain the Court's exclusive focus in Union Gas on Congress's intent to
impose liability on the states.
273. See supra note 216. That there was no question about Congress's power to require the states to
pay retrospective relief as a condition of receiving federal funds suggests that those cases may be even
more at odds with the forum-allocation view than I suggested above. Perhaps the decisions should be taken
as holding that state courts cannot be obliged to entertain suits against themselves in their own courts even
where Congress concededly has the power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity from federal court
jurisdiction. If so, then Congress's only option to "enforce" the Fourteenth Amendment in any meaningful
way would be to subject the states to suit in federal court. Congress would not have the option of
subjecting states to liability and obligating the state courts to enforce that liability.
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Amendment seeks to protect state treasuries and that states are free to deny a
state forum.
At any rate, this explanation of Hess and the Edelman line of cases
reconciles them with the forum-allocation interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment only by recognizing an immunity from liability that has its source
outside the Eleventh Amendment. The reconciliation is semantic only and is,
in any event, problematic because: ( 1) "Eleventh Amendment immunity" does
not really have its source in the Eleventh Amendment; 274 and (2) the
immunity from liability recognized in Will rests to some extent on the Eleventh
Amendment. 275 Saying that there are two immunities, one from liability and
one from jurisdiction, does not much advance the analysis. The question is
whether there is any meaningful difference between the immunity from liability
recognized in Will and the immunity from liability arguably recognized in
Seminole Tribe, and this question, in turn, depends on the scope of Congress's
power to abrogate the Will immunity.
The Court in Will treated the states' immunity from liability as subject to
plenary abrogation by Congress. Under the then-prevailing Union Gas regime,
Eleventh Amendment immunity was subject to abrogation by Congress
pursuant to any of its legislative powers. Thus, under Union Gas, the two
immunities were in substance identical as far as congressional power was
concerned: Both amounted only to a rule of clear statement. Seminole Tribe
holds that Eleventh Amendment immunity may be abrogated by Congress only
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. 276 This holding would not have
produced any difference between the two immunities as applied to the facts of
the Will case, as the plaintiff in that case sought to enforce an obligation
imposed on the states by the Fourteenth Amendment and relied on a statute
enacted by Congress pursuant to that Amendment. 277 With respect to statutes
not enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, the issue arises whether
the two immunities continue to be identical. In other words, does the Court's
holding in Seminole Tribe that the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity may
not be abrogated under Article I extend to the quasi-constitutional immunity
from liability recognized in Will? Or does the latter immunity continue to be
merely presumptive, subject to abrogation by Congress pursuant to any of its

274. See supra note 6.
275. See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
276. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1124-25 (1996).
277. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 554 n.l3 (1981) (Powell, J., concurring) ("Section 1983 was
enacted in 1871 as one of the statutes intended to implement the Fourteenth Amendment."). The Court held
in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. I (1980), that section 1983 supplies a remedy as well against state officials
who violate federal statutes not relating to civil rights. See 448 U.S. at I 0-11. With respect to claims
brought under section 1983 to enforce obligations of the state under statutes enacted under Article I,
Congress's power to abrogate the immunity from liability would be broader than its power to abrogate
immunity from lower federal court jurisdiction, if one interpreted Eleventh Amendment immunity as merely
the latter type of immunity.
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legislative powers? Put otherwise, did the Court in Seminole Tribe recognize
an immunity of the states from liability that may not be abrogated by Congress
under Article I? If the Court was serious in Seminole Tribe that the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction over state court suits again.st states depends on the state's
consent to the suit, then the Court has denied Congress the power effectively
to abrogate the Will immunity from liability under Article I.
IV. THE ABROGATION REDUCTIO AND MCKESSON'S UNRAVELING

Examination of another conundrum posed by Seminole Tribe will help
point the way to a resolution of the conflict between Seminole Tribe and
McKesson concerning the nature of Eleventh Amendment immunity. Although
there may at first seem to be little connection between the problem examined
in this Part and the one discussed in the prior sections, our discussion will
show the two to be closely linked.
In Seminole Tribe, the Court held that Congress has the power to abrogate
Eleventh Amendment immunity pursuant to its power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment, but not under its Article I legislative power. The Fourteenth
Amendment, however, includes a clause prohibiting states from depriving
persons of property without due process of law. Can Congress pass a statute
giving individuals a property right vis-a-vis the states and then, to "enforce"
the Due Process Clause, abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity
with respect to suits to enforce that right? An affirmative answer to this
question threatens to reduce Seminole Tribe's abrogation holding to nothing.
I call this the abrogation reductio.
Section A of this Part elaborates on the abrogation reductio and shows its
surface plausibility. Section B considers and rejects possible doctrinal
modifications the Court might adopt to avoid the reductio. Section C continues
the search for an escape from the reductio by pressing into service the Court's
procedural due process jurisprudence, of which McKesson forms an integral
part. This analysis shows three things: First, the conflict between McKesson
and the immunity-from-liability interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment is
much deeper than it appeared in Part I. Second, the Court's procedural due
process doctrine offers a rationale for escaping the abrogation reductio. This
escape may depend on the Court's rejection of some of its broader precedents
concerning the scope of Congress's Section 5 enforcement power, or its
willingness to find such precedents inapplicable where the right being
"enforced" is a procedural one, but one or both of these possibilities seems
likely. Because this rationale for escaping the reductio (relying as it does on
McKesson) succeeds only if the forum-allocation interpretation is right, the
prospect of escaping the reductio thus offers a substantial reason for preferring
that interpretation. But, at the same time (and this is the third point), our
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analysis also exposes significant doctrinal problems with the Court's
procedural due process jurisprudence and with McKesson in particular. These
doctrinal problems cast considerable doubt on the plausibility of the traditional
reading of the McKesson decision, and as a consequence they leave the forumallocation interpretation on significantly weaker ground.

A. The Abrogation Reductio
The complex and highly problematic relationship between McKesson and
Seminole Tribe's abrogation holding is best understood by giving further
consideration to Congress's post-Seminole Tribe power to give patent holders
a right to obtain damages in federal court from states that infringe. After the
Court's Atascadero decision, Congress amended the patent laws to make clear:
(1) that the primary obligations that the patent laws impose do apply to state
governments; (2) that states that infringe patents are liable in damages to the
patent holders; and (3) that patent holders may obtain those damages in federal
court. 278 The Senate Report accompanying the Patent and Plant Variety
Protection Remedy Clarification Act indicates that Congress believed that it
had the power to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity under
Article 1. 279 But, perhaps anticipating the Seminole Tribe decision, the Report
covered its bases and relied further on the idea that Congress has the power
to abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity in patent cases under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 280 The Report indicates that patents
are property and thus implicate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. 281 The reasoning appears to be that the existence of a "property"
278. See Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 271,296 (1994).
Congress passed similar laws relating to trademarks and copyrights. See Trademark Remedy Qarification
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1122, 1125, 1127 (1994); Copyright Remedy Clarification Act, 17 U.S.C. § 511 (1994).
279. SeeS. REP. No. 102-280, at 7-8 (1992).
280. See id. (expressly relying on ''the Patent Clause, the Commerce Qause, and the enforcement
provision of the fourteenth amendment").
281. See id. at 8 & n.55. The Report cited the district court decision in Lemelson v. Ampex Corp., 372
F. Supp. 708 (N.D. lll. 1974), for the proposition that patents are property. In that case, the court suggested
that patents were property for purposes of the Takings Clause and that, accordingly, a right to compensation
exists under that Clause if states infringe. See Leme/son, 372 F. Supp. at 710-13. This suggestion is
problematic. Although the Court has interpreted the term "property" in the Takings Clause more narrowly
than the same term in the Due Process Clause, it may be conceded that patents may constitute property for
purposes of the Takings Clause. Cf Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002-04 (1984) (finding
that trade secrets are property for purposes of Takings Clause). But the Court's takings cases would appear
to require the conclusion that a state's infringement of a patent is not a ''taking," as it does not "virtually
destroy" the property's value. See TRIBE, supra note 175, § 9-3, at 593. Patent infringement is akin to the
tort of unfair competition, and the Court has distinguished takings from ordinary tons. See Pruneyard
Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82 (1980) ('"[N]ot every destruction or injury to property by
governmental action has been held to be a 'taking' in the constitutional sense."') (quoting Armstrong v.
United States, 364 U.S. 40,48 (1960)); Omnia Commercial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 508 (1923)
("[D]estruction of, or injury to, property is frequently accomplished without a 'taking' in the constitutional
sense."); National By-Prods., Inc. v. United States, 405 F.2d 1256, 1275 (Ct. Cl. 1969) ("[T]he
Government's foreknowledge will not convert an otherwise insufficient injury into a taking. At most it
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right under the Due Process Clause gives rise to a congressional power to
abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity with respect to that
property. 282
If this reasoning were to hold, then Congress's power to abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity would appear to be coextensive with its power to
legislate under Article I, and, if so, Seminole Tribe's holding that Congress
lacks the power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity under Article I
would be eviscerated. This would be so whether we regarded the Eleventh
Amendment as a forum-allocation principle or as conferring an immunity from
liability. Suppose that the Amendment is a forum-allocation principle. By
hypothesis, Congress would have the power to: (1) prohibit states from
infringing patents; and (2) require them to pay damages to the patent holder
if they do infringe. It seems clear that the patent holder's right to damages is
a "property" right for purposes of the Due Process Clause. There is no doubt

could strengthen the plaintiff's case in a tort action."). As discussed below, the term "property" in the Due
Process Clause has been construed by the Court in such a way as to encompass any statutory entitlement
vis-a-vis the state, and a state "deprives" persons of that property whenever it injures the property interest
intentionally. Cf Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 332-36 (1986) (holding that negligent conduct cannot
give rise to "deprivation" of property for purposes of Due Process Clause). The Senate Report does not cite
the Takings Clause; it relies only on the Due Process Clause.
282. Two courts have considered the validity of this abrogation. In College Savings Bank v. Florida
Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, No. 95-4516, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18817 (D.N.J. Dec.
13, 1996), the plaintiff raised a patent infringement claim under the Patent Act and a false advertising claim
under the Lanham Act against a state agency. The court upheld Congress's abrogation of the states'
Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Patent Act, but not under the Lanham Act. With respect to the
patent infringement claim, the court wrote that "if rights protected by the Patent Act are correctly
considered 'property,' legislation making the states liable in federal court for violating that statute would
'plainly' be 'appropriate' for enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 76. The court went on to
conclude that patents are indeed property, relying primarily on cases stating that they are. See id. at 77-79.
On the other hand, the court found that the right to be free from competition based on false advertising was
not a property right, relying on the absence of cases calling such a right a property right. See id. at 88-95.
On this latter conclusion, see infra note 289.
In Genentech, Inc. v. Regents of the University of California, 939 F. Supp. 639, 643 (S.D. Ind. 1996),
mandamus granted on other grounds sub nom. In re Regents of University of California, Misc. No. 471,
1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 30617 (Fed. Cir. Nov. 14, 1996), the court relied on the above-quoted passage from
the Senate Report and, in dictum, accepted the Fourteenth Amendment/due process abrogation theory. The
court held that although Congress could on this theory validly abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment
immunity from patent infringement claims by holders of federal patents, it could not subject states that hold
federal patents to declaratory judgment actions by individuals seeking a declaration of the patent's
invalidity. The patent holder has "a protectable property right and to permit the State to infringe that
property right without redress for the patent owner would deprive that owner of property without due
process of law." ld. But someone seeking a declaration that a patent is invalid, the court said, "has no
protectable property right of which it ... has been deprived without due process of law." ld. That is
because that person "is free to manufacture said substances until [the patent holder] not only lodges an
infringement action, but also secures either injunctive relief or final judgment in its favor [, and,] [i]n either
event, [it] will have gotten due process of law before a deprivation occurs." !d. at 643-44. That may be
true, but, as discussed below, a patent holder does not necessarily suffer a deprivation of property without
due process of law just because his patent has been infringed by the state. If the infringement was "random
and unauthorized," the state would satisfy due process simply by making a postdeprivation state remedy
available. See infra text accompanying notes 321-39. It is accordingly not as clear as the court seemed to
think that the patent holder and the person claiming that the patent is invalid stand in different positions
with respect to Congress's abrogation power. Both arguably have property interests that Congress may (or
may not) have the power to protect by abrogating Eleventh Amendment immunity.
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that "property" can be created by federal statute for purposes of that
Clause. 283 The Court has found that the right to continue receiving an
uninterrupted stream of money payable in the future triggers due process
protection. 284 If so, then there can be little doubt that the right to receive
money presently owing (which is by definition what the right to damages is)
is also a property right. On the Senate's reasoning, the existence of this
property right brings the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause into the
picture and gives rise to a congressional power to abrogate the states' Eleventh
Amendment immunity, which (as we are assuming the correctness of the
forum-allocation interpretation) means that Congress can give the lower federal
courts jurisdiction to entertain suits seeking such damages from the states. If
the power to abrogate this immunity hinges only on the existence of a right to
damages, and if Congress's power to subject states to damage liability is
coextensive with its power to impose obligations on them (a tenet of the
forum-allocation theory), then Congress's power to abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity is coextensive with its power to legislate under Article
I as delineated in such decisions as New York v. United States. 285
The problem does not go away if we assume that the Eleventh Amendment
immunizes the states from damage liability to individuals. On the Senate's
reasoning, this immunity can be abrogated as long as individuals have a
property right vis-a-vis the states. The Senate Report states that a patent is a
property right for purposes of the Due Process Clause, and it concludes that
the existence of this right gives Congress the power to abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity. 286 If we assume that Eleventh Amendment immunity
is immunity from liability, then Congress's creation of a property right in a
patent, on the Senate's reasoning, gives rise to a congressional power to
subject states that infringe to liability in damages to patent holders. Again, this
proves too much. The Senate is probably correct in concluding that a patent
is property for purposes of the Due Process Clause. Under the Court's current
approach to this subject, whether a statute establishes a property right turns on
whether the statute ·places mandatory limits on a state's discretion to act

283. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (involving property interest in continued
receipt of disability benefits under Social Security Act); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (involving
property interest in continued employment with federal agency, an interest created by federal statute);
Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (involving property interest in continued receipt of financial aid
under Aid to Families with Dependent Children program); see also Henry Paul Monaghan, Of "Liberty"
and "Property", 62 CORNELL L. REv. 405, 435 n.194 (1977).
284. In Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 262, and Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 332, the Court found a property right
in the continued receipt of money not yet due.
285. 505 u.s. 144 (1992).
286. If the Senate had adhered to the forum-allocation view, it would not have had to hang its hat on
the idea that a patent is property for due process purposes. The fact that it did may suggest that it
understood the Eleventh Amendment to protect the states from damage liability; that is, it believed its
power to abrogate was a power to subject states to damage liability.
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towards the putative property holder. 287 So if Congress prohibits states from
infringing patents, then patent holders have a property right in states' not
infringing their patents. The problem, of course, is that Congress's power to
place mandatory obligations on the states is coextensive with its power under
Article I to make its laws applicable to the states. If Congress has the power
to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity whenever it has the power to place
mandatory obligations on states towards individuals,288 then Congress's
power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity has, again, been made
coextensive with its power to legislate substantively with respect to the states
under Article I, as construed in such cases as New York and Garcia. If so,
Seminole Tribe's abrogation holding has been reduced to nothing. 289

287. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudennill, 470 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1985). In Sandin v.
Conner, 115 S. Ct. 2293, 2297-99 (1995), the Court described this as the approach adopted by its recent
decisions concerning "liberty" interests, but then proceeded to depart from it in the context of prisoners'
rights. The Court recognized, however, that the prevailing approach "may be entirely sensible in the
ordinary task of construing a statute defining rights and remedies available to the general public." ld. at
2299. In any event, the Court did not purport to alter its approach to finding property interests.
288. That the obligation be an obligation toward individuals is a potentially significant qualification.
Clearly an obligation not to infringe someone's patent satisfies it, as does the obligation to pay the person
damages. It is possible that the state's obligation not to pollute the water or air does not give anyone a
"property" right. Perhaps it would. The requirement that the obligation be toward individuals would appear
to make relevant much of the Court's standing jurisprudence. It may be the case that Congress's power to
give individuals a "property" right is coextensive with its power to give individuals standing to seek
injunctive relief. Cf. Cass R. Sunstein, Whats Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and
Article Ill, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163, 234 (1992) (suggesting that Congress might confer citizen standing to
enforce environmental obligations by providing by statute that "all Americans have a kind of property
right-a tenancy in common-in some environmental asset").
289. The abrogation reductio was perceptively noted by the district court in College Savings Bank v.
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, No. 95-4516, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18817
(D.N.J. Dec. 13, 1996). The court there ruled that Congress's abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity
in the Lanham Act was not a valid exercise of its Section 5 power, at least as applied to a false advertising
claim. (The court noted that false advertising claims are separate and distinct from trademark infringement
claims. See id. at *88 n.25.) The court reasoned as follows:
[W]e are unaware of any authority suggesting that Congress may, by simple fiat, abruptly
declare that a simple statutory cause of action, which traditionally has not been understood to
involve any kind of property, now encompasses a "property right" to which the Fourteenth
Amendment applies. Indeed, if Congress has such power, it could easily "reverse" the outcome
in Seminole Tribe by inserting into some staff report a reference regarding the importance of
using the Fourteenth Amendment to protect the "right" to have a state negotiate over a gaming
compact. To quote Justice Scalia, "If state sovereign immunity has any reality, it must mean
more than this."
ld. at *93-94 (quoting Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 44 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part)). The court nevertheless found that the abrogation of immunity in the Patent Act was
valid under Section 5 because patents are property. The court based these divergent results on the existence
of statements in prior decisions recognizing that the right to be free of infringement of patents is a property
right, and the absence of statements in prior decisions recognizing that the right to be free of competition
based on false advertising is a property right. The court, however, did not discuss the cases that set forth
the test for defining "property" under the Due Process Clause. Although the court's concern that a contrary
holding would reduce Seminole Tribe's abrogation holding to nothing is consonant with the concerns raised
by this Article, the reasons the court gave for distinguishing patent infringement claims from false
advertising claims are not entirely satisfying.
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B. Avoiding the Reductio by Adjusting Constitutional Doctrine
As the Senate's conclusion cannot coexist with Seminole Tribe's holding
that Congress lacks the power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity
under its Article I powers, something has got to give. This Section considers
possible doctrinal adjustments the Court could make to avoid the reductio
without rejecting Seminole Tribe's abrogation holding. It turns out that
avoiding the reductio in this fashion either would require adjustments too
dramatic to contemplate or would be inconsistent with other parts of Seminole
Tribe.
First, and most dramatically, the Court could reverse its holding in
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer 90 that Congress has the power to abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court's
reasoning in Fitzpatrick, in fact, seems inconsistent with the Seminole Tribe
result, as Justice Brennan pointed out in Union Gas, 291 and as diversity
theorists have noted as well. 292 The Fitzpatrick reasoning should have led the
Court to recognize an abrogation power under Article I for the same reason
that Hamilton's reasoning in the Federalist Papers should arguably have led
the Court in Hans to adopt the diversity interpretation. 293 The rather skeletal
analysis in Fitzpatrick stressed that the Fourteenth Amendment imposed
significant obligations on the states, and the Court concluded from that premise
that the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the power to subject states to
damage actions in federal court if Congress regards such actions as necessary
to enforce those obligations. 294 The Court thus appears to have reasoned that
the existence of a constitutional obligation of the states, combined with a
congressional power to "enforce" those obligations by legislation, adds up to
a congressional power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity. This
analytical jump from the existence of a primary obligation to a congressional
power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity would, of course, produce
the very same result under provisions of the Constitution antedating the
Fourteenth Amendment. For example, the Constitution as originally adopted
included a Contracts Clause,295 which, as interpreted in Fletcher v. Peck, 296
forbids the states from impairing the obligation of its own contracts with
individuals. 297 The Court's analysis in Fitzpatrick would support the
290. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
291. See 491 U.S. I, 17-18 (1989) (arguing that reasoning of Scalia's dissenting opinion in Union
Gas, which was ultimately embraced in Seminole Tribe, would be inconsistent with Court's holding in
Fitzpatrick).
292. See Field, Congressional Imposition, supra note 58, at 1230.
293. See supra note 230.
294. See 427 U.S. at 456.
295. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. I.
296. 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
297. See id. at 136-39.
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conclusion that the Contracts Clause, perhaps as supplemented by the
Necessary and Proper Clause/98 empowers Congress to subject states to both
damage liability and federal court jurisdiction in order to enforce that
obligation. The same analysis would support the conclusion that Congress has
the power to subject the states to damage liability and federal court jurisdiction
whenever it has the power to impose primary obligations on the states.
Because the Court declined to recognize such a power in Seminole Tribe, the
latter decision appears to be a rejection of the Fitzpatrick analysis.
The Court in Seminole Tribe took pains not to call into question the
Fitzpatrick result. There probably are rationales for sustaining a congressional
power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity under the Fourteenth
Amendment that do not support the same abrogation power under antecedent
constitutional provisions. Such a rationale would no doubt have to rely heavily
on the idea that federal-state relations were fundamentally altered by the Civil
War Amendments, something the Court emphasized in Fitzpatrick. 299 But,
while this basic alteration may be necessary to support the Seminole Tribe
holding, it is not sufficient. First, it does not supply us with a basis for
concluding that one of the alterations made was the establishment of a
congressional power to make states liable to individuals and to subject states
to suit in federal courts. 300 Second, even if we had a basis for such a
conclusion, we would still lack a reason for denying that the Fourteenth
Amendment authorizes the exercise of this power for the purpose of enforcing
the primary obligations imposed on the states by Congress under its Article I
powers. Just as the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause has been
construed to incorporate much of the Bill of Rights, 301 the same Clause
might reasonably have been construed to incorporate Congress's Article I
powers for abrogation purposes. 302 It is conceivable that the Court will so
hold when confronted with the abrogation reductio, but this would mean
rejecting Seminole Tribe's holding that Congress may not abrogate under
Article I. If we take seriously Seminole Tribe's abrogation holding and the
Court's indication that it does not mean to reject Fitzpatrick insofar as it held
that Congress may abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment, we will have to look elsewhere for an escape from the
abrogation reductio.
The Court could try to avoid the reductio by reversing what remains of
Garcia. By taking away Congress's power to place primary obligations on the
states under Article I, the Court would deny Congress the power to create
298. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
299. 427 U.S. at 455-56.
300. See Fletcher, Historical Interpretation, supra note 7, at 1115-16.
301. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 804-13 (3d ed. 1996).
302. See JACOBS, supra note 42, at 163-64 (suggesting that Due Process Clause of Fourteenth
Amendment is "potential basis for renouncing [Eleventh Amendment] doctrine").
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correlative property rights, and hence, it would cut the reductio off at its
inception. The Court has already begun cutting back on Garcia, but as noted,
New York left Congress the power to impose obligations on the states so long
as the obligations are imposed on nonstate actors as well. 303 Denying
Congress all power to impose obligations on the states would limit Congress's
powers vis-a-vis the states even more drastically than the pre-Garcia cases did,
for those cases conceded Congress the power to impose obligations on the
states in areas not traditionally regulated by the states. 304 Patent, copyright,
and bankruptcy would probably fall into this category. Resurrecting the
National League of Cities standard may indeed strike the Court as an attractive
way to avoid the reductio, as it would permit Congress to subject the states to
liability and suit in federal court at the behest of patent holders without
sweeping in all of Congress's Article I powers. The statute at issue in Seminole
Tribe, however, could probably have been voided on the merits for failing even
the New York test. 305 The statute imposed on the states and no one else the
duty to negotiate in good faith with Indian tribes concerning gambling. 306 It
thus singled out states for regulation in a way that New York appeared to
prohibit. The Court in Seminole Tribe nevertheless pointedly reserved the
question of the statute's substantive validity?07 It may well be that the
Justices in the Seminole Tribe majority would like to place additional limits on
Congress's power to place substantive obligations on the states. This would
certainly be the cleanest way to avoid the reductio, but given the Court's
reservation of this issue, its decision to strengthen the Eleventh Amendment
is not explained by its desire to scale Garcia back further.
Third, the Court could reconsider the test for defining "property" for
purposes of the Due Process Clause. The Court has recently shown a
willingness to redefine liberty, 308 and it could well do the same for property,
but avoiding the reductio in this way would require dramatic doctrinal changes.
303. See supra text accompanying note 99.
304. See supra text accompanying note 96.
305. See Monaghan, supra note 34, at 119-20. It might perhaps be contended that IGRA is valid under
New York on the theory that it gives the states a choice between: (I) negotiating in good faith with Tribes,
and (2) subjecting themselves to preemptive federal legislation. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144, 173-74 (1992) (upholding federal law giving states choice between complying with federal directive
or "having state law pre-empted by federal regulation"). If this had been a possible ground for upholding
the federally imposed obligation to negotiate, then it is not clear why it would not also have been a basis
for upholding the jurisdiction of the federal court. The Eleventh Amendment does not bar federal
jurisdiction over states that consent. If the fact that states remained free to refuse to negotiate and to accept
instead a preemptive federal law means that states were not being "commandeered," but only "encouraged,"
to negotiate with the Tribe, then it is not clear why the existence of this option did not also mean that the
state was merely being "encouraged" to consent to federal jurisdiction. The Court appears to have read the
statute as imposing federal jurisdiction on the states, and if so, then the statute similarly must be read as
imposing the duty to negotiate. Such commandeering of states would appear to be prima facie invalid under
New York.
306. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1119 (1996).
307. See id. at 1126 n.lO.
308. See supra note 287.
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Recall that if the forum-allocation interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment
were right, Congress would have the power not only to prohibit the states from
infringing patents but also to obligate them to pay damages to the patent
holder. The right to damages is among the least controversial of property rights
under the Due Process Clause. 309 It is difficult to conceive of a redefinition
of "property" that would exclude this right from the scope of the Due Process
Clause without wreaking great havoc on due process doctrine.
If the immunity-from-liability interpretation were right, then Congress
would have the power to place mandatory obligations on the states (so long as
they are also placed on nonstate actors carrying out the same activities), but
not to subject states to damage liability to individuals. The reductio on this
assumption would rest on a definition of property that turned on the existence
of mandatory state obligations towards individuals. It is not inconceivable that
the Court would shift gears in this area and define property in such a way as
not to include every mandatory state obligation towards individuals. Perhaps
it could define the concept of property for due process purposes as it does in
the context of the Takings Clause, so that it includes only legal rights closely
analogous to common law property rights-interests, for example, that are
broadly alienable at the option of the property holder. 310 Such an approach
may, indeed, allow the Court to accept a congressional power to abrogate
Eleventh Amendment immunity in patent cases without sweeping in all of
Congress's other Article I powers. Exactly what this alternative doctrinal
universe would look like is pure speculation at this point, but it would
certainly require the rejection of a great deal of precedent, for it would have
to exclude from the scope of "property" such statutorily conferred and notfreely-alienable rights as the right to continued receipt of welfare payments and
the right to continued employment if specified conditions are met. 311 Whether
the Court would go to such lengths just to save Seminole Tribe's abrogation
holding is certainly subject to question.
As noted, this escape from the reductio would work only if the Court also
rejected the forum-allocation interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. In this
respect, therefore, our search for an escape from the reductio supplies us with
some slight additional support for the immunity-from-liability interpretation.
But this escape from the reductio is ultimately unsatisfying. To adjust the
constitutional definition of property to the extent required to accommodate
309. See supra note 284 and accompanying text.
310. See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982); United States
v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945) (describing property rights in physical thing as
"denot[ing) ... the right to possess, use and dispose of it"). See generally TRIBE, supra note 175 § 9-7,
at 607-13 (discussing Court's "deference to common-law conceptions of property" in takings area).
311. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976) (recognizing right to receive Social Security
disability payments); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 151-52 (1974) (recognizing right to continued Civil
Service employment); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 & n.8 (1970) (recognizing right to receive
welfare payments not yet due).

1997]

Eleventh Amendment Immunity

1753

Seminole Tribe's abrogation holding would surely be to let the tail wag the
dog. If doctrinal adjustments are required, the definition of property in the Due
Process Clause seems like a poor choice. Although the Court's definition of
property cannot be said to be universally admired, adjusting it in the direction
that would be required to avoid the reductio would move the doctrine in this
area in exactly the wrong direction. 312
C. McKesson and the Abrogation Reductio
McKesson and related procedural due process cases offer a more promising
escape from the abrogation reductio. Examination of McKesson's relation to
this issue allows us, in addition, to appreciate that the conflict between
McKesson and the immunity-from-liability interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment runs far deeper than it at first appeared. Unsurprisingly, given the
deep incompatibility of McKesson with the immunity-from-liability
interpretation, escaping the reductio by relying on McKesson requires the
rejection of the immunity-from-liability interpretation. But, at the same time,
this analysis reveals problems with the conventional understanding of
McKesson's holding that cast doubt on its plausibility. In the next Part, I will
suggest a possible reinterpretation of McKesson that would save what I regard
as its key insight. This reinterpretation, however, removes McKesson and Reich
from the ranks of the cases supporting the forum-allocation interpretation, thus
weakening significantly the doctrinal case for the forum-allocation
interpretation.

1. Avoiding the Reductio by Relying on McKesson and Related
Procedural Due Process Cases
McKesson is of course relevant to the abrogation reductio because, in
addition to interpreting the Eleventh Amendment, the Court rendered an
important due process holding. As discussed in Part II, McKesson's due
process holding provides an important a link in the chain of reasoning
underlying the forum-allocation interpretation. The Court in McKesson held
that, when the state does not give a taxpayer an opportunity to challenge a
tax's conformity with law before paying the tax, the Due Process Clause
requires the state to offer a postpayment opportunity to challenge the tax's
validity, and, if the tax turns out to have been invalid, a remedy sufficient to
cure the violation. 313 Often, the constitutionally required remedy will be a
312. The Court"s previous attempts to avoid undesired results by narrowing the definition of "liberty"
and "property"' have not been well received. See Monaghan, supra note 283, at 423-34, 439-44.
313. See McKesson Corp. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 22 (1990).
If a state deprives a person of property or liberty without due process, but the deprivation turns out to have
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refund, 314 a prototypically retrospective remedy for Eleventh Amendment
purposes. Because of the Eleventh Amendment, an action for a refund may not
be maintained against the states in the lower federal courts, but the state must
make the remedy available in its own courts. It may not rely on its law of
sovereign immunity to bar the remedy, 315 and, if it fails to provide the
required remedy, the Supreme Court may exercise its appellate jurisdiction and
reverse. 316 The Court appeared to consider its holding an uncontroversial
application of principles it had articulated in procedural due process cases such
as Mathews v. Eldridge, 311 in which the Court had held that, while the Due
Process Clause does not always require a predeprivation hearing to challenge
state deprivations of liberty or property, it does require an effective opportunity
to challenge the state's decision at some point. 318 The McKesson Court
stressed that the hearing must come "at a meaningful time," which it
interpreted to mean that the hearing must at least come before the deprivation
becomes final. 319 The Court appears to have concluded that a deprivation of
property is not final if an opportunity to obtain a postdeprivation remedy
exists. It accordingly held that the Due Process Clause requires that a
deprivation of liberty or property by the state be accompanied by an
opportunity to obtain a retrospective remedy from the state if no predeprivation
opportunity to test the deprivation's conformity with law was available and if
no other remedy would cure the violation of law.
Our discussion of the abrogation reductio in Section A of this Part allows
us to appreciate the depth of McKesson's conflict with the immunity-fromliability interpretation. Under that interpretation, Congress lacks the power to
subject states to damage liability under its Article I powers. But as we saw,
Congress has the power under Article I to create "property" rights for purposes
of the Due Process Clause simply by placing mandatory obligations on the
states. 320 Under McKesson, Congress's creation of a property right against
the states automatically gives rise to an obligation on the state's part to pay
damages to the property holder if the state has deprived that person of her
property without affording a predeprivation hearing (and no other remedy
would cure the violation). Thus, under McKesson, not only is the state not
been consistent with substantive law, the person is nevertheless entitled to compensation under section 1983
for injuries suffered as a result of a violation of procedural rights. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,
254-57 (1978). McKesson is understood to stand for the proposition that if the deprivation turns out to have
been in violation of substantive law, the person is also entitled under the Due Process Clause to a remedy
sufficient to cure the violation.
314. But cf supra note 123 (noting that if tax is unconstitutional because discriminatory, refund may
not be required).
315. See Reich v. Collins, 115 S. Ct. 547, 549 (1994).
316. See McKesson, 496 U.S. at 27.
317. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
318. See id. at 348-49.
319. See McKesson, 496 U.S. at 38-39.
320. See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
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immune from congressional power to subject it to damage liability, the state
is constitutionally obligated to pay individuals damages whenever it has
violated a mandatory obligation imposed on it by Congress vis-a-vis
individuals, even if Congress did not expressly create a damage remedy.
McKesson, so interpreted, is thus fundamentally incompatible with the
immunity-from-liability interpretation.
If so, then McKesson seems to entrench the abrogation reductio. This
would indeed be the case if the immunity-from-liability interpretation were
correct. As discussed above, under the immunity-from-liability view, Congress
would have the power to abrogate that immunity whenever it has the power
to legislate substantively. McKesson tells us that Congress would be
"abrogating" this immunity by legislating substantively. There would be no
need for an additional act of "abrogation" to render the states liable in
damages. Thus, if we assumed the correctness of the immunity-from-liability
view, McKesson would make the abrogation reductio more of a problem, not
less.
If the forum-allocation interpretation were correct, however, McKesson and
related procedural due process cases would offer a rationale for avoiding the
abrogation reductio. By hypothesis, Congress would have the power to subject
the states to damage liability to individuals; Eleventh Amendment immunity
would simply be an immunity from the original jurisdiction of the federal
courts. Suppose Congress has made states liable in damages to individuals for
patent infringement. As we saw, the individual would then have a property
interest in receiving damages from the state. 321 Under McKesson, the state
violates the Due Process Clause if it does not pay the individual the damages.
But, by the same token, the state would satisfy its obligations under the Due
Process Clause (with respect to the patent holder's property interest in
damages) 322 by making available a damage remedy in its own courts. If a
state enacted a law giving individuals a right to obtain damages for patent
infringement against the state in state courts, then Congress would be hard
pressed to justify an abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity (meaning
here immunity from lower federal court jurisdiction) under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. If the state did not subject itself to damage
liability in its own courts, then Congress would be justified in abrogating the
immunity (thus making the state suable for damages in federal court). But the
abrogation reductio would be avoided because Congress's power to abrogate
would not be coextensive with its power to legislate; it would depend as well
on the state's failure to open its courts up to patent claims against itself and

321. See supra text accompanying note 284.
322. The discussion in this paragraph assumes that the only relevant property right is the right to
damages. Below, I consider the analytical modifications required by the recognition that there is also a
property right in noninfringement.
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its agencies. Notice that the price the state must pay to avoid Congress's power
to subject it to federal jurisdiction would be its agreement to waive its
immunity from the jurisdiction of its own courts. The resulting scheme would
be precisely the one that would be produced by the Eleventh Amendment if
interpreted as a forum-allocation principle. Defenders of this interpretation
regard the Amendment as a sort of abstention doctrine, 323 a doctrine that
entrusts the enforcement of the states' federal liabilities to individuals to state
courts that have indicated some willingness to enforce those liabilities
faithfully, but reserves a congressional power to confer jurisdiction on the
federal courts if the state courts seem unwilling. The proposed rationale for
avoiding the reductio, based in part on McKesson, thus seems neatly to "prove"
the correctness of the forum-allocation view. Indeed, the resulting scheme
would closely resemble the scheme that would have been set up by the
proposed substitute for the Eleventh Amendment that was rejected by the
Framers immediately before the current version was passed: Congress would
lack the power to create a federal forum for the vindication of federal rights
only if the states make provision for enforcing those rights in the state
courts. 324
But escaping the reductio is not so easy. Recall that the right to damages
is not the only property right involved in patent cases. The patent holder also
has a property right in the state's "noninfringement" of the patent. 325 Does
a state satisfy its due process obligations with respect to this property right
merely by enacting a law permitting patent holders to obtain damages in state
court against the state? Answering this question requires a closer look at the
Court's procedural due process jurisprudence, a quagmire into which I venture
with some trepidation.
As noted, the Court treated McKesson as merely an application of the
Mathews v. Eldridge approach to procedural due process. The Court in
Mathews held that the Due Process Clause does not always require a
predeprivation hearing; sometimes a postdeprivation hearing will suffice. 326
323. See Jackson, supra note I, at 7; see also id. at 99 n.394 (stating that under analysis proposed by
author, "whether monetary relief is available in federal district court against states may come to depend,
in part, on the adequacy of the remedies available in the state courts"). Because Jackson espouses not only
the forum-allocation view, but also the diversity view (under which Eleventh Amendment immunity could
freely be withdrawn by Congress under any of its powers), a decision by Congress that the state courts are
inadequate would be binding on the courts. Under the version of the forum-allocation view described here,
on the other hand, Congress would have the power to remove cases from the state to the federal courts only
if the states fail to set up procedures that comply with the requirements of the Due Process Clause, as
interpreted by the courts.
324. See supra text accompanying notes 199-200. It is not clear that under this proposal the Supreme
Court would have retained jurisdiction to review state court decisions denying the federal right. Perhaps
that rejected version of the Eleventh Amendment would have been interpreted to permit the Supreme Court
to determine in each case whether, in retrospect, adequate provision had been made for the enforcement
in state court of the federal right at issue in the case.
325. See supra note 287 and accompanying text.
326. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348-49 (1976).
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McKesson tells us that when a postdeprivation hearing suffices, the Due
Process Clause requires the state to make available a damage remedy against
itself sufficient to compensate the property holder for losses suffered as a
consequence of the legal violation. Now we must consider the cases that tell
us when a postdeprivation hearing suffices. The most pertinent line of cases
is the one that begins with Parratt v. Taylor321 and culminates in Zinermon
v. Burch. 328 These cases are, like McKesson, simply applications of the
general principles set forth in Mathews. 329 They establish that where a person
has been deprived of liberty or property330 by the state, but a postdeprivation
remedy would satisfy due process, the property holder may not maintain a
damage action against the responsible state officials under section 1983 if state
law makes available an adequate postdeprivation remedy. 331 More important
for present purposes, however, is what these cases tell us about when a
postdeprivation remedy suffices for due process purposes. Parratt and its
progeny establish that postdeprivation remedies suffice when state officials
deprive persons of property in a "random and unauthorized" way. 332
Parratt's specific holding that a negligent destruction of property is random
and unauthorized for this purpose is no longer relevant, as the Court
subsequently held that negligent conduct does not amount to a "deprivation"
for due process purposes. 333 But the more general principle that "random and
unauthorized" injury to property does not violate the Due Process Clause if the
state makes available a postdeprivation remedy survives. The combination of
Parratt and McKesson appears to mean that if a state infringes a patent in a
random and unauthorized way, it satisfies its obligations under the Due Process
Clause as long as it makes available a postdeprivation damage action against
itself in its own courts. But the state violates the Due Process Clause without
regard to the existence of a postdeprivation remedy if the infringement was not
327. 451 u.s. 527 (1981).
328. 494 u.s. 113 (1990).
329. See Parratt, 451 U.S. at 540-41 & n.5; Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 127.
330. This analysis would apply only to property rights defined by state law. If a person has suffered
the deprivation of a property right defined by federal law, then he or she would be able to sue the relevant
state official immediately in federal court under section 1983 as defined in Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S.
1 (1980). (Subsequent cases, including Seminole Tribe itself, may require qualification of this statement at
the margins.)
331. See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 128. This rule is curious in that the availability of a federal forum
turns on the absence of positive state law recognizing an obligation that the Due Process Clause directly
imposes on the states. If the Due Process Clause requires a postdeprivation remedy, then state courts are
required to make one available, even if the state's written law (be it statutory or judge-made) does not so
recognize. The Court accordingly might have said that someone who suffers a deprivation of property in
circumstances where a postderivation remedy suffices must pursue the postdeprivation remedy in state
courts, which under Testa v. Kan, 330 U.S. 386 (1947), are required to provide the remedy. Instead, the
Court held that because of the absence of state positive law recognizing the due process obligation to
provide a postdeprivation remedy, the property holder gets immediate access to a federal forum in which
to seek the postdeprivation remedy. Access to the federal court thus depends on the states' failure to enact
what would otherwise be a redundant law.
332. See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 138-39.
333. See Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986).
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"random and unauthorized."
The meaning of this term was elaborated in Zinermon. The resulting
standard is far from transparent, but it seems fair to say that a deprivation of
property would not be random and unauthorized under Zinermon if the
possibility that a deprivation would occur was predictable, and if the likelihood
of the deprivation occurring could feasibly have been reduced if the state had
set up more or better procedures to be followed by the relevant state
officials. 334 In such circumstances, the state is obligated by the Due Process
Clause to set up those procedures, 335 and if it does not, then any deprivation
that occurs is a violation of due process without regard to the existence of
postdeprivation remedies. This standard is certainly rather fuzzy around the
edges, but, as applied to our patent hypothetical, it seems to lead to the
conclusion that the state is required under the Due Process Clause not only to
make it clear that its officials may not infringe patents, but also to set up some
sort of preclearance procedure to be used by any state official who is likely to
be using patented technology. Such procedures might have to include notice
to potentially interested patent holders and an opportunity to adjudicate such
issues as patent validity. If such procedures were "feasible" under Zinermon
and the state did not establish them, then any infringement that occurs violates
the Due Process Clause. If the state does set up such procedures and an
infringement occurs because a state official did not comply with them, then the
deprivation was "random and unauthorized." 336 In such circumstances, the
state satisfies its due process obligations by making available a postdeprivation
hearing, which, under McKesson, must include a right to damages against the
state. If the state sets up the required predeprivation procedures and an
infringement occurs even though the procedures were followed, apparently the
334. See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 137-38; see also id. at 139 (commenting that Parratt is a "special
instance of the Mathews due process analysis where postdeprivation process is all that is due because no
predeprivation safeguards would be of use in preventing the kind of deprivation alleged"); Cleveland Bd.
of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (I 985) ('"[T]he root requirement' of the Due Process Clause"
is '"that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant
property interest."') (quoting Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)).
335. There is some ambiguity in the Zinermon opinion about whether the Court was holding that the
state of Florida was obliged under the Due Process Clause to provide greater predeprivation procedural
safeguards. See Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 117 (noting that plaintiff "disavowed any challenge to the [Florida]
statutes themselves"). However, the Court's repeated statements that Parratt represents "a special case of
the general Mathews v. Eldridge analysis," 494 U.S. at 128; see also id. at 129 (stating that Parratt "is not
an exception to the Mathews balancing test, but rather an application of [it]"), indicate that the Court held
that the state of Florida (either its legislature or the executive official to whom the legislature had delegated
the authority to confine mentally ill people) was required by the Due Process Clause to provide greater
predeprivation procedural safeguards. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions About Due Process,
Judicial Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REv. 309, 347 n.219 (1993).
336. This is the clear implication of the Court's conclusion in Zinermon that the state official's conduct
was authorized and not random because the state had delegated to him "broad ... , uncircumscribed power
to effect the deprivation at issue." Zinermon, 494 U.S. at 136. Thus, if the state had circumscribed the
power by establishing procedural safeguards but the officer had violated those procedures, the deprivation
would have been random and unauthorized for Parratt purposes and postdeprivation remedies would have
sufficed to satisfy the Due Process Clause.
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deprivation does not violate due process and the state is not required to provide
a postdeprivation hearing or damage remedy. 337 (Apparently, the
predeprivation hearing was all the patent holder was entitled to. Of course, if
the forum-allocation interpretation were correct, an appeal to the Supreme
Court would be possible from an adverse predeprivation decision of an
adjudicatory nature, even if the state provided no "judicial" review.) 338
If the Due Process Clause does indeed require such preclearance
procedures, then this line of cases merely adds to what the state must do to
avoid susceptibility to federal jurisdiction. If a state sets up the required
preclearance procedures and provides further that a damage remedy is available
against the state in state court if the procedures are not followed and a
deprivation results, then it will have done all that it was required to do under
the Due Process Clause. Congress would therefore be hard pressed to justify
the abrogation of such a state's Eleventh Amendment immunity. If abrogation
is not possible under those circumstances, then we will have avoided the
abrogation reductio, for it would be fully within the state's power to avoid
being made suable by private individuals in federal court (and, as we are
assuming the correctness of the forum-allocation interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment, the states are not immune from federal liability). Under the
resulting scheme, a state may be subjected to suit in federal court if it has not
established the provisions for pre- and postdeprivation procedures required by
the Due Process Clause, but, if it has established those procedures, the property
holder's substantive federal entitlement would have to be litigated in the state
courts (or administrative agencies), either before or after the deprivation. Once
again, we will have escaped the reductio in a way consistent with the forumallocation interpretation. The role of the Eleventh Amendment under such a
scheme would be to channel the adjudication of federal claims against states
into the state courts, subject to possible review in the Supreme Court. 339
2.

The Scope of Congress~ Section 5 Enforcement Power

There is, however, an obstacle to this escape from the abrogation reductio
that we have not yet considered. The line of reasoning just described would
337. This assumes that Congress has not made states liable in damages-in other words, that the only
·"property" interest involved is the right to noninfringement. If Congress did subject states to damage
liability (something it would have the power to do only if the forum-allocation interpretation were correct),
then, as discussed above, the patent holder would have an additional property interest in being paid the
damages and the states would have to provide a forum for the recovery of those damages.
338. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 475 U.S. I, 7 (1986) (allowing review of
commission determination where California Supreme Court had denied discretionary review); HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 100, at 643 & n.12. If the Due Process Clause does not require the predeprivation
hearing to be "adjudicatory" in nature (with notice to the property holder), then presumably it would require
the state to make available a postdeprivation hearing of an adjudicatory nature.
339. See supra note 338 and accompanying text.
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succeed at avoiding the reductio only if Congress's Section 5 power to
"enforce" the Fourteenth Amendment were limited to providing additional
remedies for the states' completed violations of the first four sections of the
Fourteenth Amendment, as the Supreme Court has interpreted them. But there
is significant support for the proposition that Congress's power under Section
5 is broader than that. This issue is currently before the Supreme Court. 340
Whether McKesson and Parratt in fact offer an escape from the reductio
consistent with the forum-allocation interpretation may in the end depend on
the Court's rejection of some of the broader interpretations of Section 5, or,
alternatively, on the Court's willingness to carve out some sort of "procedural
due process" exception to Section 5. I conclude that this is not a significant
obstacle because one or the other is likely.
Existing precedents appear to recognize that Congress's power under
Section 5 extends beyond providing additional remedies for completed
violations of the other provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment. First, and
most controversially, there is some support for the proposition that Section 5
gives Congress some power to interpret the other provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment to impose broader requirements on the states than the Court has
found them to impose. 341 If so, then perhaps Congress has the power to
determine that a deprivation of a property right by the state violates due
process without regard to the existence of postdeprivation remedies, and
whether or not the state had in place predeprivation procedural safeguards. The
broad understanding of Section 5 as giving Congress the power to construe the
other provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to provide broader protections
than the Court has read those provisions to afford was limited somewhat in
Oregon v. Mitchell. 342 The deciding vote in that case was Justice Black's,
and he expressed the view that Congress's independent power under Section
5 to determine what the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment
require should be confined to the area of race discrimination. However, he
would have limited Congress's power to that extent only where Congress was
legislating in an area exclusively reserved to the states by the Constitution. 343
In other areas, Congress's "enforcement power need not be tied so closely to
the goal of eliminating discrimination on account of race." 344 The scope of
Black's exception is difficult to pinpoint, since it would seem that whenever
Congress exercises a power granted it by Article I, it has not acted in an area
"exclusively reserved to the states." One possibility would be to distinguish

340. The Supreme Court will address the issue in reviewing Flores v. City of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352
(5th Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 293 (1996).
341. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1966). See generally STONE, supra note 301,
at 253-ti6.
342. 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
343. See id. at 130.
344. /d.
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legislative powers that the Constitution allocates to Congress with some
precision and specificity, as to which the Constitution clearly and specifically
negates state exclusivity, from the broader and less specific congressional
powers. If such a line were drawn, then a Section 5 power to interpret the
requirements of the Due Process Clause with respect to property rights created
under specific clauses of Article I, such as that relating to patents, would
arguably survive Oregon v. Mitchell. This would partially avoid the reductio,
for there would still be an Article I legislative power under which Congress
would lack the power to abrogate, but it is difficult to come up with a federal
legislative power that would be "broad and unspecific" for these purposes other
than the power to regulate interstate commerce. Adopting this line would thus
reduce Seminole Tribe to a holding that Congress may not abrogate under the
Commerce Clause. More importantly, this line seems inconsistent with the
specific holding in Seminole Tribe itself, for Congress there had exercised its
power over Indian commerce, a subject that has never been exclusively
regulated by the states. 345
Avoiding the reductio may require an adjustment (or clarification) of
Section 5 doctrine in other respects as well. First, there is authority for the
proposition that where the existence of a violation of the self-executing
portions of the Fourteenth Amendment turns on matters of fact, the courts will
defer to Congress's reasonable assessment of those facts. 346 If so, then
perhaps the Court would defer to a congressional finding that certain property
rights against the states would not be adequately protected by the state courts
even with Supreme Court review. 347 Second, even the Justices most eager to
345. See County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 234 (1985).
346. See generally Katzenbach, 384 U.S. 641; Archibald Cox, The Supreme Court, 1965
Term-Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91,
106-07 (1966). Even the petitioners in the City of Boerne case, currently before the Supreme Court, read
the Court's past Section 5 cases to uphold Congress's "exercise of superior factfinding skills in the context
of applying the Court's designated standard for constitutional violations," and they do not ask the Court
to reject those holdings. Brief for Petitioner at 35, City of Boerne (No. 95-2074).
347. Of course, if the forum-allocation interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment were correct, then
the Amendment might be said to reflect a constitutional judgment that state courts are as good as federal
courts in protecting these rights, and a contrary congressional judgment might accordingly be out of bounds.
On the other hand, if Congress has the power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity, then presumably
it has the power to conclude otherwise. Perhaps the Court would say that Congress is free to determine that
state courts are not adequate in protecting rights conferred by the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment, but not rights conferred under Article I. This would come close to a stipulation that the
abrogation power simply does not extend to "procedural due process" rights. As discussed below, such a
stipulation may, in the end, be the only way to avoid the reductio. See infra note 355 and accompanying
text.
There is another, related objection to the congressional "factfinding" described in the text. If a state
has done everything the Due Process Clause requires it to do, then it seems that Congress is not responding
to the states' failure to enforce adequately the Due Process Clause, but rather the states' failure to enforce
adequately the laws Congress enacted under Article I. In other words, if a state has set up the procedures
the Due Process Clause requires and Congress is still not satisfied, then Congress is saying, essentially, that
protecting the "property" right it created requires better procedures than what the Due Process Clause
requires. In these circumstances, Congress's objections have nothing to do with the Fourteenth Amendment
and everything to do with the laws Congress enacted under Article I. If so, then it seems difficult to justify
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read Section 5 narrowly appear willing to accept that Congress has the power
to create remedies where a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment (as the
Court would interpret it) "lurks."348 In other words, "Congress has the power
to forestall the occurrence of acts that would violate rights that the courts have
found or would find protected by the [Fourteenth Amendment]."349 While
Parratt may establish that there is no completed violation of the Due Process
Clause if the state sets up adequate predeprivation procedures and makes
available adequate postdeprivation remedies, perhaps the state's infringement
of a patent would be regarded as evidence of a "budding," "sprouting,"
"incipient," or "nascent" violation of the Due Process Clause350 that would
justify a congressional decision under Section 5 to subject the state to suit in
federal court for damages on the theory that state court procedures are unlikely
to be effective enough at remedying such infringements. 351
In the end, though, Section 5 doctrine does not pose a very significant
obstacle to the proffered Parratt- and McKesson-based rationales for escaping
the abrogation reductio. The arguments for upholding an abrogation on
"factfinding" or "prophylaxis" grounds seem question-begging or weak. 352
The case for a congressional power to abrogate based on a substantive
congressional power to interpret the requirements of the Due Process Clause
more broadly than the Court does seems stronger,353 but this broader
the abrogation as necessary to "enforce" the Due Process Oause.
348. EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 260 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
349. STONE, supra note 301, at 259. The petitioners in City of Boerne also appear to accept this
"prophylactic" use of Congress's Section 5 power. See Brief for Petitioner at 33, City of Boerne (No. 952074).
350. The Fifth Circuit used these adjectives to describe the types of uncompleted violations of the
Fourteenth Amendment that would justify congressional exercises of Section 5 power. See Flores v. City
of Boerne, 73 F.3d 1352, 1359, 1360, 1361 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 117 S. Ct. 293 (1996).
351. This argument raises some of the same problems as the "factfinding" argument discussed above.
See supra note 347. It also is in tension with my conclusion above (albeit a tentative one) that a patent
infringement by the state would not in fact violate the Due Process Clause if the state provided
predeprivation procedures and postdeprivation remedies in the event those procedures were violated. See
supra text accompanying note 337.
352. See supra notes 347, 351. Henry Monaghan has argued that, under the reasoning of the Parratt
line of cases, Congress would lack the power to provide a federal forum for state deprivations of liberty
or property that do not rise to the level of a substantive due process violation. See Henry Paul Monaghan,
State Law Wrongs, State Law Remedies, and the Founeenth Amendment, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 979, 997-98
(1986). He offers this conclusion as a reason for abandoning Parratt, a decision that he regards as "most
puzzling" and inconsistent with "long-embedded understandings of when a denial of due process occurs
for fourteenth amendment purposes." /d. at 979. Of course, if the Parratt line of cases is incoherent, then
relying on it to avoid the abrogation reductio is problematic, for extending the Parratt analysis to new
fields only aggravates the conflict with the "long-embedded understandings" to which Monaghan refers.
I do not offer this as a reason for rejecting this possible escape from the reductio, however, because (1)
the Court has not taken up Monaghan's call for Parrott's abandonment; and (2) Parratt and McKesson are
closely related offshoots of Mathews, and accordingly rejecting Parratt would come close to rejecting
McKesson, something this Section of the Article strives to avoid. Since this effort is not entirely successful
for other reasons, I will offer a reinterpretation of McKesson below.
353. This argument still leaves one wondering why Congress should have the power to open up the
federal courts to suits against the states even if states are willing to take the additional procedural steps that
Congress thinks the Due Process Clause requires. Arguably, Congress's power to abrogate under the Due
Process Clause should always be contingent on the states' unwillingness to provide procedures the Due
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interpretation of Section 5 may not long survive. Even if it does, the Court
could in the end avoid the abrogation reductio by stipulation: It could simply
hold that whatever the scope of Congress's power to abrogate under Section
5 to "enforce" the "substantive" provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, that
power does not extend to "procedural" provisions such as the procedural Due
Process Clause. Such an "exception" would not be entirely without theoretical
grounding354 or support in the case law. 355 It may, in the end, be the only
way to avoid the abrogation reductio.
3.

The Untenability of the Conventional Reading of McKesson

Although this analysis of McKesson and related due process cases may
help avoid the reductio while preserving the forum-allocation interpretation of
the Eleventh Amendment, our analysis has at the same time exposed the
implausibility of the conventional understanding of McKesson's due process
holding. When we began this discussion we were concerned that the Due
Process Clause gave Congress too much power: that it gave Congress the
power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity under Article I, whereas the
Seminole Tribe decision denied Congress that power. Now it has become clear
that McKesson as conventionally understood is implausible because it would
unduly limit Congress's powers.
As explained above, the procedural due process cases, including
McKesson, actually deny Congress the flexibility to choose how to give
efficacy to the obligations it places on the states. 356 Even though Congress
chose to rely on postdeprivation damage actions as the principal means of
giving efficacy to the patent laws, Zinermon would apparently require the
states to set up some sort of preclearance procedure. Because such procedures
would be required by the Constitution, presumably a state that has not set them
up could be ordered to do so by a federal court. 357 Perhaps this result accords
with the Eleventh Amendment's preference for prospective relief over

Process Clause requires, whether those requirements are determined by the Court or by Congress. If so,
then any valid exercise of the abrogation power premised on the Due Process Clause must always be
phrased in conditional form-for example, "Federal courts shall have jurisdiction over suits to enforce
[property right X) against states that do not enact [procedure Y) to protect such right."
354. See supra note 337.
355. The Court has, for example, been willing to distinguish procedural due process claims from other
constitutional claims for purposes of section 1983. On this distinction, see Monaghan, supra note 352.
356. See supra Subsection IV.C.l.
357. Assuming, of course, someone with standing seeks such relief. If the states had the choice
between setting up such procedures and submitting to the jurisdiction of the federal courts, then this
interpretation of Zinermon might actually help advance Congress's goal of having patent claims litigated
in the federal courts, for states may well prefer to submit to federal court suits against themselves than to
incur the cost of setting up the procedures Zinermon would appear to require. But, if the Due Process
Clause requires the predeprivation procedures, the states presumably do not have the option of declining
to set them up.
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retrospective relief. (Although the states remain liable in damages if
infringements occur, presumably fewer infringements will occur if the state
offers a hearing before the deprivation.) But it does seem odd, to say the least,
to interpret the Due Process Clause in such a way as to require the conclusion
that a federal statute that can be constitutionally applied to the states only
because it also applies to private individuals358 places substantial burdens on
states that Congress has not opted to place on anyone. That no one has ever
suggested that states are required to set up preclearance procedures to avoid
patent violations casts doubt on the conclusion that the Due Process Clause
requires this strange result.
More important for our purposes, McKesson appears to require a damage
remedy from the state for every violation of mandatory obligations imposed
on the state by federal statute for the benefit of individuals, even if Congress
has chosen not to provide a damage remedy. 359 McKesson thus denies
Congress the power to place mandatory obligations on states for the benefit of
individuals but to rely for their enforcement exclusively on mechanisms other
than private damage actions. 360 There is an argument to be made that
individuals who have been given "rights" against the states by federal statutes
that impose obligations on states for their benefit should always be entitled to
a damage remedy if the state violates that obligation and causes them
injury. 361 But the claim that our Constitution establishes such a regime is
inconsistent with too many Supreme Court decisions to be plausible. For this
reason, an interpretation of McKesson that would require that conclusion is
implausible too.
As Justice Brennan, McKesson's author, wrote in Davis v. Passman, 362
"statutory rights and obligations are established by Congress, and it is entirely
appropriate for Congress, in creating these right and obligations, to determine
in addition who may enforce them and in what manner."363 Other cases make
358. See supra text accompanying note 99.
359. If Congress has not expressly created a damage remedy, the Zinermon/McKesson analysis leads
to the conclusion that the Due Process Clause requires a damage remedy if: (1) the state has not set up the
required predeprivation procedures and a wrongful deprivation occurs; and (2) if the state has set up such
procedures and a wrongful deprivation occurs because the procedures were not followed.
360. It would remain open to Congress to phrase the statute in such a way as to make the state's
conduct nonmandatory. See, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. I, 18-25 (1981).
But presumably, if the state's obligation were not mandatory, no one would have the power to obtain
prospective relief. McKesson, as construed above, would appear to require a private damage remedy under
the Due Process Qause whenever the state has violated a federally imposed obligation if the obligation is
mandatory in the sense that prospective enforcement would be appropriate, and the obligation is towards
individuals such that the individual could be said to have a correlative "property" right. On this latter
requirement, see supra note 288.
361. See supra note 21.
362. 442 u.s. 228 (1979).
363. !d. at 241. It might be objected that Justice Brennan's statement is inapposite because he was
speaking about statutory rights imposing obligations on private individuals, not states. (Violation of
statutory obligations by private individuals does not, of course, produce violations of the Due Process
Clause.) However, Brennan does not confine his statement to statutes that impose obligations on private
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it clear that one of the choices Congress might make when imposing an
obligation on a state would be to permit individuals to maintain an action for
prospective relief only. That Congress made such a choice appears to have
been the Court's assumption, for example, in the Edelman case,364 where
there was no question that the claimants had "property" interests against the
state. 365 The Will case not only denied a damage remedy against the state
under section 1983, but established a strong presumption that no such remedy
exists unless Congress clearly says otherwise. 366 Likewise, the Sea Clammers
line of section 1983 cases clearly recognized that Congress may impose
obligations on states yet preclude damage claims against the state or its
officials. 367 The reasoning of the Sea Clammers line of cases was endorsed
and indeed extended to a new context in Seminole Tribe itself. 368 If so, then
individuals, and the Davis case itself involved a claim against a government official.
364. This is the interpretation that is most congenial to the forum-allocation view. Cf supra note 273.
365. The benefits were not distinguishable in this respect from those involved in Goldberg v. Kelly,
397 U.S. 254 (1970), or Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See supra note 311.
366. See supra Subsection ID.C.4. Section 1983 entitles individuals to a remedy only if federal law
gives them a "right[], privilege[], or immunit[y)." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). The Court in Pennhurst had
already interpreted this requirement as not authorizing relief if the relevant federal law did not impose
mandatory obligations on the states. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hasp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 27-28
(1981). And in Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103 (1989), the Court wrote
that the availability of a remedy under section 1983 to enforce a federal statute "turns on whether the
statute, by its terms or as interpreted, creates obligations 'sufficiently specific and definite' to be within 'the
competence of the judiciary to enforce,' is intended to benefit the putative plaintiff, and is not foreclosed
'by express provision or other specific evidence from the statute itself."' !d. at 108 (quoting Wright v.
Roanoke Redevelopment & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 423 (1987)). The first two requirements suggest
that anyone who would have standing to enforce a statute under section 1983 would have a property right
in the state's compliance with the statutory obligation. See supra note 287 and accompanying text
(discussing definition of "property" for purposes of Due Process Clause). Thus, Will's denial of a damage
remedy against states was relevant only where persons would otherwise apparently have possessed a
property right vis-a-vis the states under federal law. See Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491
U.S. 581 (1989). The third Golden State requirement, see 493 U.S. at 108, is, of course, a recognition that
Congress may "foreclose" private damage actions for persons who would otherwise possess a "property"
right, something that is inconsistent with McKesson's holding that the Due Process Clause requires such
damages, see McKesson Corp. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 22 (1990).
367. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. I (1981). See
generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 100, at 1134-36 (discussing Sea Clammers and subsequent
decisions). This case and its successors hold that where Congress has imposed an obligation on states by
statute but has established an exclusive enforcement scheme, the section 1983 remedy is unavailable. This
is so even if the exclusive enforcement scheme does not make a damage remedy available. See id. at 1134.
The Court in these cases held that a damage remedy was unavailable under section 1983; it did not consider
whether the Due Process Clause independently required a damage remedy, but its whole analysis is
inconsistent with such a conclusion. The Sea Clammers line of cases denies the existence of a damage
remedy against state officers. See id. The Will case establishes that a damage remedy against the state itself
is unavailable in these cases. See supra note 366.
368. The Seminole Tribe Court relied on the reasoning of Sea Clammers in denying the Tribe's right
to maintain an Ex parte Young action against the Governor of Florida. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116
S. Ct. 1114, 1132-33 (1996). Although the Court inexplicably did not cite Sea Clammers, it reasoned in
a strikingly similar manner. The Court found the Ex parte Young remedy unavailable because Congress had
established a liability scheme that, in the Court's view, was incompatible with the existence of such a
remedy. I agree with the criticisms raised by scholars about the Court's application of this principle in the
Seminole Tribe case itself. See generally Jackson, supra note 15. However, I do not find the principle that
an Ex parte Young remedy should not be available to enforce a statutory right where Congress has
established an alternative enforcement scheme that is incompatible with such remedy any more
objectionable than the decision in Sea Clammers.
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McKesson is in conflict with Seminole Tribe in yet another way. Given the
many decisions affirming Congress's power to impose mandatory obligations
on states without subjecting them or their officials to damage liability,369 an
interpretation of McKesson that would disable Congress from doing so must
be wrong.

V.

REINTERPRETING MCKESSON

In this Part, I shall suggest two possible ways to reinterpret McKesson
without abandoning its key holding that a retrospective remedy was required
in that case. The first reinterpretation responds directly to the problem just
discussed: that McKesson's due process holding, as conventionally understood,
would deny Congress the power to place mandatory obligations on states
without subjecting them to damage liability. This first reinterpretation retains
the holding that Florida was required to provide a retrospective remedy against
itself in its own courts, but regards the source of that obligation not to be the
Due Process Clause, but the substantive provision of federal law that Florida
violated, the dormant Commerce Clause. This first reinterpretation has the
virtue of squaring McKesson with the cases recognizing that Congress may
impose obligations on states without subjecting them to damage liability. But
there are problems with this interpretation, the principal one being that the
decision offers no basis for distinguishing the dormant Commerce Clause from
any other constitutional or statutory provision. Indeed, the Court's reliance on
the Due Process Clause indicates that it regarded the remedial principle it
articulated as a generally applicable one.
My second proposed reinterpretation helps address this problem. This
reinterpretation reads McKesson to establish a generally applicable right to
damages for the violation by the states of federal laws, but it reads the case to
establish a right to damages from responsible state officials rather than the
governments for which they work. Even if not combined with the first
reinterpretation-that is, even if the right to damages were regarded as having
Like the Sea Clammers decision itself, this aspect of Seminole Tribe appears to be in conflict with
the McKesson!Parratt/Zinennon cases as well as another line of procedural due process cases, the
Amett/Loudermillline discussed below. See infra text accompanying notes 375-81. If McKesson stands for
the proposition that a state must provide a postdeprivation hearing and a damage remedy if the deprivation
turns out to have been invalid, it must also require the availability of injunctive relief if the deprivation is
a continuing one. If so, it is in tension with the Court's holding in Seminole Tribe that no such relief was
available even in a suit against the Governor. But cf. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016, 1025 (11th
Cir. 1994) (holding that IGRA gave Tribes no property interest). This may be yet another fundamental
conflict between McKesson (as conventionally understood) and Seminole Tribe.
369. In addition to the other decisions cited in this Subsection, see Martinez v. California, 444 U.S.
277, 282 (1980) (assuming that individuals have property interest in state wrongful death actions and that
state law of sovereign immunity "deprives" people of such property insofar as it immunizes state officials
from wrongful death liability, but finding nevertheless that immunity is constitutional because "the State's
interest in fashioning its own rules of tort law is paramount to any discernible federal interest").
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its source in the Due Process Clause-the second reinterpretation would have
the virtue of reconciling McKesson with doctrine in related areas. But this
interpretation would not avoid the problems with McKesson just identified. To
do the latter, we must combine the two reinterpretations of McKesson.
But, if the source of the obligation to award damages is not the Due
Process Clause, how can it nevertheless be a generally applicable one? The
answer is suggested by the close affinity that becomes apparent, when we
construe McKesson as an officer liability case, between McKesson and such
other officer liability cases as Ex parte Young, Bivens, 370 and Poindexter. All
of these cases, I maintain, are best understood as establishing that the
Constitution itself requires effective remedies, both prospective and
retrospective, whenever the Constitution is violated, but that the remedies the
Constitution contemplates are remedies against officials rather than the
governments for which they work. I locate this constitutional principle in the
Supremacy Clause. Unlike the Due Process Clause, the Supremacy Clause is
flexible enough to accommodate an exception for statutory claims where
Congress in enacting the statute provided for alternative remedies or precluded
private remedies altogether.
A. Reinterpreting McKesson as to the Source of the Obligation to Afford
Relief
As just noted, an interpretation of McKesson that would read it to disable
Congress from placing obligations on states without subjecting them to private
damage liability cannot be right. The most straightforward way to avoid this
problem without calling into question the Court's holding that the state was
required to pay damages to the plaintiff would be to reject what the opinion
suggests about the source of the state's obligation to pay damages. As
discussed, the McKesson Court relied on the Due Process Clause, and the case
is naturally understood to stand for the proposition that the source of the
state's obligation to pay damages is the Due Process Clause. 371 An
alternative interpretation that would avoid this problem would regard the state's
obligation to pay damages as having its source not in the Due Process Clause,
but in whatever law imposed the obligation that was violated. The claim in
McKesson was that the state tax was invalid because it discriminated against
interstate commerce and thus violated the dormant feature of the Commerce
Clause. The proposed alternative interpretation of McKesson would read the

370. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (recognizing federal right of action
for damages against federal officials who violate Fourth Amendment).
371. See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 100, at 852 (commenting that McKesson Court treated
remedial obligation as arising not from constitutional provision that was violated (dormant Commerce
Clause) but from Due Process Clause).
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case as establishing that the damage remedy that Florida was under an
obligation to provide was required by the Commerce Clause itself, not the Due
Process Clause. On this reading, a state is obligated to provide a damage
remedy for violation of a federal norm if the federal norm that imposes the
obligation on the state (or some other federal norm) makes the state liable in
damages. 372 The Due Process Clause would not be the source of the right to
damages. Arguably, the Due Process Clause would require the state to make
available a forum in which to seek a damage remedy made available by some
other law if some other law makes a damage remedy available, 373 but the
more appropriate source of this obligation would in my view be the Supremacy
Clause, which by its terms requires state courts to give effect to federal
law.374
There are, however, problems with this alternative interpretation of
McKesson. First, the proposed interpretation of the Due Process Clause as not
requiring any greater remedies than what the substantive law makes available
comes close to adopting the view of that Clause that was forcefully espoused
by Chief Justice Rehnquist in Arnett v. Kennedj3 75 but has been decisively
rejected by the Court. Rehnquist's well-known "bitter with the sweet" approach
to statutorily created property interests insists that if the legislature establishes
a mandatory state obligation but at the same time establishes a streamlined
procedure for enforcing the obligation or correcting violations, then the
procedural limitations necessarily qualify the "property" right at issue. 376 In
such circumstances, the process that is due is only the process the legislature
provided for in the statute.377 Whatever the theoretical appeal of Rehnquist's
reasoning, a majority of the Court rejected it in Amett,378 and again in
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill: 379

372. I do not mean, by phrasing the rule in this way, to suggest that there should be a presumption
that damages are not available unless specifically authorized. Rather, I mean merely that the availability
of damages should be a matter of interpreting the legal provision that imposes the obligation, or
conceivably another legal provision, such as section 1983, intended to establish supplementary remedies.
The presumptions that should apply in this interpretive enterprise are another question entirely. In another
piece, I argue that the Supremacy Clause should be read to establish that prospective and retrospective relief
are presumptively available for the violation of any federal legal norm. See Vazquez, supra note 80, at 74.
373. The Due Process Clause would perhaps also give the state the option of replacing the damage
remedy with an adequate predeprivation opportunity to test the legal obligation. See Ward v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 253 U.S. 17 (1920) (recognizing that Due Process Clause would not have been violated
if plaintiffs' decision to forgo predeprivation procedures had truly been voluntary).
374. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 6 ("This Constitution ... shall be the Supreme Law of the Land");
Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 ( 1947).
375. 416 U.S. 134 (1974).
376. See id. at 153-55.
377. See id. at 177-78 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
378. See id. at 166 (Powell, J., concurring in part); id. at 177-78 (White, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); id. at 211 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[A] majority of the Court rejects Mr. Justice
Rehnquist's argument ....").
379. 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
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The point is straightforward: the Due Process Clause provides that
certain substantive rights-life, liberty, and property-cannot be
deprived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures. The
categories of substance and procedure are distinct. Were the rule
otherwise, the Clause would be reduced to a mere tautology. . . .
"While the legislature may elect not to confer a property interest . . . ,
it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an
interest, once conferred, without appropriate procedural
safeguards. " 380
In short, in determining the scope of a "property" right created by statute, one
looks at the substantive obligations the statute imposes, but not to the
procedures the statute sets up to enforce those obligations. Once the property
right has been defined, the Due Process Clause kicks in and tells us what
procedures the state must offer for its enforcement. The legislature presumably
has the power to require more or better procedures than what the Due Process
Clause would require, but it cannot offer less. This reasoning appears to
require the conclusion that the procedures the state must afford to protect
property rights created by federal statute, such as the right to be free from
patent infringement, are not just those defined by Congress, but also those
required by the Due Process Clause.
Admittedly, the tension between my reinterpretation of McKesson and
Arnett and Loudermill is significant. Yet if we do not reinterpret McKesson,
we will be stuck with a substantial conflict between that decision and the cases
that indicate that Congress may create a primary obligation but withhold a
damage remedy. This shows that the real conflict is not between
Arnett/Loudermill and our reinterpreted McKesson, but between
Arnett/Loudermill on the one hand and the cases recognizing congressional
discretion to create a substantive obligation but withhold a damage remedy on
the other. While Arnett seems to require a separation between the legislature's
power to impose primary obligations and its discretion to determine the
methods of enforcing it, Sea Clammers and the other cases discussed above
appear to say that the availability of remedies for the violation of statutorily
created obligations is entirely up to the legislature to determine. This conflict
will have to be resolved somehow, and I am confident that it will not be
resolved by denying Congress the discretion to withhold a damage remedy. It
may be possible to resolve this conflict within the analytical framework
established in Loudermill. Perhaps damage remedies could be conceptualized
as "substantive" for due process purposes. 381 This is not the place to
380. !d. at 541 (quoting Arnett, 416 U.S. at 167 (Powell, J., concurring in part)).
381. This would be inconsistent with McKesson's holding that the Due Process Clause requires the
damage remedy, see McKesson Corp. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 22
(1990), but this is precisely the aspect of McKesson that our first reinterpretation rejects. It is true that
Parratt and Zinermon seem to hold that a damage remedy is required by the Due Process Clause in certain
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elaborate possible resolutions of this problem beyond noting that Congress's
power to establish obligations but withhold a damage remedy is far better
established than the due process obligation of a state to pay damages to
individuals, and so the former would likely prevail in a head-to-head conflict.
A second problem with this proposed reinterpretation is that the Court's
opinion in McKesson makes it quite clear that it is resting the obligation to
award a damage remedy on the Due Process Clause. The Court's reliance on
the Due Process Clause indicates that the Court was making a general point
about the importance of and need for retrospective remedies. The Court says
nothing in the opinion to distinguish the remedial imperatives of the dormant
Commerce Clause from those of any other constitutional provision, or indeed
any other provision of law. In short, the McKesson opinion resists being
recharacterized as a decision about the remedies required by the dormant
Commerce Clause.
On the other hand, as we have seen, the due process interpretation
produces a sharp conflict with cases that have not generally been regarded as
constitutionally problematic. Doctrinal coherence demands that this conflict be
resolved. Reinterpreting McKesson as a holding about the remedies required
by the dormant Commerce Clause resolves the conflict without rejecting the
narrow holding that Florida was required to pay damages in that case, and this
sort of resolution is preferable to an outright overruling of McKesson. 381
Nevertheless, a resolution that pays greater regard to the Court's evident intent
to make a more general point about remedies would be preferable. On this
score, the second reinterpretation I suggest below, when combined with the
first, comes out ahead.
B. Reinterpreting McKesson as to the Subject of the Duty to Pay Damages
A second possible reinterpretation of the McKesson decision would view
it as establishing that individuals injured by a state's violation of mandatory
federal obligations have a right to damages not from the state itself, but from
state officials. I will discuss in Section C how this second proposed
reinterpretation helps address some of the problems of the first. The appeal of
the second reinterpretation, however, does not depend on acceptance of the
circumstances. Yet as discussed below, these cases do not in fact hold that the damages must come from
the state itself. To the extent that these cases hold that the Due Process Clause requires a damage remedy
against state officials for violations of duties imposed by statute even if the legislature that created the
obligation specifically withheld a damage remedy, these decisions are in conflict with Sea Clammers and
might have to be rethought. But I am not alone in calling for a reconsideration of these cases. See, e.g.,
Fallon, supra note 335; Monaghan, supra note 352; Michael Wells & Thomas A. Eaton, Substantive Due
Process and the Scope of Constitutional Torts, 18 GA. L. REv. 201 (1984).
382. Compare the majority's treatment of precedent in United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995),
in which the Court purported not to disturb the actual results in such prior cases as Wickard v. Filbum, 317
U.S. Ill (1942), even though it clearly (though not explicitly) rejected the tests applied in those cases.
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first reinterpretation. We would derive some doctrinal benefits from adopting
the second proposed reinterpretation of McKesson even if we rejected the first
reinterpretation and assumed that the individual's right to damages is grounded
in the Due Process Clause. These benefits include greater cohesion between
McKesson and the Parratt line of cases, Will and other cases denying damage
relief against the states in state court, and, most importantly, Seminole Tribe.
Indeed, this second proposed reinterpretation adds internal consistency to the
McKesson opinion itself by providing an explanation of the Court's "assent"
language. By doing so, however, it withdraws McKesson from the ranks of the
cases supporting the forum-allocation interpretation and places it among those
supporting the immunity-from-liability interpretation.
The defendant in McKesson was a state agency, which for Eleventh
Amendment purposes is treated as the state itself. 383 It was against the state
agency that, under state law, the plaintiff was to bring an action for a refund
of the taxes it claimed had been unlawfully exacted. The state courts agreed
that the taxes were unlawful, but they denied a refund for a variety of
reasons. 384 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the reasons cited by the
state court could not override the due process requirement of a remedy. The
Court held that the Due Process Clause required a remedy against the state
itself,385 but to the extent that the Court suggested the refund must as a
constitutional matter come from the state, the Court's language was dictum.
The state itself had designated the state agency as the relevant defendant. With
relatively little massaging, the opinion could be read to establish that the Due
Process Clause requires a retrospective monetary remedy sufficient to cure the
violation of law, but that the remedy as a constitutional matter need be
available only from the responsible state official. It can come from a state
agency if the state designates such an agency as the proper defendant, but in
the absence of such a designation, the Due Process Clause requires only that
a damage action be available against the official.
This interpretation of McKesson helps harmonize this decision with
Supreme Court precedents in a number of related areas. First, it helps reconcile
McKesson with the Parratt line of cases. In all of those cases, after all, the
defendant was a state official, not the state itself. The Court held in these cases
that no violation of due process occurs when a state official deprives an
individual of property in a random and unauthorized way so long as the state
makes available a postdeprivation tort remedy against the official. 386 It is true
383. See supra note 100.
384. See McKesson, 496 U.S. at 22.
385. See id. at 31; see also HART & WECHSLER, supra note 100, at 866.
386. Although the postdeprivation remedy in Parratt itself was a remedy against the state, see Parratt
v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981), in subsequent cases the Court has found postdeprivation remedies against
the official to satisfy due process, see, e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 115 (1990) (holding that
"postdeprivation tort remedy" suffices under Due Process Clause when conduct causing deprivation is
random and unauthorized; such tort remedies are usually against officials rather than government itself);

1772

The Yale Law Journal

[Vol. 106: 1683

that these cases were brought under section 1983, and the Court has held that
section 1983 does not authorize damages suits against the states
themselves. 387 This explains why the defendants in these cases were
individuals rather than the state. But, if the Court had believed that the Due
Process Clause required a damage remedy against the state itself, it would
presumably have found the individual liable for the deprivation of property so
long as the state did not make available a damage remedy against itself in state
court. Yet the Court has found the availability of damages against officials
personally to be sufficient to negate a due process violation.
This interpretation of McKesson also reconciles it with Will. The issue in
that case was whether damages could be recovered in state court against the
state itself under section 1983, where the state had injured the plaintiff in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. 388 The
Court decided that Congress had not clearly manifested an intent to render
states liable under section 1983, and thus no damages were available even in
state court. The substantive violation in that case was a violation of the Equal
Protection Clause, so Congress has the power to abrogate Eleventh
Amendment immunity with respect to the claim-if it wishes to do so--even
after Seminole Tribe. But, if state deprivations of property or liberty interests
without due process render the states themselves liable in damages, then
plaintiffs would be constitutionally entitled to maintain such a suit in state
court even without relying on section 1983.389
Most importantly, the second reinterpretation helps make sense of the
McKesson Court's reference to the state's "assent," and thus lends the opinion
internal consistency that it would lack under the prevailing interpretation. I
earlier dismissed the McKesson Court's reference to the need for the state's
"assent" primarily because it conflicted with the Court's due process
holding. 390 If the Due Process Clause's requirement of a remedy flows from

Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 520 n.l (1984); see also Fallon, supra note 335, at 349 (suggesting that
Parratt requires federal courts "to develop constitutional standards defining the scope of various
officials' ... liabilities") (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). See generally infra Section V.C.
387. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 68-69 (1989).
388. See id. at 66.
389. As noted above, persons who have a "right, privilege, or immunity" for purposes of section 1983
also likely have "property" rights for purposes of the Due Process Clause. See supra note 366.
390. See supra text accompanying note 169. I also relied above on the Court's citation of General Oil
Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211 (1908), a case in which the state used its own law of sovereign immunity to
deny relief and the Court exercised appellate jurisdiction anyway, ruling that an injunction was required
by the Constitution. The defendant in Crain, however, was a state official. Our reinterpretation of
McKesson allows us to explain Crain as establishing both that the Constitution requires that an injunction
be available for ongoing violations of the Constitution and that a suit seeking an injunction against a state
official is not a suit against the state for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. This is, of course, how I
have read Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Crain is thus entirely in accord with this Article's thesis.
Indeed, the Crain Court relied heavily on the same cases I rely on here, such as Poindexter. See 209 U.S.
at 225-27 (citing Poindexter v. Greenhow, ll4 U.S. 270 (1885)); see also infra Section V.C (explaining
Poindexter's bearing on the proposed reinterpretation of McKesson).
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the requirement of a hearing at a meaningful time, then clearly the remedy
cannot be dependent on the state's consent to provide the hearing. This must
mean, I concluded, that states are not free to deny a hearing on the basis of
their own law of sovereign immunity. But, if we reinterpret McKesson as
establishing a due process right to a hearing and a remedy against the
responsible state official, but not the state, McKesson's assent language begins
to make sense. Although the Due Process Clause does not require a remedy
payable by the state itself, the state is free to substitute itself as the proper
defendant, as it had done in McKesson. If it does so, it is (by hypothesis)
voluntarily consenting to suit against itself. The reinterpretation of McKesson's
due process holding thus makes it possible to understand McKesson's Eleventh
Amendment holding as stating that the state consents to suit by voluntarily
substituting itself for the official as the defendant, and that if it does so, the
Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction. If the state does not agree to do so,
then the official would remain personally liable, and, if the state court does not
enforce that liability, the Supreme Court can do so through its appellate
jurisdiction. Where the state has not agreed to substitute itself as the defendant,
the Supreme Court would have no appellate jurisdiction over a suit against the
state itself, and the state would not be subject to liability under the Due
Process Clause. Because this reinterpretation makes sense of the Court's
"assent" language, it reads the opinion in its best light. 391 Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, the new understanding of both aspects of McKesson
helps reconcile the case with the language in Seminole Tribe to the effect that
the Supreme Court possesses appellate jurisdiction over cases brought against
the states in state courts only where the states consent to the lawsuit.

As noted above, Vicki Jackson, in defending the forum-allocation interpretation, has asserted that
"[t]he mere existence of the state court of general jurisdiction to which a claim against the state might be
presented, even absent the state's consent to be sued, has justified the Supreme Court's assertion of
constitutional obligations to provide remedies against the state." Jackson, supra note 1, at 38. But the cases
she cites for this statement are consistent with the suggested reinterpretation of McKesson. All but two are
suits against state officials or local governments, which are not regarded as the state for Eleventh
Amendment purposes. Of the other two, McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102 (1898), appears to be a case
in which the state did not invoke sovereign immunity in the state courts. Iowa-Des Moines National Bank
v. Bennett, 284 U.S. 239 (1931 ), is more difficult to square with a requirement of consent to suit in the
state courts. The state there defended the case on the ground that the acts of the state's officials in
unconstitutionally collecting a tax were in violation of state statutes and thus not acts attributable to the
state. See id. at 243-44. The Supreme Court reversed, and, relying on such cases as Home Telephone &
Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278 (1913), held that the unconstitutional acts were attributable
to the state. See Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank, 284 U.S. at 246-47. While admittedly a close question, the
case might be reconciled with the requirement of consent on the theory that the state was not denying
consent to suit, but merely denying (erroneously) that there was any state action for purposes of the
Constitution.
391. This reading is also consistent with all of the cases on which the Court relied in McKesson. See
McKesson Corp. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 4% U.S. 18, 27 n.8 (1990). In none
of the cases relied on by the Court which were brought against a state or state agency (as opposed to a state
official or a local government) seeking a refund of back taxes was there any indication that the state had
asserted sovereign immunity as a defense to the state court action. See id.
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The suggestion that revenue officers are personally liable to taxpayers if
the taxes were collected pursuant to laws that turned out to have been invalid
might strike some readers as odd, but from our earliest days, the mechanism
for challenging the legality of taxes was a suit against the tax collector for
money had and received. 392 Granted, our tax collection system today, both
state and federal, differs in significant respects from the system that prevailed
in those early days, and these differences make the officer-liability regime
appear inapt. Then, taxes were collected by a revenue officer whose relation
to the state was closer to that of an independent contractor than to that of an
employee. The collector was entitled to retain the funds, if paid under protest,
pending a judicial decision on their legality. 393 Today, there is no longer a
particular government official to whom one pays a tax, and against whom one
might proceed personally to recover amounts paid under duress; we are instead
required, under pain of significant penalties, to pay our taxes at a specified
time directly to the treasury. Under the current scheme, we would be hard
pressed to identify the state official to hold personally responsible for an
invalid tax law, and, beyond that, it seems unfair to hold any individual
functionary personally liable for the unconstitutionality of the tax laws she
enforces.
These changes, however, can be fully accommodated by the interpretation
of McKesson advocated here. McKesson, construed as an official liability case,
insists that the Constitution requires that there be a state official against whom
someone who is unlawfully deprived of liberty or property may recover
damages when the victim had no predeprivation opportunity to test the
deprivation's legality, but it goes on to recognize that the state may consent to
substitute itself as the defendant. By recognizing a constitutional right to
damage relief against an officer, McKesson insists that the state's power to
immunize its officials is contingent on the state's agreement to take on the
whole of the officials' constitutionally imposed liability. Aorida made such
provision by establishing a procedure for challenging the legality of a tax in
a suit against the state agency responsible for collecting the tax, an agency that
would otherwise have been immune under the Eleventh Amendment.
McKesson, construed to recognize a constitutional right of action against the
officer, makes this waiver of sovereign immunity a necessary condition of the
withdrawal of the right of action against the officer. 394
392. See, e.g., Elliott v. Swartwout, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 137 (1836); see also Louis Jaffe, Suits Against
Governments and Officers: Damage Actions, 77 HARV. L. REv. 209, 227-28 (1963) (discussing common
law suits against tax collectors).
393. See generally Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236 (1845); Jaffe, supra note 392.
394. Henry Hart anticipated this interpretation of McKesson in his Dialogue, where he wrote:
Wherever the applicable substantive law allows [a personal action against an official who
commits a wrong in the name of the Government], the Government may be forced to protect
its officers by providing a remedy against itself. The validity of any protection it tries to give
may depend on its providing such a remedy .... Consider, for example, the possibility that
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Does this mean that a state would be free to set limits on its consent to be
sued and tell taxpayers that if they do not approve, they are free to pursue their
constitutional right of action against the state official?395 In theory, yes.
However, a state court's construction of a general consent to suit for a refund
as in fact permitting less relief than what the Constitution would require in a
suit against the officer would rightly be held by the Supreme Court to be
novel, unforeseen, and thus inadequate to bar relief against the state when the
tax had been paid before the novel construction was announced. 3% More
importantly, the Court would rightly regard the changes that have occurred in
the state's tax collection procedures, such as the requirement that taxes be paid
directly to the treasury rather than to any particular state official, as placing an
undue burden on the constitutional right of action against the officer. It might
accordingly require any state that wishes to return to that regime to do such
things as specify clearly which officers are to be liable. This would, among
other things, enable the responsible official to take steps to prepare for such
liability, such as procuring an indemnity agreement from the state or insurance.
As any sane officer faced with the prospect of personal liability in these
circumstances would insist on some such arrangement, the state will wind up
bearing the cost indirectly anyway. For this reason, the likelihood that the state
will go through the trouble of reviving the long-dead official-liability regime
in the tax area is extremely low.
Doctrinally, it might be objected that the construction of McKesson
defended here comes close to adopting the position of Justice Story, dissenting
in Cary v. Curtis. 391 Cary involved a federal statute enacted to deal with a
problem that had arisen under the traditional tax collection scheme. As noted
above, the tax collectors traditionally retained any funds paid under protest
pending adjudication of the legality of the tax. This practice delayed
significantly the government's access to the collected funds, and so Congress
passed a law requiring tax collectors immediately to tum over the funds to the

summary collection of taxes might be invalid if the Government did not waive its immunity to
a suit for refund.
Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in
Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1362, 1370 (1953). McKesson as interpreted here, would fortify Hart's
premise, for it would establish that the Constitution itself requires the availability of a remedy against the
officer in certain circumstances. (Although Hart did not expressly so state, this may in fact have been his
position, for it is not clear what else could have led him to the conclusion that the government's refusal
to consent to a refund action might be "invalid.")
395. Cf McKesson Corp. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 49 n.34
(1990) (raising similar argument that state's waiver of sovereign immunity did not apply when taxpayer
had passed on burden of tax; argument was rejected by Supreme Court as misdescription of state law).
396. See NAACP v. Alabama ex rei. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). The Court in Reich v. Collins,
115 S. Ct. 547, 55! (1994), invoked this line of cases in rejecting the Georgia Supreme Court's holding,
unsupported by prior decisional law, that the exclusive avenue for challenging a tax's legality was a
predeprivation action. Presumably, however, the Georgia court's interpretation of Georgia law must be
regarded as binding in future cases.
397. 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 236.
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Treasury. The law went on to provide that if the Secretary of the Treasury
determined that the tax was not in fact legally owing, he had a duty to refund
the amount overpaid. The issue in Cary was whether this statute did away with
the taxpayer's right to recover against the collector for money had and
received. The majority held that it did, 398 but Justice Story strenuously
objected. Story had constitutional concerns about reading the statute to deny
the taxpayer any judicial remedy, leaving him totally at the mercy of the
Secretary of the Treasury, and to avoid this problem Story would have
construed the statute not to withdraw the common law remedy. Far from
undermining the proposed interpretation of McKesson, Justice Story's opinion
supports it. Story recognized that the taxpayer did not have a right of action
against the sovereign because such relief was barred by sovereign
immunity. 399 Thus, Justice Story's position resembles that of our revised
understanding of McKesson both in his insistence on the availability of
remedies and in his recognition that in the absence of the government's waiver
of sovereign immunity, the remedies are available only against state officials.
That Story was in dissent in the case does not undermine the proposed
interpretation of McKesson because the majority recognized neither the
common law action for money had and received nor a remedy against the
government itself. If the majority's position conflicts with the reading of
McKesson proposed here, it conflicts even more with the conventional reading
of McKesson as requiring relief against the state.400 The most relevant aspect
of Cary for our purposes, then, is that even the Justices who believed most
strongly in the importance of remedies and the rule of law did not assert the
availability of a damage remedy against the state itself.
An official liability interpretation of McKesson is supported further by the
decisions on which the Court in McKesson relied. After declaring that its due
process decision was "rooted firmly in precedent dating back to at least early
this century,"401 the first case the Court discussed was Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Railway Co. v. O'Connor. 402 In that case, the Court upheld the
availability of relief against the Secretary of State personally. It noted, to be
sure, that it would be "inconceivable" that the state would refuse to reimburse
him for the amounts awarded, pointing to a state statute that appeared to

398. After the Cary decision, Congress restored the right of action against the collector. See HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 100, at 376.
399. See Cary, 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 255 (Story, J., dissenting).
400. The majority's holding can in the end be squared with both interpretations of McKesson, however,
if the Court is understood to be relying on the availability of a predeprivation remedy. That is how Henry
Hart understood the majority's holding in Cary. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 100, at 378 (quoting
Henry Hart's Dialogue, supra note 394, at 1370).
401. McKesson Corp. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 32 (1990).
402. See McKesson, 496 U.S. at 32, 39, 51 (citing Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v.
O'Connor, 223 U.S. 280 (1912)).
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contemplate such reimbursement,403 but the remedy the Court recognized was
one against the officer.404
It is similarly inconceivable, for reasons already discussed, that a state
today would opt to revise its laws to relegate taxpayers to suits against revenue
officers. Consequently, the distinction between officer liability and government
liability in the tax context is one that may safely be overlooked, as the Court
did in McKesson, without altering substantive results. But the distinction is still
important analytically because it helps explain what the Court meant when it
suggested that the state's consent to suit was relevant to the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction. Even more important, the recognition that a state is
required by the Constitution to make available a retrospective remedy against
its officials tells us exactly the price the states must pay for withholding their
consent to suit, and thus to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. Finally,
as discussed below, the official liability interpretation of McKesson has
significant implications outside the tax area.
Unless combined with the first reinterpretation, however, this second
reinterpretation of McKesson leaves us with the doctrinal problems that
originally led us to search for a different interpretation. The two proposed
reinterpretations address different doctrinal problems caused by McKesson, so
adopting both of them produces twice as much doctrinal coherence as adopting
one alone. But the value of the combined reinterpretations exceeds the sum of
its parts. That is because the second reinterpretation helps solve what we
regarded as the principal shortcoming of the first: its failure to take seriously
the McKesson Court's apparent intent to establish a generally applicable
remedial rule.
C. McKesson as a Supremacy Clause Case
The first reinterpretation of McKesson solved the most serious doctrinal
problems posed by the decision, but it did so by interpreting the case as a
decision about the remedies required by the dormant Commerce Clause. The
problem with this reading of the case is that the opinion says nothing that
distinguishes the dormant Commerce Clause from any other constitutional
provision, or indeed any other provision of law. The Court's reliance on the
Due Process Clause indicates that the Court meant its holding to have
relevance beyond dormant Commerce Clause cases. But relying on the Due
403. See 223 U.S. at 287.
404. See also American Trucking Ass'n, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987) (suit against
Pennsylvania's Secretary of Department of Revenue); Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984)
(suit against Hawaii's Director of Taxation); Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363 (1930) (suit against
Oklahoma's State Auditor); Gaar, Scott & Co. v. Shannon, 223 U.S. 468 (1912) (suit against Texas's
Secretary of State); Central of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Wright, 207 U.S. 127 (1907) (suit against Georgia's
Comptroller General).
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Process Clause produces the doctrinal problems described above. To solve both
sets of problems, we might try to find a constitutional home other than the Due
Process Clause for the supposed right to damages from the states, a
constitutional provision that would allow us to apply McKesson's remedial
holding more broadly than just to dormant Commerce Clause cases. But the
argument that any provision of the Constitution establishes a general rule that
states are constitutionally obligated to pay damages to individuals injured by
their violations of law faces a significant embarrassment: Leaving aside
McKesson and related due process cases, the only Supreme Court decisions to
recognize that states are under a constitutional requirement to pay damages to
individuals are the takings cases discussed in Section I.A, and they rely on
textual support that does not apply to other constitutional provisions: the
Takings Clause's express reference to "compensation." Can it be that the
courts for QVer two centuries have overlooked a more general constitutional
requirement that states pay damages? The Eleventh Amendment cases
involving the Contracts Clause, including not just Hans but many others as
well,405 would appear to rule out any such conclusion. 406
Our second proposed reinterpretation points the way to a solution.
McKesson can be understood to establish that governmental violations of the
Constitution give rise, as a constitutional matter, to a right of action against
responsible state officials. Recharacterizing the decision as an affirmation of
the constitutional availability of a damage remedy against state officials who
violate the Constitution transforms McKesson from a constitutional oddity into
one of a long line of cases throughout our history awarding such damages.
McKesson, so interpreted, would be of a piece with such landmark cases as
Poindexter, Ex parte Young, and Bivens.401 These cases are best understood
as recognizing that the constitutional remedy for governmental violations of the
Constitution is a remedy against the officials who violated the Constitution, not
the governments for whom they work. 408
If this constitutional right to damages does not have its source in the Due
Process Clause, what is its source? The now evident connection between
McKesson, Poindexter, and Ex parte Young helps answer this question. These
cases make it clear that the Supremacy Clause is both the doctrinal linchpin for
405. See A etcher, Historical Interpretation, supra note 7, at 1123 n.338.
406. Even diversity theorists such as William Fletcher concede that the intent of the Framers of the
Eleventh Amendment and the Supreme Court's decisions rule out the conclusion that damages against the
states are available under the Contracts Clause. See id. at 1122-24. But cf. Wolcher, supra note 28 (arguing
that courts should allow damage remedy against states for constitutional violations that are enforceable in
state court with Supreme Court review).
407. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (recognizing federal right of action
for damages against federal officials who violate Fourth Amendment); see also FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S.
4 71 ( 1994) (declining to recognize federal right of action for damages against federal agencies that violate
Constitution).
408. This interpretation of Poindexter, Ex parte Young, and Bivens is defended at greater length in
Vazquez, supra note 80.
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the availability of relief against state officials and the source of the policy
driving the result.
Doctrinally, the Supremacy Clause nullifies any state laws that might be
read to authorize the challenged conduct and removes any defense of official
authority or sovereign immunity, thus leaving the official subject to common
law remedies.409 These early cases suggest that the Supremacy Clause merely
withdraws a defense, leaving the common law as the affirmative source of the
remedy against the official, but this understates the role the Supremacy Clause
played in these cases.410 The cases make it clear that the Supremacy Clause
requires the states to make available against state officials whatever remedies
would have been available under the common law against private parties who
caused a similar sort of injury. It is for this reason that state officials are liable
even if state law provided them with some sort of immunity from liability. 411
In a very real sense, therefore, the source of the remedy against the state
official in these cases is the Supremacy Clause.412
As to the constitutional policy being advanced by such remedies, the
Poindexter Court had this to say:
Of what avail are written constitutions whose bills of right for the
security of individual liberty have been written, too often, with the
blood of martyrs shed upon the battle-field and the scaffold, if their
limitations and restraints upon the power may be overpassed with
impunity by the very agencies created and appointed to guard, defend,
and enforce them . . . ? And how else can these principles of
individual liberty and right be maintained, if, when violated, the
judicial tribunals are forbidden to visit penalties upon individual
offenders, who are the instruments of wrong, whenever they interpose
the shield of the State? The doctrine is not to be tolerated. The whole
frame and scheme of the political institutions of this country, State
and Federal, protest against it. . . . [The Constitution] creates a
government in fact, as well as in name, because its Constitution is the
409. See Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 290 (1885) ("'That which ... is unlawful because
made so by the supreme law, the Constitution of the United States, is not the word or deed of the State,
but is the mere wrong and trespass of those individual persons who falsely speak and act in its name.");
id. at 288 (holding that because of constitutional violation, state official "stands ... stripped of his official
character; and, confessing a personal violation of the plaintiff's rights for which he must personally answer,
he is without defence"). Similar language was used in Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908).
410. It is also misleading to say that the contours of the remedy were at this time not considered to
be a matter of federal law, for during the reign of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) I (1842), the distinction
between the common law and federal law was not as clear as it is now.
411. See, e.g., Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299, 305 n.l7 (1952); General Oil
Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211 (1908). See generally Vazquez, supra note 80, at 120-26.
412. Gradually, "[b]y almost imperceptible steps," the Court abandoned this common-law model and
"[came] to treat the remedy of injunction as conferred directly by federal law for abuse of state authority
which in the view of federal law ought to be remediable." Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State
and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 489, 524 (1954). The Bivens decision reflects the completion of this
transformation with respect to the damage remedy. I examine the transformation in greater depth in
Vazquez, supra note 80, at 121-42, 178-84.
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supreme law of the land ... and its authority is enforced by its power
to regulate and govern the conduct of individuals, even where its
prohibitions are laid only upon the States themselves. The mandate of
the state affords no justification for the invasion of rights secured by
the Constitution of the United States; otherwise that Constitution
would not be the supreme law of the land. 413
The heart of the proposed reinterpretation of McKesson is well encapsulated
in the Court's powerful affirmation of the need for retrospective remedies to
give efficacy to constitutional norms: The need is great, to be sure, but the
Constitution's method of securing this efficacy, "even where the prohibitions
are laid upon the States," is to "regulate and govern the conduct of
individuals" and to "visit penalties upon individual offenders who are the
instruments of the wrong." (By "individuals," the Court clearly is referring to
individual state officials.) Visiting penalties upon the states themselves was
either not perceived to be necessary to give the Constitution the desired
efficacy, or was understood to be forbidden. It is noteworthy that the Justices
who wrote and concurred in this forceful paean to the importance of
constitutional remedies also concurred in the Hans decision. And it is even
more significant that no one suggested the possibility of obtaining these
remedies from the state itself in Poindexter, even though the suit was brought
and litigated in the state courts.414
There is, in addition, significant support in the statements of the Framers
of the original Constitution for the proposition that they contemplated that the
obligations of the state governments would be enforced in court by means of
suits against state officials, not against the states themselves. After discussing
the methods by which the Constitution would provide for the efficacy of
federal obligations, the Founders decided not to retain the scheme set up by the
Articles of Confederation, under which federal norms were enforceable only
against the states as political bodies. They opted instead to give Congress the
power to make federal legislation operative on individuals and enforceable in
the courts against individuals. Although the Founders were making a broader
point than the one we are considering, their expressed reasons for preferring
the new system are relevant here as well. The Founders rejected the prevalent
system because they believed that duties could be enforced against political
bodies only through military force. Against individuals, by contrast, duties
could be enforced through the courts:

413. Poindexter, 114 U.S. at 291-92.
414. In Vazquez, supra note 80, I offer a more extensive textual and jurisprudential defense of the idea
that the Supremacy Clause is the source of a constitutional law of remedies for constitutional violations,
as well as a more detailed doctrinal defense of the proposition and an examination of the doctrinal
implications of adopting the theory.
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Hence we see how necessary for the Union is a coercive principle. No
man pretends the contrary: we all see and feel this necessity. The only
question is, Shall it be a coercion of law, or a coercion of arms?
There is no other possible alternative. Where will those who oppose
a coercion of law come out? Where will they end? A necessary
consequence of their principles is a war of the states one against the
other. I am for coercion by law-that coercion which acts only upon
delinquent individuals. This Constitution does not attempt to coerce
sovereign bodies, states, in their political capacity. No coercion is
applicable to such bodies, but that of an armed force. If we should
attempt to execute the laws of the Union by sending an armed force
against a delinquent state, it would involve the good and the bad, the
innocent and guilty, in the same calamity.
But this legal coercion singles out the guilty individual, and
punishes him for breaking the laws of the Union. 415
The fear that any attempt to enforce federal laws against the states as political
bodies would necessarily involve military force appears in retrospect to have
been exaggerated, but what is important for present purposes is that the
Founders feared such violence and for that reason rejected the notion of
enforcing federal obligations against the states as collective political bodies.
Moreover, their discussions reveal that they viewed "legal" obligations as by
their nature enforceable in courts, and they appeared to assume that judicial
proceedings could be maintained only against individuals.416
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion in New York v. United States 417
relied in part on this history to justify the holding that Congress generally may
not impose obligations on states as states418 (although, as noted, she
somewhat inconsistently upheld Garcia insofar as it allowed Congress to
regulate states as part of a broader class).419 These statements do not,
however, support the Court's holding. After all, the Constitution itself imposes
obligations directly on the states. It is thus difficult to interpret these
statements as contemplating that there would be no federal obligations
operative on states as political bodies. The Framers' statements are best taken
as statements about remedies and enforcement, not the existence vel non of
legal obligations. The Framers' concerns support the conclusion that the federal

415. 2 DEBATES, supra note 231, at 197 (statement of Oliver Ellsworth) (emphasis added). William
Samuel Johnson's statement to the Connecticut ratifying convention was to the same effect: "The force,
which is to be employed [to carry out the laws of the Union] is the energy of Law; and this force is to
operate only upon individuals, who fail in their duty to their country." William Samuel Johnson, Speech
in the Connecticut Ratifying Convention (Jan. 4, 1788), reprinted in 15 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 248-49 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1984).
416. See generally Vazquez, supra note 105, at 1097-101 (arguing that Framers viewed Jaws as
operating on individuals and being enforceable in courts).
417. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
418. See id. at 163-66.
419. See supra text accompanying note 99.
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obligations of the states-those imposed by the Constitution and those imposed
on the states by Congress-are, as a constitutional matter, to be enforced in
suits against the individual state officials who violate federal law. In other
words, the remedy the Constitution contemplates for the enforcement of federal
obligations of the states (and the federal government, too) is a remedy against
individual officials.
Interpreting McKesson as a Supremacy Clause case establishing a
constitutional right of action for damages against state officials responsible for
violating federal law is faithful to as much of the Court's decision in the case
as possible while avoiding the doctrinal problems that led us to reject the due
process rationale. Like the due process rationale, the Supremacy Clause
rationale allows us to give effect to the Court's evident intent to articulate a
generally applicable remedial principle, but the Supremacy Clause rationale is
better than the due process rationale at accommodating a congressional
determination that damages should not be available for violations of federal
statutes. That is because the purpose of the damage remedy under the
Supremacy Clause rationale is to ensure the efficacy of federal law. If
Congress passes a statute but determines that a private right of action for
damages should not be available, that is presumably because Congress has
established alternative mechanisms that it believes adequate to secure the
efficacy of that statute. Nothing in the Supremacy Clause makes the courts a
better judge of that question than Congress. It is conceivable that Congress
would pass a law and preclude private damage actions because it does not
want the statute to be "fully" enforced. The Supremacy Clause rationale can
accommodate that judgment as well. If Congress denied a private damage
action because it was only half-heartedly behind the federal statute, then that
is presumably because the nation is only half-heartedly behind the statute. In
such circumstances, half-hearted enforcement is the "correct" degree of
enforcement; any more would be overenforcement. 420
This sort of flexibility would be unavailable if the right to damage were
located in the Due Process Clause. As discussed, the doctrinal gloss that has
accreted around the Clause requires, among other things, a strict separation
between the concepts of substance and procedure. Thus, if the Due Process
Clause conferred a right to damages (something it could do only if we
classified damages as "procedure") then it would not be within Congress's

420. There are, admittedly, rule-of-law considerations that might lead one to disable Congress from
enacting laws that it does not want vigorously enforced. Most significantly, respect for law is reduced if
the citizenry observes a proliferation of "laws" that are frequently violated with no consequences. It is to
protect this rule-of-law value that I argue that the Supremacy Clause should be read to establish a
presumption of a private right of action for damages against state officials who violate federal statutes and
treaties. See Vazquez, supra note 80, at 74-75. But the decisions discussed at the end of Part IV rule out
the conclusion that Congress lacks the power under our Constitution to deny a private right of action to
beneficiaries of the statutes it passes. For further discussion of this issue, see supra note 21.
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power in creating a substantive obligation to deny such relief to persons
injured by a statutory violation.
With respect to federal statutes, the private damage action grounded in the
Supremacy Clause can at best be presumptive-i.e., subject to a congressional
negation. By contrast, a federal statute purporting to cut back on available
remedies for constitutional violations by state or federal officials would raise
grave concerns under the Supremacy Clause. The Supremacy Clause right of
action for damages for constitutional violations is accordingly one that would
not be subject to congressional negation. It is this aspect of McKesson,
interpreted as a Supremacy Clause case about official liability, that I regard as
most important. Indeed, for this reason, I regard the adoption of this
interpretation of McKesson to be far more important from a rule-of-law
perspective than adoption of the diversity interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment would be. Under the diversity view, as currently embraced by at
least three of the dissenters in Seminole Tribe, the availability of relief against
the states depends in the end on a congressional decision to withdraw the
states' sovereign immunity. A remedy for constitutional violations that depends
on Congress's affirmative action is far from ideal, as Congress, being the
majoritarian branch, is unlikely to pay due regard to the countermajoritarian
norms of the Constitution. The courts and private parties are the best defenders
of these norms, and McKesson, if read to support the existence of a
constitutionally based private right of action, would go far to advance this ruleof-law goal.
Reading McKesson to confer a right to damages against officials rather
than the state itself would also make sense of the Court's own statement that
the Supreme Court's power to review state court judgments in suits against
states is contingent on the state's assent. We give effect to the assent language
by recognizing that the state's decision to permit a suit against itself is purely
voluntary; the Constitution does not subject the state to liability. We
nevertheless give effect to the McKesson Court's apparent conviction that a
remedy in that case was required by recognizing that the Constitution requires
a damage remedy against the officer. The state does not have to consent to a
suit against itself, but it must do so if it wishes to shield its officers from
liability. As it will often wish to do so, the interpretation of McKesson
defended here will place some pressure on the states to consent to federal
liability.
Interpreting McKesson as a Supremacy Clause case would mean that the
damage remedy it recognizes would not apply to deprivations of property that
violate state law. This may well reduce the interpretation's appeal. I am
sympathetic to the view that when the state requires you to pay taxes first and
litigate later, the state should be required to make available a full refund
remedy not only when the tax is determined to have violated federal law, but
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also when the tax turns out to have been invalid because it violated state law
or when the tax was found not to be owing because state law did not require
its payment in the first place.421 Such a rule would admittedly protect rule-oflaw values such as the interest in procedural regularity. These are the same
values that underlie the Amett!Loudermill line of cases, but, for reasons
already discussed, the claim that the Due Process Clause unyieldingly protects
these values is difficult to square with cases recognizing the legislature's
power to deny private remedies for the violation of the obligations it creates.
The latter cases suggest that the protection of those rule-of-law values has been
left by our Constitution, to some extent at least, to the legislature that created
the substantive norm.
At any rate, despite its express reliance on the Due Process Clause, the
McKesson opinion in the end appears not to go so far as to affirm the
constitutional need for a refund when the tax violated only state law. All of the
precedents the Court regarded as support for the conclusion that the states are
obligated to provide a refund remedy were cases in which the tax was alleged
to have violated federal law. At several points, the Court described its holding

421. Because by hypothesis the taxpayer is making the initial findings of fact and application of law
to fact in these cases, it is difficult to think of a situation in which the taxpayer would have cause to
complain about having been required to pay taxes that the statute does not actually purport to require. The
problem would arise only if some state agency interpreted the statute one way and threatened substantial
penalties if the taxes covered by such interpretation were not paid, but the taxpayer disagrees with the
interpretation and ultimately gets a court to agree. Assume, for example, that the state agency responsible
for taxes has interpreted the state law to require a certain form of accounting and the taxpayer believes that
that is an erroneous interpretation of the state statute. If the state requires you to pay first and litigate later,
then it may be unfair for the state not to offer a refund if the court agrees with the taxpayer and not the
agency. Notice that this analysis relies on the availability of judicial review of agency interpretations of
statutes. To say that the Due Process Clause requires a remedy in these circumstances would appear to read
that Clause as imposing on the states a very particular system of separation of powers-a system, for
example, that denies the state legislature the power to delegate to the agency the authority to interpret state
statutes authoritatively pending a contrary interpretation by the judicial branch. It is difficult to maintain
that the Constitution requires the states even to give their courts the power to reject the interpretations given
to statutes by state agencies. If so, it is even more difficult to read into the Constitution a requirement that
state court rejection of such interpretations be given retroactive effect.
There is a more plausible argument to be made that the Due Process Clause requires the state to
adhere roughly to some substantive norm when it deals with its citizens, that is, that it not act in an
arbitrary or capricious way. In this respect, a state's violation of its own law that results in a deprivation
of liberty or property implicates the Due Process Clause and, it might be argued, requires the state to offer
a postdeprivation damage remedy. This was, of course, the issue in the Parratt/Zinermon line of cases. If
those cases are read to hold that the Due Process Clause requires a damage remedy for the violation of state
laws that do not confer a damage remedy, they would be consistent with Amett/Loudermill but would
conflict with Sea Clammers and the other cases discussed above. Holding that the right to damages, if any,
comes from the Supremacy Clause rather than the Due Process Clause would appear to reject a federal
constitutional right to damages for the violation of state law. Perhaps a constitutional right to damages
under the Supremacy Clause might be said to exist when the state acts in an arbitrary way, on the theory
that such conduct violates substantive due process. This would deal with the Sea Clammers line of cases
by accepting that damages may not be available where a statute that denies damages was not complied with
(so long as the failure to comply was not so egregious as to be "arbitrary"), while satisfying the intuition
that the Constitution confers protection against arbitrary governmental action and should provide a damage
remedy for it. Scholars have argued that the Parratt line of cases should be understood as substantive due
process cases. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 335; Monaghan, supra note 352.
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as a requirement that the state provide a remedy for its "unconstitutional"
deprivations. 422 In its final paragraph, it summed up its holding as follows:
When a State penalizes taxpayers for failure to remit their taxes
in timely fashion, thus requiring them to pay first before obtaining
review of the tax's validity, federal due process principles long
recognized by our cases require the State's postdeprivation procedure
to provide a "clear and certain remedy" for the deprivation of tax
moneys in an unconstitutional manner. 423
These statements suggest that the remedial principle the Court recognized
extends only to taxes that violate the federal Constitution. 424 Other parts of
the opinion suggest that the principle applies to taxes that violate federal
statutes as wel1. 425 Finally, in Reich v. Collins, 426 the Court stated that
McKesson and the cases McKesson relied on "stand for the proposition that 'a
denial by a state court of a recovery of taxes exacted in violation of the laws
or Constitution of the United States by compulsion is itself in contravention
of the Fourteenth Amendment. "'427 The Supremacy Clause rationale explains
why the refund remedy is required when the deprivation violated the federal
Constitution and federal statutes, but not when the deprivation merely violated
state law. If the basis of the refund remedy were the Due Process Clause, on
the other hand, it would be difficult to explain why the remedy is limited to
deprivations that are unlawful because they violate federal law. The Supremacy
Clause rationale thus helps explain this feature of the McKesson and Reich
decisions as well.
D. What Remains of the Forum-Allocation Interpretation?

I offer this rather extended reinterpretation of McKesson's due process
holding not just because of its importance for our law of constitutional
remedies, but also because of what it tells us about the nature of Eleventh

422. See McKesson Corp. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 31 (1990)
(holding that Due Process Clause "obligates the State to provide meaningful backward-looking relief to
rectify any unconstitutional deprivation"); id. at 46 (referring to "unconstitutional deprivation of property").
423. ld. at 51 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
424. The Court cannot be understood to be saying that the taxes were "unconstitutional" in these cases
because the state denied a refund remedy. The Court was discussing what the Due Process Clause required,
and it made it quite clear that the Due Process Clause is satisfied in tax cases even if the state does not
offer a predeprivation hearing, but only if it provides a refund remedy. Its statements that a refund remedy
is required when the tax is "unconstitutional" must therefore mean that the remedy is required when the
tax violates some other provision of the Constitution.
425. This is suggested by its quotation from Carpenter v. Shaw, 280 U.S. 363, 369 (1930), see 496
U.S. at 34.
426. 115 S. Ct. 547 (1994).
427. Id. at 549 (quoting Carpenter, 280 U.S. at 369) (emphasis added).
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Amendment immunity. To say that the Constitution relies on private damages
actions against state officials as the mechanism to give efficacy to the federal
obligations of the states is not necessarily to say that the Constitution disables
Congress from subjecting the states themselves to damage liability. It is quite
plausible to conclude that the Constitution sets up a default system for
enforcing federal norms-suits against officials-but gives Congress the power
to supplement that system by making the states themselves liable. Neither the
cases recognizing the liability of officials for constitutional violations, nor the
absence of cases finding the states themselves liable, is in direct conflict with
the idea that Congress has the power to make the states themselves liable. The
evidence of Framers' intent I pointed to above is equivocal on this score as
well. The Framers were clearly concerned that enforcing federal norms against
states as political bodies would require the frequent exercise of military force,
with undesired consequences, but it is also evident that they contemplated that
military force would sometimes be necessary to enforce federal law against
recalcitrant states. The question is whether they intended to establish a
constitutional principle requiring that federal norms be enforced against state
officials first, a course likely to obviate resort to military force, or instead left
it to Congress to decide whether the risk of resort to military force was
sufficiently small in a given context that placing a liability on states should not
be a concern. Their statements do not answer that more specific question.
My reinterpretation of McKesson's due process holding as affirming the
constitutional availability of damage relief against state officials who violate
federal law does not, therefore, provide affirmative support for the conclusion
that Congress lacks the power to subject the states to damage liability to
individuals. It does, however, strengthen the case for the immunity-fromliability view. By helping explain the Court's reference to the state's "assent"
in that case, it makes it possible to read the case as conditioning the Supreme
Court's jurisdiction on the state's consent to being sued in the state courts. As
discussed above, if the states have the power to evade Supreme Court review
by refusing to consent to suits against them, then any liability Congress
imposes on the states will be illusory. This interpretation of McKesson, in turn,
removes McKesson and Reich from the ranks of the cases that support the
forum-allocation view and adds them to the already impressive array of
authority supporting the immunity-from-liability interpretation. In this Section,
I consider the support for the forum-allocation view that remains after the
defection of McKesson and Reich.
I begin by discussing how the abrogation reductio fares under the
immunity-from-liability view. In Part IV, I concluded that if we make certain
assumptions about the scope of the Section 5 enforcement power, we can avoid
the abrogation reductio even if we assume that the Due Process Clause requires
a damage remedy. We avoid the reductio on that assumption only if we
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assume the correctness of the forum-allocation interpretation, for the price the
states must pay to avoid congressional abrogation of their immunity is to
submit to liability and suit in their own courts. Can the reductio be avoided if
we assume that the Eleventh Amendment confers an immunity from liability?
If we assume that the Eleventh Amendment prevents Congress from subjecting
states to damage liability and that the Due Process Clause does not itself
require a damage remedy for state deprivations of property, it seems easier to
avoid the reductio. It is true that a patent is still property and that states are
still required to provide some sort of protection for it. It is also true that under
this interpretation state officials may be personally liable for patent
infringement, at least if Congress makes them liable. If we assume that
Eleventh Amendment immunity is immunity from liability, then Congress can
"abrogate" it, meaning it can subject the states to liability, only if the states fail
to take the required steps to protect the underlying right. Note that these steps
do not include subjecting itself to damage liability. The obligation of the
officials to pay damages does not come from the Due Process Clause, so the
state's failure to entertain damage suits against its officials in its courts would
not support an abrogation power. 428 Of course, some of the broader theories
of congressional power under Section 5 might support a power to abrogate
immunity even in these circumstances, given that a property right concededly
exists. For this reason, avoiding the reductio will in the end depend either on
the Court's narrow construction of Section 5 generally or on its exemption of
procedural due process cases from whatever broad enforcement power may
exist in other contexts. At any rate, avoiding the reductio is no more difficult
under the immunity-from-liability interpretation than under the forum-allocation
interpretation, and, depending on how the Court interprets Section 5, it may be
easier under the immunity-from-liability view.
Apart from the dicta in such cases as Employees and Atascadero, 429 the
remaining support for the forum-allocation view consists of the takings
cases430 and Hilton. 431 Can the takings cases be reconciled with an
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment as establishing an immunity of states
from liability to individuals? Perhaps not, as these cases establish that the
states must provide a monetary remedy when they take property for a public
428. The states may be required to entertain such actions in their courts anyway, see Howlett v. Rose,
496 U.S. 356, 383 (1990); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947), but this obligation does not come from
the Due Process Clause. The Supreme Court's power to review cases from the state courts against state
officials is not affected by the Eleventh Amendment, as such suits are not suits against the state. For the
same reason, the lower federal courts can be given original jurisdiction over such cases.
429. I refer here to the Atascadero footnote and Justice Marshall's analysis in Employees. See supra
Section II.B. As noted above, Atascadero may in fact be consistent with the immunity-from-liability
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. See supra note 144; see also supra notes 390-91 (discussing
compatibility with immunity-from-liability view of other cases sometimes cited as support for forumallocation view).
430. See supra Section II.A.
431. See supra text accompanying notes 144-51; infra text accompanying notes 433-40.
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purpose. Conceivably, these cases might be explained on a "consent" theory
similar to that of the proffered interpretation of McKesson, since all states
permit inverse condemnation actions, but if these cases turned on consent, then
the states could defeat the remedy, or at least Supreme Court enforcement of
the remedy, simply by repealing their laws on that subject. A more promising
way to reconcile the takings cases with the immunity-from-liability
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment would be simply to regard the
Takings Clause as sui generis in that it is the only constitutional provision that
expressly entitles individuals to retrospective relief from the states.432 As
such, it may be said to establish a limited constitutional exception to the
immunity from liability that the Eleventh Amendment otherwise confers.
That leaves Hilton. In that case, a bare majority of the Court held that
Congress subjected the states to damage liability to individuals when it enacted
FELA,433 a liability that because of the Eleventh Amendment, is not
enforceable in the lower federal courts. The Court also indicated clearly that
the Supremacy Clause requires the state courts to enforce that liability.434 It
would seem inconsistent with the latter statement to permit the state courts to
decline to provide the remedy on sovereign immunity grounds. The Court's
citation of Howleu v. Rose435 is an indication that it believed that a state's
invocation of sovereign immunity for this purpose would violate the
Supremacy Clause. 436
However, the Court did not say anything about its own jurisdiction to
review state court decisions in FELA cases. The state court in Hilton did not
dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds; instead, it dismissed on the merits,
holding that Congress had imposed no liability.437 The Supreme Court
reviewed that judgment, but its exercise of appellate jurisdiction could be
reconciled with McKesson and Seminole Tribe on the ground that the state had
consented to the suit by not raising a sovereign immunity defense. If so, then
a future state court could gut the state's duty to pay damages under FELA
simply by invoking the state's own law of sovereign immunity and thus
making it clear that it does not consent to the suit.
If the Court were to reconcile Hilton with Seminole Tribe in this way, it
would be affirming on the one hand the state courts' obligation under the
Supremacy Clause to afford a remedy and their duty not to refuse to do so on
sovereign immunity grounds, but on the other hand, it would be recognizing

432. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 100, at 849.
433. See Hilton v. South Carolina Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 200 (1991).
434. See id. at 207.
435. 496 U.S. 356, 367--68 (1990), cited with approval in Hilton, 502 U.S. at 207.
436. But cf Hess v. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp., 115 S. Ct. 394 (1994) (stating in FELA case that
applicability of Eleventh Amendment relegates claimants to suits in state courts "if the state permits");
supra text accompanying note 255.
437. See Hilton, 502 U.S. at 200.
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its own powerlessness to intervene where the states have violated that duty. Its
affirmation in Hilton that states are under a federal obligation to pay damages
to individuals under FELA might thus be interpreted as a rejection of my
earlier dismissal of federal liabilities not enforceable in any federal court as no
liability at all. If so, the refusal of the Justices in the Seminole Tribe majority
to go along with my characterization would be in keeping with their
confidence in the state courts' ability and willingness to enforce federal law
faithfully. Like Chief Justice Marshall, I find such confidence to be misplaced,
especially in this context, not because I hold a particularly unfavorable opinion
of the character of state court judges, but because I hold a realistic opinion
regarding the strengths and weaknesses of human beings generally. Persons
whose jobs are dependent on the favorable opinion of the state's more overtly
political branches are unlikely to be reliable enforcers of obligations imposed
on state governments from without. To give Congress the power to obligate the
states to pay damages to individuals and to expect the state courts to enforce
this obligation without monitoring by a federal court calls to mind an aspect
of the scheme set up by the Articles of Confederation that Hamilton (and
others) decried as "imbecili[c ]" :438
There was a time when we were told that breaches by the States of
the regulations of the federal authority were not to be expected; that
a sense of common interest would preside over the conduct of the
respective members, and would beget a full compliance with all the
constitutional requisitions of the Union. This language, at the present
day, would appear as wild as a great part of what we now hear from
the same quarter will be thought, when we shall have received further
lessons from that best oracle of wisdom, experience. It at all times
betrayed an ignorance of the true springs by which human conduct is
actuated, and belied the original inducements to the establishment of
civil power. Why has government been instituted at all? Because the
passions of men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice
without constraint.439
Having learned this lesson so recently, it is highly unlikely that the Founders
would have given the federal government the power to obligate the states to
pay damages to individuals without also giving the federal courts the power
to enforce that obligation should the states prove recalcitrant. The Court would
be truer to the Founders' convictions if it either overruled Hilton (insofar as
it holds that Congress has the power to impose damage liability on the states)
438. THE FEDERALIST No. 15, at 107 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
439. ld. at 110. It is worth recalling here as well Madison's statements in The Federalist No. 51:
"[W]hat is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were angels, no
government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on
government would be necessary." THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,

1961).
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or rejected the "consent" requirement alluded to in McKesson and Seminole
Tribe. To do neither would be to recognize the theoretical existence of a legal
obligation that would in reality have the force of a dead letter. 440
VI. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AS IMMUNITY FROM LIABILITY:
IMPLICATIONS, OPEN QUESTIONS, AND COMPATIBILITY WITH THE
RULE OF LAW

This Article began by noting the serious questions that have long been
raised about the Eleventh Amendment's conformity with the nation's rule-oflaw aspirations. The forum-allocation interpretation of the Amendment would
have greatly alleviated these problems, if not totally cured them. This Part
assesses the nature and seriousness of the rule-of-law problems that would
remain if the Court were to adopt the immunity-from-liability interpretation of
the Eleventh Amendment. I conclude that as long as the Constitution continues
to be interpreted to authorize private suits against state officers who violate
federal law, an interpretation of the Constitution as barring private damage
actions against the states themselves does not raise severe rule-of-law
problems. Indeed, as noted, an interpretation of McKesson and such other cases
as Poindexter, Ex parte Young, and Bivens as recognizing a right of action
against state officials who violate the Constitution, a right of action grounded
in the Constitution itself and not subject to congressional narrowing, would do
more to advance the rule of law than would adoption of the diversity
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, which, as embraced by the
dissenting Justices in Seminole Tribe, would recognize a remedy against the
states only if Congress provides one. I do not, of course, maintain that the two
are mutually exclusive, but I do suggest that the rule of law would be better
served if energies that have heretofore been directed at defending the diversity
and forum-allocation theories were directed instead to exploring the remedial
avenues that may remain open under an official-liability regime.
What are those remedial possibilities for, say, an individual who claims
that a state is infringing her patent? First, as the Court indicated in Seminole
Tribe, the Eleventh Amendment does not bar the federal courts from awarding
injunctive relief against state officials who violate federal laws. 441 Although
440. The Hess opinion shows how easy it is for Justices who lack confidence in the state courts'
willingness to enforce federal liabilities of the states to equate the lack of Supreme Court review over a
certain category of case with the absence of a state court obligation to entertain such cases. See Hess, 115
S. Ct. 394; supra notes 255-63 and accompanying text.
441. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1131 n.16 (1996). In International Postal Supply
Co. v. Bruce, 194 U.S. 601 (1904), and Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10 (1896), the Court held that even
though the patent law's prohibition of infringement applies to the federal government, the sovereign
immunity of the United States precludes courts from enjoining federal officials from using federal property
that infringes a patent. Given Congress's power to waive sovereign immunity, it is difficult to conceive of
this as a constitutional holding. The Court in Belknap did, however, rely on Eleventh Amendment holdings
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the Seminole Tribe Court's Ex parte Young holding muddies the waters a bit
concerning the circumstances in which such relief will be available, it seems
clear that such relief is available at least if Congress has clearly so provided.
There is some authority for the proposition that monetary sanctions for failure
to comply with a prospective court order can be assessed against the state
itself, as opposed to the official.442 Adoption of the immunity-from-liability
interpretation may call into question the vitality of that authority where the
order requires compliance with a duty imposed on the state pursuant to
Article 1. 443 But, at a minimum, a state official who violates a court order not
to infringe a patent would be personally subject to contempt sanctions. This
appears effective to ensure prospective compliance with the federal obligation
not to infringe.
Our analysis of Zinermon in Part IV suggested that the Due Process Clause
may impose a duty on states to set up a procedure whereby officials who are
contemplating using patented material would be required to obtain
preclearance, a procedure that might include notice to the patent holder and an
opportunity to adjudicate the patent's validity and whether the contemplated
conduct infringes. As noted, it seems odd to read the Due Process Clause to
require this procedure when the patent laws require no similar procedure of
private parties. At any rate, it appears unlikely that a court would require the
creation of such a bureaucracy when Congress has not so required. This raises
the question whether Congress can require that the states set up such
procedures. On the one hand, to impose such requirements on the states
without imposing parallel requirements on private individuals would appear to
single out the state for regulation in violation of New York. On the other hand,
it is only because the states are immune from damage liability that Congress
would even consider this scheme. Perhaps a congressional requirement along
these lines would be upheld by the Court as a valid "enforcement" of the
States' due process obligations with respect to an admitted property right.
Congress may additionally have the option of easing standing and ripeness
obstacles to injunctive relief. How far the Court would allow it to go in this

in reaching its conclusions. See 161 U.S. at 18-23. To the extent that the Court regarded this holding as
applying as well to the states, the decision would appear to have been superseded by such more recent
decisions as the second Pennhurst decision, in which the Court stated that "when a plaintiff sues a state
official alleging a violation of federal law, the federal court may award an injunction that governs the
official's future conduct .... Under the theory of Young, such a suit would not be one against the State
since the federal-law allegation would strip the state officer of his official authority." Pennhurst State Sch.
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 102-03 (1981 ). The aspect of the Belknap decision that does retain current
relevance is the Court's affirmation of the availability of damages in an action at law against the federal
officials responsible for infringing patents. See 161 U.S. at 26.
442. See supra note 108 and accompanying text; see also Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
443. To the extent that the Court in these cases relied on the conclusion that Congress abrogated
sovereign immunity when it enacted 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1994), Seminole Tribe would appear to call into
question the courts' power to award such penalties and costs when the federal law that the state officer
violated was enacted by Congress under Article I.

1792

The Yale Law Journal

[Vol. 106: 1683

direction is unclear after Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 444 but the concurring
Justices seemed to be willing to give Congress substantialleeway. 445 It is not
clear that this avenue would be productive in the patent context, but Congress
may find it useful in other contexts.
Relying on prospective relief only, however, even if broadened in the ways
suggested, would still leave states with the ability to violate federal obligations
for a time. Such a regime leaves the states with little incentive to take any
federal obligations seriously until confronted with a suit seeking to stop an
ongoing violation. The state could, without assuming any risk, conduct itself
entirely without regard to any possible federal obligations until confronted with
a legal challenge. In the meantime, the interests underlying the federal
obligation have been compromised.
To address this problem, Congress might impose a penalty for past
violations of federal obligations payable to the federal government. It is
established that the Eleventh Amendment does not apply to suits by the federal
government. The prospect of such a penalty should lead the state to pay more
attention to possible federal obligations, but this technique of enforcement
could be costly, as it requires setting up a federal bureaucracy to monitor state
activities in the area. It has been suggested that the federal government has the
power to authorize private parties to bring suit on its behalf, and perhaps also
to allow the private party to keep the penalty if it prevails.446 This qui tamtype arrangement, however, would appear to come so close to replicating the
barred liability to individuals that the Court would probably strike it down. 447
The arrangement would stand a greater chance of passing muster if the suit
were brought by private individuals in the name of the United States but the
penalty were required to be turned over to the United States. This arrangement
might work if the federal obligations involved had broad public impact and
there existed public interest organizations willing to take on such projects. It
may work, for example, in the environmental area. With respect to federal
obligations that benefit discrete categories of individuals, such as the obligation
not to infringe patents or copyrights or to engage in false advertising, affected
individuals would seem to lack an incentive to bring an action if they cannot
keep the "penalty." Perhaps if such individuals were permitted to add a
"penalty-to-the-United-States" count to an action they would otherwise bring
for injunctive relief, they would have an adequate incentive to do so, if only
to deter future infringements. If this arrangement were found to comport with
the Eleventh Amendment, the concerns raised above about states simply
444. 504 U.S. 555 (1992); see also supra note 288.
445. Justices Kennedy and Souter appear to contemplate little more than a clear statement rule, under
which Congress would be required to identify the interest it seeks to protect and the plaintiff's connection
to that interest. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
446. See Siegel, supra note 110.
447. See supra notes 110-1 I.
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ignoring their federal obligations until called to account would be further
alleviated.
A scheme in which the rightholder could be compensated for past
violations would obviously be . preferable. It is here that our reinterpreted
McKesson and such related cases as Poindexter and Bivens become relevant.
As interpreted above, these cases stand for the proposition that the Supremacy
Clause establishes a private damage action against state officials who violate
the Constitution. I have argued elsewhere that the Supremacy Clause should
be read to establish a presumption that federal statutes that impose obligations
on government provide a private damage action against government officials
to the individuals the statute was designed to protect.448 Even if this
presumption were rejected, however, Congress would retain the power to make
state officials personally liable for their violations of federal statutes. Current
case law recognizes this power, as the Court in Maine v. Thiboutof'4 9
construed section 1983 to make state officials personally liable for violating
statutory obligations imposed pursuant to Article 1.450 It has been suggested
that the Thiboutot decision is endangered after Seminole Tribe, 451 but even
the dissenters in Thiboutot did not deny that Congress had the power to impose
such liability; they merely argued that Congress had not done so when it
passed section 1983.452
If there is a problem with the suggestion that Congress may make state
officers personally liable for violating statutes that validly place obligations on
states, the problem stems not so much from the Eleventh Amendment, which
has long been understood not to apply to suits seeking damages from officers
personally, but from the Tenth Amendment, and the New York decision in
particular. For example, the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification
Act makes "employers" liable in damages in certain circumstances, but if the
employer is a corporation, the statute does not subject the corporation's
officers or directors to personalliability. 453 Would an amendment to that Act
making state officials personally liable for violations of the Act run afoul of
New York's apparent holding that Congress may impose the same obligations
448. See supra note 420.
449. 448 U.S. 1.
450. Although the 7hiboutot case itself was against the state of Maine, the Court was well aware that
its holding would make officers personally liable. See id. at 22 (Powell, J., dissenting) ("In practical effect,
today's decision means that state and local governments, officers, and employees now may face liability
whenever a person believes he has been injured by the administration of any federal-state cooperative
program, whether or not that program is related to equal or civil rights.") (citations omitted). To the extent
that the Court held (or assumed) that section 1983 created a cause of action against states, it is no longer
good law. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989); supra Subsection ill.B.4.
451. See Jackson, supra note 15.
452. Indeed, Justice Powell's dissent states that he "do[es] not mean to imply that either[§ 1983 or
§ 1988] must be limited strictly to claims arising under the post-Civil War Amendments." See 7hiboutot,
448 U.S. at 25 n.l5 (Powell, J., dissenting).
453. See 29 U.S.C. § 210l(a)(l) (1994) (defining "employer" as including certain "business
enterprise[s]"); id. § 2104(a) (making employers liable to employees in particular circumstances).
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on states that it imposes on private individuals, but not more? Perhaps the
Court would hold that state officials are not the state for New York purposes,
just as they are not the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes. This may not
be likely, as the Court already defines the state more broadly for Garcia/New
York purposes than it does for Eleventh Amendment purposes. 454 A stronger
argument is that the power to make state officials personally liable comes from
the Supremacy Clause and the need to give efficacy to the statutes Congress
has the power to enact. By preventing Congress from making the states
themselves liable, the Eleventh Amendment makes it impossible for Congress
to employ with respect to the states the same enforcement scheme it has
chosen for private parties. As argued above, the Supremacy Clause establishes
a right of action against state officials as the default mechanism for giving
efficacy to those officials' constitutional obligations. If the Constitution permits
Congress to impose additional obligations on the states, then it should be
construed to authorize Congress to give efficacy to those obligations by
making state officials personally liable.
But, even if I am wrong, the problem is not an insuperable one, as
Congress can surely make state officials personally liable if it makes similarly
situated employees and directors of private companies liable as well. If that is
what it takes to provide a retrospective remedy for state violations, then
Congress would have little reason not to do so. Where the claimant has the
option of suing both the employee or director and the corporation, the deeper
pocket will wind up paying the judgment. While it may be a nuisance to
individual corporate employees or directors to be named as a defendant,
anyone who has sufficient resources to make an appealing target is also likely
to be sophisticated enough to have arranged for full indemnification (including
for litigation costs).455 Indeed, Congress appears to have made corporate
officers and directors personally liable for such legal violations as failure of
the company to pay a minimum wage,456 yet suits naming officers personally
for failure to pay the minimum wage are rare. 457 It appears that state officials
may now be sued personally for failure to pay the minimum wage, even
though the state itself may not be (at least if the immunity-from-liability
interpretation is correct).458 Unlike employees of private companies, however,
employees of state agencies do have an incentive to sue their bosses
personally.
454. See supra note 100.
455. Such an agreement may not protect the officer if the company should declare bankruptcy, but a
sophisticated officer could protect herself from this possibility by obtaining liability insurance.
456. See Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1994) (defining "employer'' as including
persons acting for employer); id. § 216(b) (making employer liable for failure to pay minimum wage). See
also supra note 441 (noting that government officials are liable in damages for patent infringement).
457. Telephone interview with Mary Qualiana, Labor and Employment Attorney, Washington, D.C.
(Feb. 7, 1997).
458. See supra note 102 (noting cases finding FLSA's abrogation of state immunity unconstitutional).
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A possibly significant obstacle to recovery against a state official for
statutory violations is "official" immunity. Under current doctrine, state
officials sued in their personal capacities are entitled to an immunity that
protects them from liability unless they violated "clearly established" law. 459
As this standard is currently applied, the law must have been clearly
established at the level of application of law to fact. 460 This may pose
problems for certain types of claimants. Patent holders, for example, would
presumably have to show that prior authorities "clearly established" both that
the patent was valid and that the defendant's conduct infringed it. But official
immunity is generally regarded as subconstitutional in stature.461 If so, then
presumably Congress can do away with it. This would appear to present no
problems under New York as long as the same standard of liability applies to
state employees as to private employees. Indeed, it may even be open to
Congress to impose a form of "strict" liability on heads of agencies by
enacting a law providing that the CEO of any entity that infringes a patent
(defined to include the head of any state agency) shall be personally liable to
the patent holder to the same extent as the company itself.
Does an official-liability regime for violations of federal law satisfy ruleof-law concerns? As noted, it is often said that the rule of law requires that
there be remedies for the violation of legal rights. 462 Would an officialliability regime be effective at compensating persons whose rights have been
violated? An obvious concern is that officials will frequently have insufficient
assets to satisfy a judgment. This is particularly likely to be the case if the
legal violation involves the collection of an unconstitutional tax from a large
corporation or the infringement of a valuable patent or copyright. It will also
often be the case when a police officer unlawfully causes severe injury to an
individual. If the injured party were in fact limited to the officer's personal
assets, then chances are that she would not receive full compensation.
But the injured party will usually not be so restricted. If the law makes
state officials personally liable for, say, the collection of unlawful taxes or the
infringement of a patent, then states will inevitably find it necessary to offer
to compensate their officials for any liability assessed against them, except
perhaps where the official's violation of law was egregious, or at least to pay
their officials higher salaries to enable them to obtain liability insurance.
Otherwise, few would agree to work for the state.463 Virtually all states have
459. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
460. See Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987).
461. See, e.g., Tower v. Glover, 467 U.S. 914,923 (1984) (holding that immunity for public defenders
did not exist at common law); Fallon, supra note 335, at 356; Fallon & Meltzer, supra note 16, at 1785.
But cf Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1131 n.15 (1996) (suggesting that official immunity may
have constitutional stature).
462. See supra text accompanying notes 2, 16.
463. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REv. 757, 812 (1994)
("Without indemnification who would agree to work for the government?").
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statutes agreeing to reimburse their officials in specified circumstances for
damages assessed against them for conduct performed within the scope of their
employment.464 States also often agree by contract to reimburse their
employees for damage liability, and sometimes they follow a policy of
reimbursing their officials even when not required to do so by statute or
contract.465 Particularly if federal statutes remove the common law immunity
the official otherwise would enjoy, any rational state official would insist on
some such arrangement before taking a job that exposes her to such
liability. 466 If the state has agreed to compensate the official, the patent
holder will eventually receive his full measure of damages from the state
(indirectly) without running afoul of the Eleventh Amendment. 467
464. See ALA. CODE§ 41-9-74(a) (1991); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 41-621 (West Supp. 1996); ARK.
CODE ANN.§ 21-9-203 (Michie 1996); CAL. Gov'T CODE§ 825(a) (West Supp. 19%); COLO. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 24-10-110(l)(b)(i) (West Supp. 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 5-14ld(a) (West Supp. 1996);
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, § 4002 (Michie Supp. 1994); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 111.071 (Harrison 1985); GA.
CODE ANN. § 45-9-60 (1990); HAW. REV. STAT. § 26-35.5 (1995); IDAHO CODE§ 6-903(b)-(c) (Michie
1990); SILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 350/2 (West 1993); IND. CODE ANN.§ 34-4-16.7-1 (Michie 1986); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 669.21 (West, WESTLAW through end of 1995 Reg. Sess.); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 75-6109
(West, WESTLAW through end of 1995 Reg. Sess.); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15.753 (Banks-Baldwin,
WESTLAW current through end of 1995 3d Ex. Sess.); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:5108.1 (West,
WESTLAW current through all 1995 Reg. Sess. Acts); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 8112 (West,
WESTLAW current through end of 1995 First Reg. Sess.); Mo. CoDE ANN., STATE Gov'T § 12-404
(Michie 1995); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 258, § 9 (West 1988); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 691.1408
(West 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 3.736 (West Supp. 1997); Miss. CODE ANN.§ 11-46-7 (Supp. 1996);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 107.170(5) (West Supp. 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-9-305 (1995); NEB. REV. STAT.
§81-8,239.05 (1996); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41.0349 (Michie 1996); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 99-D:2
(1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 59-10-1 (West 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-4 (Michie Supp. 1996); N.Y.
PUB. OFF. LAW § 17(3)(a) (McKinney 1988); N.D. CENT. CODE§ 32-12.1-04 (19%); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2744.07(A) (Anderson 1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51,§ 162(A) (West Supp. 1996); OR. REV.
STAT.§ 30.285 (1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS§ 9-31-12 (Michie Supp. 1996); S.C. CODE ANN.§ 15-78-70 (Law
Co-op. Supp. 1995); S.D. CODIFIED LAws§ 3-19-1 (Michie 1994); TEX. CN. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN.
§ 104.002 (West Supp. 1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 63-30-36 (Michie 1993); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §
5606(a) (West Supp. 1996); VA. CODE ANN.§ 2.1-526.8(A) (Michie 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.§
4.24.490(1) (West Supp. 1997); W.VA. CODE§ 29-12A-ll(a)(2) (1992); WIS. STAT. ANN.§ 895.46(l)(a)
(West Supp. 1995); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 1-39-104 (Michie 1988). The courts that have considered the
question have held that the existence of a state law duty to reimburse an official does not transform a suit
against the official into a suit against the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes. See HART & WECHSLER,
supra note 100, at 1076-77.
465. See CLAYTON P. GILLETTE, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 707-08 (1994). Additionally, "it is not
uncommon for organizations of public employees, such as a peace officers' association, to make
arrangements for low cost group insurance coverage against personal liability for certain kinds of torts (e.g.,
wrongful arrest, assault and battery, etc.)." SHO SATO & ARVO VAN ALSTYNE, STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT LAW 784 (2d ed. 1977). "Careful counsel may also discover that in some jurisdictions
mandatory official bonds covering certain positions may be written in terms broad enough to include
tortious injuries, with liability running in favor of members of the public." Id. (citations omitted).
466. It is well-settled that a state's agreement to reimburse its officials does not transform a suit
against the official into a suit against the state for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment, even though the
damages will ultimately come from the state treasury. See Fowler v. Lindsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 411, 412
(1799) (stating that "remote interest of the State, in making retribution to her grantees" does not deprive
federal court of jurisdiction); Demery v. Kupperman, 735 F.2d 1139, 1146-48 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that
state's agreement to indemnify does not transform suit against official into suit against state for Eleventh
Amendment purposes).
467. It is the practice of local governments that have agreed to compensate their officials-and
probably of most states as well-to pay judgments against their officials directly to the plaintiff. Telephone
interview with Benjamin L. Hall, III, former City Attorney for Houston, Texas (Feb. 13, 1997). If a state
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In the end, it may not be necessary for the patent holder even to sue the
officer in court. As interpreted above, McKesson recognizes the state's freedom
to substitute itself for the officer as the defendant, and certainly Congress can
make it clear in the statute that the state has this option. The state would have
a number of incentives to do so. First, it would greatly simplify the process for
all concerned, including its officers and itself. The cost of administering an
officer-liability-plus-state-reimbursement scheme is likely to be greater for the
state than the cost of administering a straight state-liability regime. For
example, the state will no doubt want its own lawyer to control the defense,
but unless the officer is dismissed as a defendant the officer is likely to want
his own lawyer as well (and this is presumably a cost that the state will
ultimately have to pick up). Second, the prospect of personal liability is likely
to lead risk-averse officers to steer excessively clear of the line drawn by the
law, and, if so, the state will forgo an excessive amount of conduct that does
not in fact violate the law. The state can remove some of this excessive
deterrence by agreeing to reimburse the official or to pay her insurance, but it
can go further to neutralize this problem by committing itself in advance to
being the sole defendant in the case. Finally, agreeing to be substituted as the
defendant may be the only way for the state to avoid a trial in federal court.
As noted, the state official can be made suable in federal court without raising
Eleventh Amendment problems. The state could, consistent with McKesson,
agree to be substituted as the sole defendant in a state court proceeding
only, 468 and if it does so, the Supreme Court can review any decision the
did not wish to be cooperative, it could force the plaintiff to seek enforcement from the official, and then
reimburse the official for what he paid to the plaintiff. If the plaintiff were forced to proceed against the
official and part of the judgment remained unpaid because the official lacked sufficient personal resources
to satisfy the entire judgment, the plaintiff should be able to recover the unpaid portion of the judgment
after the official receives reimbursement from the state of the amount paid by him to the plaintiff the first
time. In this way, the plaintiff should eventually recover the whole judgment.
Presumably, a state would not be free to say that any amounts paid to the official by the state as
reimbursement for damages shall be exempt from attachment by the judgment creditor. A state law to that
effect would arguably constitute an impermissible burden on the constitutionally required remedy against
state officials and thus violate the Supremacy Clause. If the exemption applied only to damages for
violations of federal law, it would probably also amount to unconstitutional discrimination against the
federal rights violated by the official. Cf McKnett v. St. Louis & San Francisco Ry., 292 U.S. 230, 234
(1934) ("A state may not discriminate against rights arising under federal laws."). A broader state law rule
shielding from execution any amounts traceable to money paid to the official by the state would certainly
not be permissible, as most of the personal resources of state officials are presumably the proceeds of
money paid to the official by the state as salary. In any event, I am not aware of any state law that purports
to shield from attachment by judgment creditors amounts paid to the official by the state as reimbursement
or salary.
468. It has long been established that states may consent to be sued only in their own courts. See
Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436 (1900). However, as McKesson established, see McKesson Corp. v. Division
of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 30 (1990), and Seminole Tribe reaffirmed, see Seminole
Tribe v. Aorida, 116 S. Ct. 1114, 1131 n.l4 (1996), a state's consent to be sued in its own courts also
constitutes consent to the Supreme Court's review of any federal claims resolved in such a suit. It is true
that the state may not in fact be voluntarily agreeing to Supreme Court review, but our discussion of
McKesson above showed why the state does not have the option of consenting to suit in its own courts but
not to Supreme Court review: The state's consent to be sued in its courts typically replaces the right the
claimant would otherwise have had to recover against state officials, and a suit against state officials could
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state court rendered. Congress could perhaps provide by statute that to avoid
a suit against the official, the state must consent to being sued in the lower
federal court. Such consent would avoid any Eleventh Amendment problems
with the federal courts' original jurisdiction, but such a provision would
remove one of the three incentives the states would have to consent. (Whether
the remaining incentives suffice to meet the federal interests involved is of
course a judgment for Congress to make.)
If Congress does indeed have the power to withdraw or narrow official
immunity, then Congress would have the power to design an official liability
scheme that should achieve roughly the same degree of compensation for
victims as a government liability scheme. In particular, a statute designating
agency (and company) heads as strictly liable for their agency's (or
company's) violations of certain statutes is very likely to produce either an
agreement between the head and the agency providing for full indemnification
or a straight waiver of immunity. But this scheme achieves full compensation
by successfully encouraging-some might say coercing-states to take on a
liability that we are assuming Congress lacks the power to impose on them
directly. The scheme seems so well-calculated to achieve Congress's goal of
getting the state to pay that it may cast doubt on the conclusion that Congress
indeed possesses this power. Recall that much of the support for the immunityfrom-liability interpretation comes from the authorities establishing that one of
the purposes of the Eleventh Amendment is to protect state treasuries. We
found the forum-allocation interpretation inconsistent with any such intent
because, if the states are liable under federal law and the Supreme Court is
available to enforce the liability, the states' treasuries would not in the end be
protected. It might similarly be argued that if Congress has the power to place
obligations on state officials that are all but certain to lead states to "consent"
to take on the liability itself, then the state treasuries have not been protected
either. If so, the official-liability regime seems just as inconsistent with the
purpose of protecting state treasuries as the forum-allocation interpretation.
The argument is not devoid of merit, but there does seem to be a
difference in kind between imposing a liability on the state directly and
imposing one on an officer in the hope and expectation that the state will agree
to take on the liability itself. It has long been recognized that "the purpose of
allowing actions against officers is ... to find a conduit to the treasury in
cases where there should be compensation and where no other device is
provided"-to bring "pressure to bear in favor of a remedy [from the
treasury]."469 And it is well established that success in this regard does not

be reviewed by the Court with no Eleventh Amendment problems. A consent to suit without Supreme Court
review would be inadequate to protect the federal interests at stake and so is rightly regarded as ineffective
to justify a withdrawal of the official's liability.
469. Jaffe, supra note 392, at 227-28.
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imbue the official with the state's Eleventh Amendment immunity, even
though the damages will in such a case come from the state treasury. 470
Congress's establishment of a strict liability standard for agency heads would
not in fact differ significantly from the standards the Court itself once applied
to determine federal officials' susceptibility to damage liability. 471 To say
such legislation unduly coerces the states' consent seems no more apt than
saying that a private party coerces the states by refusing to do business with
them unless they agree to waive their immunity. Perhaps all of this goes to
show that the real purpose of sovereign immunity is not to protect the state
treasury, that it advances instead only the state's dignitary interest in not being
subjected to liability unless it has consented. But perhaps it shows instead that
the immunity protects the states' treasuries only at the margins. To recognize
Congress's power to impose strict liability on officials, as suggested above,
may mean that the margin is getting smaller. Be that as it may, the margin
would entirely disappear were we to accept the forum-allocation view. The
suggested officer liability scheme is thus at least marginally more faithful to
the purpose of protecting state treasuries than the forum-allocation
interpretation.
At any rate, if the claimed conflict with the purpose to protect state
treasuries were deemed problematic, it could be addressed by denying
Congress the power to render state officials strictly liable for their agencies'
statutory violations, without going further and denying Congress the power to
remove the rather stringent "official" liability the Court has given them. To do
the latter would contradict many years of treating this immunity as
subconstitutional. 472 There is, however, some intimation in Seminole Tribe
that the Court may be heading in that direction. 473 If it does, then Congress
would be able to subject state officials to personal liability only for their
violations of "clearly established" law. Congress's only option in that event
would be to provide as much detail in its statutes as possible.
Where Congress has not taken special steps to increase the likelihood that
officials will have obtained a commitment of full indemnification-and this
will typically be the case for constitutional violations, as the majoritarian
branch is unlikely to be as intent on securing compensation for violations of
these countermajoritarian norms-then the chances that victims of legal
violations will not be fully compensated are very real. For example, as noted,
many state indemnification statutes exclude indemnification for particularly

470. See supra note 466.
471. See, e.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 179 (1804) (holding naval captain liable for
seizure of neutral vessel pursuant to executive order). See generally Engdahl, supra note 42; Ann
Woolhandler, Patterns of Official Accountability, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 396, 453-57 (1986-87).
472. See supra text accompanying note 461.
473. See 116 S. Ct. at 1131 n.15 ("[E]ven assuming [the immunity enjoyed by state and federal
officials] has no constitutional foundation, .... ").
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egregious violations of law. An official-liability regime will therefore not
entirely satisfy those who insist that there must be full remediation. But,
contrary to the claims of some scholars,474 neither the rule of law as an ideal,
nor the Anglo-American legal tradition, demand that everyone who has
received unjust or unfair treatment at the hands of government be fully
compensated for his injury. Take just one uncontroversial example: An
innocent person who has been accused of a crime, has been duly indicted and
tried and acquitted, but whose liberty was restrained for a lengthy period of
time pending completion of the trial, is not entitled to a damage remedy
against the state or its officials (except perhaps in very rare circumstances).
The injury suffered by innocent persons forced to defend themselves in a
criminal trial, even if not confined, is of the most acute kind, and it is not
alleviated by the knowledge that the evidence points to him as the perpetrator.
The absence of a remedy in such circumstances cannot be reconciled with any
principle of full remediation, if understood as full compensation for undeserved
governmental injuries, yet our system does not offer him one, nor can it
without bankrupting the state.
What the rule of law does require, and what our legal system has
traditionally sought to provide, is a remedial scheme that is generally effective
at producing systematic compliance with legal norms. With respect to
constitutional norms, because they are countermajoritarian, and perhaps with
respect to all norms applicable to government, the remedial scheme will be
effective only if the power to obtain the remedies resides in private individuals.
Our law of constitutional remedies has accordingly always relied on private
rights of action against state officials, and it is this scheme of remedies that I
maintain is grounded in the Supremacy Clause. It is a happy consequence of
this reliance on private rights of action that the scheme, to a considerable
degree, yields compensation to those injured by violations of federal law. But
the focus of the Supremacy Clause's remedial scheme, and of the rule-of-law
goal, is deterrence: securing prospective compliance with law by threatening
a sanction in the event of a violation. 475 In truth, the maxim that for every
right there must be a remedy is a less unyielding command of the rule of law
than the maxim that for every law there must be a sanction.476
474. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 7, at 1485-86 ("Few propositions of law are as basic today ... as
the ancient legal maxim ... : Where there is a right, there should be a remedy.").
475. A fault-based liability regime-a regime that would deny relief, for example, to our innocent,
subsequently acquitted defendant-might, to be sure, be defended on noninstrumental grounds. See John
C. Jeffries, Jr., Compensation for Constitutional Torts: Reflections on the Significance of Fault, 88 MICH.
L. REv. 82,93-101 (1989) (defending such regime on grounds of corrective justice). My claim here is that
the Supremacy Clause should be regarded as the basis of a fault-based scheme of constitutional remedies
for constitutional violations designed to achieve general and systematic compliance with constitutional
norms.
476. Hamilton invoked the latter principle in The Federalist No. 15, and I rely on it strongly in
interpreting the Supremacy Clause's declaration that the Constitution is the "law" of the land as the source
of a constitutional law of remedies for violations of the Constitution. See Vazquez, supra note 80.
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That our law of constitutional remedies focuses on deterrence is evident.
Official immunity, for example, is clearly geared toward that goal, the apparent
theory being that you cannot deter violations of an ambiguous legal norm
without overdeterring. Although the Court may apply the principle too
stringently, leaving undeterred too much conduct that could and should be
deterred, the principle itself seems sound from a deterrence perspective.
The Due Process Clause might perhaps have been regarded as the source
of a justice-based constitutional interest in full remediation, but the Court's due
process jurisprudence appears designed to advance instead the deterrence goals
that I argue underlie the Supremacy Clause. This is reflected in the Court's
holding that a government official's negligent conduct does not violate the Due
Process Clause, even if it produces "serious injury." 477 That is because the
Clause protects individuals against "abusive governmental conduct."478 This
suggests that there may not be very much distance between my interpretation
of the Supremacy Clause and the Court's interpretation of the Due Process
Clause, and thus between my recharacterization of McKesson and the
conventional one. 479
How does the official-liability regime fare from a deterrence perspective?
One would expect a regime of personal liability to be more effective at
deterring unlawful conduct than a regime of entity liability. 480 If the liability
falls on the individual officer, then that officer is more likely to be deterred
than if the liability is borne by the government and thus spread among all
taxpayers. If this intuition holds, then from a rule-of-law perspective, there
may be a problem with agreements to indemnify, as they take the sting off the
sanction. There is evidence, however, that the stigma of being sued personally

By emphasizing the deterrence goal, I do not mean to disparage the interest in compensating victims
of injustice. I agree with John Finnis's statement that "[i]f 'effectiveness' is to be contrasted (as it need not
be) with 'justice,' the coercive force of law is not merely a matter of effectiveness." JOHN FINNIS,
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 260 (1980). However, Finnis is here referring to the injustice that
the law-abiding suffer if the law-breaker is not punished, and he too seems to have a form of deterrence
in mind. He seems to fear that the law-abiding will stop abiding the law if they see law-breakers going
unpunished. See id. at 262-{)3. I recognize the importance of compensating victims of wrongs simply for
the noninstrumental justice of it, but in our constitutional system this interest clearly can be sacrificed for
the common good, which includes notably the need to deter violations of law. It is this need that clearly
drives the existing remedial scheme, and properly so from a rule-of-law perspective.
477. Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347 (1986).
478. ld. at 348.
479. The Court in Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986), said that "like its forebear in the Magna
Carta," the Due Process Clause was "'intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the
powers of government."' Id. at 331 (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 527 (1887)). The forebear
in the Magna Carta was that document's reference to the "law of the land." The Court in Mu"ay's Lessee
v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (8 How.) 272 (1856), explained that "[t]he words, 'due
process of law,' were undoubtedly intended to convey the same meaning as the words, 'by law of the land,'
in Magna Charta." !d. at 276.
480. The Supreme Court appears to share this intuition. See FDIC v. Meyer, 114 S. Ct. 996, 1005
(1994) (suggesting that effectiveness of Bivens remedy lies in enabling recovery against officer); Carlson
v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 21 (1980) ("Because the Bivens remedy is recoverable against individuals, it is a
more effective deterrent than the [Tort Claims Act] remedy against the United States.").
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leads to overdeterrence despite the broad protection officials receive from
official immunity doctrines, 481 and despite the widespread practice of
indemnifying officers.482
Some scholars have argued that an entity liability regime is superior to an
official-liability regime from the deterrence perspective. Larry Kramer and
Alan Sykes conclude that the choice between government liability and officer
liability is, as a matter of economic efficiency, "a matter of indifference"483
if the officer has sufficient resources to pay any judgment (and the transaction
costs of negotiating employment contracts is low), or if the state has agreed to
indemnify the official. 484 They identify several inefficiencies that would be
produced by an official liability rule if the officer lacked the resources to cover
a judgment. Most pertinent are the inefficiencies that tend to lead to inadequate
precautions against violations of law. On this score, their views about an
official liability rule seem equivocal. They note that "it is conceivable that ...
employees may exercise inefficiently high levels of care due to the conjunction
of risk aversion with personal liability, or to the fact that the burden of
overcautious behavior falls on the general public and not on the
employees.'>485 They acknowledge that the government may correct this
problem by offering to indemnify, but they conclude that the government
might find the cost too high because it would mean forgoing the benefits of
cost externalization.486 What, specifically, are these benefits? An enterprise
decreases its cost of doing business by allowing the losses it causes to fall on
the injured third party. This net benefit, they claim, "can be divided between
the employer and the employee (in the form of higher wages) to make them
both better off at the expense of the injured party whose judgment goes wholly
or partially unsatisfied.''487 It is not entirely clear why these possible benefits
would deter an employer from agreeing to indemnify if it fears that the
employee would take inefficiently high levels of care, for in such
circumstances the employer would not realize the benefits of cost
externalization. Those benefits would be realized only if the employee were
not risk averse. There are, of course, degrees of risk aversion. With respect to
any but the least risk averse employee, the appeal of an arrangement of the
481. See Nina Pillard, Taking Fiction Seriously: The Failure of Official Liability Under Bivens 39-40
(Jan. 24, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
482. See Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Litigation, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 641, 686 (1987) (noting that "rampant official fear of personal liability may be an
overreaction" in light of practice of indemnification).
483. Larry Kramer & Alan 0. Sykes, Municipal Liability Under § 1983: A Legal and Economic
Analysis, 1987 SUP. CT. REV. 249, 277 n.95.
484. See id. at 272, 277 n.95.
485. /d. at 280.
486. See id.
487. /d. at 278. This is a description of one of the inefficiencies of a personal liability regime in the
private sector, but the authors conclude that these concerns apply "[t]o a considerable extent" in the public
sector as well. /d.
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type Kramer and Sykes fear would appear to depend significantly on her
ability to avoid severe economic consequences by declaring bankruptcy. 488
But, if the right to an effective system of constitutional remedies has its source
in the Supremacy Clause, then to the extent that a system of
bankruptcy-which is, after all, only statutory-undermines it, we would
expect the latter to have to give way. Even if the substantive legal norm to
which we want to give efficacy is statutory, and thus the right to damages as
well, it is possible that Congress may have the power to deny bankruptcy
protection to state officials, although this suggestion admittedly raises problems
under New York of the sort we have already encountered. In any event, while
such an arrangement between employer and employee might be something to
apprehend in the private sector, it seems highly unlikely when the employer
is a non-profit-maximizing state government and the employee is a civil
servant whose salary is probably highly regulated and not individually
negotiated.
Peter Schuck has argued that a government liability regime is superior
from the perspective of reducing violations of law "because much official
wrongdoing is ultimately rooted in organizational conditions and can only be
organizationally deterred."489 Placing the liability on the agency rather than
on the street-level officer, he argues, will be more effective at producing the
sort of system-wide change that will often be necessary to reduce legal
violations. This seems like a persuasive case for placing the liability on higherlevel officials instead of street-level officials, as Congress would do by making
agency heads strictly liable for statutory violations, but it is not necessarily a
reason for abandoning the officer-liability regime entirely. It is true that a
system that makes supervisors liable for their failure to take steps to correct
a system-wide problem might produce "intolerable litigation costs."490 Such
a rule would "tempt plaintiffs to implead any number of . . . officials. Each
might well want his own attorney, and the ensuing litigation over which
official was the 'negligent' one would consume considerable resources."491
488. See Alan 0. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1241-42 (1984).
The Bankruptcy Code itself, however, places significant limits on the ability of an employer and employee
to profit through such a scheme. Under Chapter 7, a debt is not dischargeable if it represents liability for
"willful and malicious injury" caused by the debtor. II U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) (1994). Under Chapter 13, such
debts are not expressly made nondischargeable, but any plans proposed under this chapter must be
presented in "good faith." II U.S.C. § 1325(a)(3) (1994). See BENJAMIN WEINTRAUB & ALAN N. REsNICK,
·BANKRUPTCY LAW MANUAL, at 'l[ 9.14[3) (3d ed. 1992). Among the factors courts have regarded as
relevant in detennining whether a plan is proposed in good faith are whether the debt is dischargeable
under Chapter 7, and "the motivation and sincerity of the debtor in seeking Chapter 13 relief." In re Estus,
695 F.2d 311, 317 (8th Cir. 1982). Thus, if the violation of federal law was willful and malicious, it would
appear that the officer would have difficulty discharging the debt under either chapter, and even if the
violation was not willful and malicious, a plan that results from the type of arrangement feared by Kramer
and Sykes might well fail the "good faith" requirement.
489. I'F.TER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT 98 (1983).
490. Kramer & Sykes, supra note 483, at 284.
491. /d.
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But, at the same time, the prospect of such costs should help induce the
relevant officers to take the desired steps in the first place. Moreover, if a
government-liability system were ultimately preferable, making supervisory
officials liable would be likely to approximate it, as such officials are likely
to be risk averse and, because of their positions, would be in a good position
to procure indemnification agreements.
If the right of individuals to recover against state officials who violate the
federal Constitution or statutes is unaffected by the Eleventh Amendment, as
I suggest, then the Eleventh Amendment, interpreted to give states immunity
from liability, would at bottom be a rule about vicarious liability: a rule
precluding the federal government from imposing vicarious liability on the
states. Government liability is always vicarious liability, as governments, like
corporations, "are a legal fiction . . . . [They] do not act, do not make
contracts, sell property, or commit torts; their agents do." 492 It may seem odd
to conclude that the Constitution imposes a rule against vicarious liability, but
it is also strange to say that the rule of law requires a system of vicarious
liability. Law is addressed at bottom to natural persons. Only natural persons
can violate legal norms, and only natural persons can be deterred from
violating legal norms. It should accordingly be possible to design a system that
imposes sanctions on natural persons that would be effective at securing
compliance with the law. Vicarious liability may be a convenient and perhaps
less costly way to ferret out the persons responsible for a legal violation, but
to say that without it the rule of law is seriously jeopardized seems an
overstatement. To the extent that an official-liability regime would be less
efficient or less effective, we may in the end just have to chalk those problems
up to the Eleventh Amendment. But the problems, such as they are, hardly
warrant the assertion that our system of constitutional remedies, or of remedies
for violations by states of federal statutes, is in conflict in some fundamental
way with rule-of-law values.
VII. CONCLUSION: THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND THE RULE OF LAW

The two rule-of-law principles I described at the beginning of this
Article-that for every right there must be a remedy, and that the judicial
power be coextensive with the legislative-and closely related one I mentioned
later-that for every law there must be a sanction-are not the only demands
of the rule of law. Also important, perhaps more so, is the citizenry's, and
hence the other branches', continuing respect for the judiciary as the
authoritative interpreter and enforcer ofthe law. John Orth's scholarship on the
Eleventh Amendment has suggested that the Hans interpretation of the
492. /d. at 249.
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Amendment was driven by a fear that any judgments rendered against the
states in the 1890s would have been disregarded by the states and not enforced
by the Executive Branch.493 Such a judgment, while apparently in conflict
with the need for a remedy for the violation of rights, was at least defensible
on "higher" rule-of-law grounds. 494 A blatantly disregarded Supreme Court
opinion would quite possibly have reduced the public's and the other branches'
respect for the institution, to such an extent as to undermine its ability to serve
the vital rule-of-law functions it serves in our government, including most
importantly the function of keeping the other branches within the bounds of
their constitutional authority. The blow to rule-of-law values was in any event
softened in such decisions as Poindexter, which supplied the groundwork for
a virtual reconciliation of the Eleventh Amendment with the rule of law.
The reasons that led the Court to interpret the Eleventh Amendment the
way it did in Hans may not have much current resonance, but to throw out a
century-old Supreme Court precedent, often relied upon in the interim, would
raise rule-of-law problems of a different sort. It is essential to the rule of law
that the Court take seriously its own prior decisions, including its stated
reasons for reaching those decisions. Similar concerns demand that the Court
seek to make the law as coherent as possible. It is in part because of my belief
in the importance of coherence in law for the rule of law that I have taken
seriously the Court's decisions in both Seminole Tribe and McKesson and have
striven to retain as much of both as would be possible without altering too
much settled precedent. And it is because of the importance to the rule of law
of respect for precedent and of doctrinal coherence that I find ironic, to say the
least, the rule-of-law-based calls for drastic doctrinal changes in this area. 495
Over a century ago, the Court, in Hans and Poindexter, opted for officer
liability as the means to give efficacy to the federal obligations of the states,
a decision that was consonant with evidence of what the Framers intended.
With one short-lived exception, the Court has adhered to that choice ever
since. Respect for precedent and for coherence and continuity in the law
should impel us to direct our energies to perfecting the officer-liability regime
rather than to switch now to a government liability regime.
Finally, the rule of law is but a means to other ends. Among the reasons
we value the rule of law is that it enables us to make decisions about how to
493. See generally ORTH, supra note 42.
494. If so, the Eleventh Amendment, as interpreted in Hans, might be regarded as one of what
Alexander Bickel has called "the passive virtues." See ALExANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962).
495. To the extent Hans had been read as a constitutional holding and relied on in the period before
Union Gas, these two rule-of-law values pulled in somewhat different directions for the Seminole Tribe
Coun. The Coun resolved the tension by treating the Union Gas precedent as vulnerable from the stan
because of the lack of a rationale for the judgment commanding a majority of the Coun. After the Seminole
Tribe decision, however, both of these rule-of-law values cut decidedly against the calls by the dissenting
Justices for yet another doctrinal shift.
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live our lives with a certain measure of confidence in the consequences of
those decisions. 496 To that end, it is sometimes better that things be settled
than that they be settled "correctly." The frequent volatility of doctrine in the
area of state sovereign immunity at various points in our history has seriously
undermined that interest. For example, the Eleventh Amendment cases from
the 1890s involved the enforceability of state bonds. Persons who purchased
the bonds in the expectation that the courts would enforce them paid a
premium that they would not otherwise have paid. The States who prevailed
in Hans and related cases, in tum, enjoyed a corresponding windfall. Had the
law been clear from the start, of course, the buyers would have discounted the
unenforceable bonds and the states would have gotten only the amount that
such a risky investment would have been worth.
The state of Eleventh Amendment law in recent years has similarly been
in flux. As a consequence, an Indian Tribe that was authorized to sue the State
of Florida in federal court by a Congress that had been conceded that power
by the Supreme Court found itself thrown out of court. Had the law been
clearer, Congress could easily have achieved the desired result by authorizing
a suit against the Governor. Similarly, patent holders who have been given a
right to recover damages against the states find their entitlement in doubt. Had
Congress known, it could have pursued other means of protecting the public
interests served by granting these monopolies. I have suggested in this Article
that one of these other means, the foundations of which are firmly established
but the contours of which have been underexplored, is to make state officials
personally liable for infringements, in the hope and expectation that states will
regard it as better for all concerned to consent to bear the financial burden
themselves. While there may be doctrinal or historical arguments to be made
in favor of the diversity interpretation or the forum-allocation interpretation of
the Eleventh Amendment, it may in the interest of certainty and predictability
be preferable to abandon those projects and to begin to put in place the officer
liability rules, and indemnity or insurance arrangements, that will, I think, at
least approximate the rule-of-law benefits that many think can be attained only
by making the states themselves liable. If I am right about the potential
efficacy of an officer-liability regime at producing compliance with federal
law, then which of the competing interpretations of the Eleventh Amendment
the Court adopts matters less, from a rule-of-law perspective, than that the
Court clearly and definitively adopt one or the other. 497
496. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of Law" as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97
COLUM. L. REv. I, 7-8 (1997).
497. Cf Daniel A. Farber, The Coase Theorem and the Eleventh Amendment, 13 CONST.
COMMENTARY 141, 141 (1996) ("According to standard law and economics reasoning, the Eleventh
Amendment may well be irrelevant."). The Court's choice, however, will of course be of enormous
significance to Congress in designing an enforcement scheme, as well as to states and state officials, who
must respond to Congress's choice by putting in place the necessary indemnification or insurance
arrangements.

